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MINUTES 

OF A 

COURT MARTIAL 


HOLDEN ON BOARD HIS MAJESTY’S SHIP 

GLADIATOR, 

# 

IN PORTSMOUTH HARBOUR , 

On WEDNESDAY, the 26 th Day of JULY, 1809 , 

/ And continued by Adjournment 

Till Friday, the 4th Day of August following, 

ON THE TRIAL OF 

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE 

JAMES LORD GAM BIER : 

ADMIRAL OF THe'bLXJE , 

Commander in Chief of the Channel Fleet , Ac. &c. 


INCLUDING 

A COMPLETE COPY OF HIS LORDSHIP’S’DEFENCE, 

Taken from the Original: 

AND THE WHOLE OF THE EVIDENCE AND 
OCCASIONAL DISCUSSION. 


TAKEN IN SHORT-HAND BY 

MR. W. B. GURNEY. 


PORTSMOUTH : 

PRINTED BY MOTTLEY, HARRISON, AND MILLER; 

SOLD BY LONGMAN, HURST, REES, AND ORME, PATERNOSTER- 
ROW, LONDON; AND CONGDON, PLYMOUTH DOCK, 




1809. 

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ADVERTISEMENT. 


In order that the public may be in possession 
of every particular relating to this important 

Trial, so materially involving the interests and 

\ 

character of the British Navy, the Cor¬ 
respondence, which laid the foundation of it, 
is published as an introduction to the Minutes, 


(copy.) 

Sir, London , 30 th May, 180.9- 

Ha ving, in my letter to you of the 10th instant, detailed 
the whole of the proceedings of the fleet under my command 

4 

in the attack on the enemy in the road of Aix; I had flattered 

> 

myself that I should have received some signification of an ap¬ 
probation of my conduct, and have had the gratifying task of 
conveying to the officers and men under my command the 
estimation in which the gallantry and discipline displayed by 
them upon that occasion were held by his Majesty and their 
Country. 

Understanding, however, that there are some doubts whether 
the fleet is to be so honoured, and feeling that even a doubt 
upon such a subject cannot be entertained consistently with my 
reputation as Commander in Chief, I request that you will be 
pleased to move the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to 

direct a Court Martial to be assembled as early as possible, for 

n n 

■< 














iv 

the purpose of enquiring into my conduct as C ommander in 
Chief, and all the transactions relating to the fleet under my 
command, from the 17 th March last, when the Caledonia 
anchored in Basques Road, to the time of her quitting tnat 
anchorage for England on the 29 th ultimo. 

I have the honour to be, &c. 

(Signed) GAMBIER, 
The Hon. W. W. Pole , Sfc. Sfc. S>-c. 

pMtMMPMMwnaai 

- v , y ■ , ^ X 

. ' . r . . . . 1 v V ’ 

My Lord, Admiralty Ojjice , 4 th June , I 8 O 9 . 

Having laid before my Lords Commissioners of the Ad¬ 
miralty your Lordship’s letter of the 30 th ultimo, requesting, 
for the reasons therein mentioned, that their Lordships would 
direct a Court Martial to be assembled as early as possible, 
for the purpose of enquiring into your conduct as Commander 
in Chief, and all the transactions relating to the fleet under 
- your command, from the 17 th of March last, when the “Ca¬ 
ledonia” anchored in Basque Roads, to the time of her quit¬ 
ting that anchorage for England on the 29th ultimo ; I am 
commanded by their Lordships to acquaint you that a Court 
Martial will, accordingly, be ordered agreeably to your desire, 
and that an early opportunity will be taken of furnishing your 
Lordship with a copy of the charge. 

I have the honour to be, 

My Lord, 

Your Lordship’s most obedient 

Humble servant, 

* 

W. W. POLE. 

Admiral Lord Gam bier , fyc. fyc. fyc. 


My Lord, Admiralty Office^ 5*k June , I8O9. 

I have received the commands of my Lords Commission¬ 
ers of the Admiralty, to acquaint you, that it is their Lordships’ 
intention to order the Court-Martial for your Lordship’s Trial, 
to assemble at Portsmouth, on Monday the 19th instant, unless 







V 


you should inform me, in answer to this notice, that you can¬ 
not be prepared by that time. 

I am, at the same time, commanded to transmit a Copy of 
the Charge preferred against your Lordship. 

I have the honor to be. 

My Lord, 

Your Lordship’s most obedient 

Humble servant, 

' i 1 * if- / 

Admiral Lord Gambler. W. W. POLE, 


Sir, London , 6th June , I8O9. 

I have this day received your letter of the 5th instant, 
acquainting me, that it is the intention of the Lords Commis¬ 
sioners of the Admiralty, to order the Court-Martial for my 
Trial to assemble at Portsmouth, on Monday the 19th instant, 
unless I should now inform you that I cannot be prepared by 
that time ; and transmitting a Copy of the Charge preferred 
against me. 

In return thereto, I beg leave to enclose a list, containing the 
names of the flag officer, and captains commanding ships em¬ 
ployed, under my command, in Basques Roads, on the 12th 
April, leaving it to their Lordships to order all, or any part of 
them, indiscriminately, to attend to give evidence : at the same 
time I must remark, that as the Rear Admiral Stopford, with 
the Caesar, Valiant, Revenge, and Theseus, and all the frigates, 
were in Aix Roads on the day stated, it may be in the power 
of those officers to say more upon the subject of the charge 
contained in their Lordships’ order, than the rest. 

I have also to state to their Lordships, that most of the officers 
named in the enclosed list, were employed in Basques Roads, 
between the 17th March and 29th April, and can give any 
information to the Court which it may think necessary, on the 
enquiry directed by the said order. 

I shall be ready to meet the Court on the 19th instant, if 
their Lordships shall be of opinion they can select, from the 
enclosed list, a number sufficient to give evidence upon the 


occasion. 




VI 



I have to request you will furnish me with copies of the 
letters to and from Lord Cochrane, referred to in the charge ; 
and also of the log-books, and minutes of signals, therein-* 
mentioned. 

I have honour to be. 

Sir, 

Your most obedient 

i . • , P . Kh • 

humble servant, 

(Signed) GAMB1ER. 
The Hon. W. W. Pole , Sfc. fyc. Sfc. 


Names of Flag Officer, and Captains commandin 
Ships employed in Basques Road 


1809 . 

Rear Admiral Stopford. 

Sir Harry Neale, Bart. 

Captain Jn. Newman, 
Bedford, 
Malcolm, 
Burlton, 
Beresford, 
Ball, 

Bligii, 
Broughton, 
Douglas, 
Richardson, 
Kerr, 

Captain Rodd, 

Hard ym an, 
Wolfe, 
Maitland, 

Sey M OUR, 

London , 6th June. 


cr 

on the 12th April , 


Captain of the Fleet, 
of the Hero. 

Caledonia. 
Donegal. 
Resolution. 
Theseus. 
Gibraltar. 
Valiant. 

Ill ustrious. 
Bellona. 
Caesar. 
Revenge. 

Indefatigable. 
Unicorn. 
Aigle. 
Emerald. 
Pallas. 

(Signed) GAMBIER. 




1 




<* 

My Lord, Admiralty Office , 7th June , I8O3. 

I have received,and laid before my Lords Commissioners 
o( the Admiralty, your Lordship’s letter of yesterday’s date, 
inclosing a list of the flag oflicer, and captains, commanding 
ships employed under your command, in Barque Roads, on the 
l'wih Apnl last; and 1 ana commanded by their Lordships to 
acquaint you, that all the officers named in the said List will be 
summoned to give evidence at the Court-Martial to be assem¬ 


bled for your trial, except Captain Maitland, of the Emerald, 
who, being on the Irish station, will not be ordered to attend, 
unless your Lordship thinks it necessary. 

i heir Lordships will cause due notice to be given to you, 
when the trial will take place. 

I am further commanded to send your Lordship copies of 
the letters to and from Lord Cochrane, referred to in the 
charge ; also of the log-books, and minutes of signals therein- 
mentioned, agreeably to your request. 

I have the honour to be. 

My Lord, 

Your Lordship’s most obedient 

Humble servant, 


Admiral Lord Gambler . W. W. POLE. 


Bomb, iEtna. 
Beagle. 
Growler. 
Caledonia. 


List of other Officers summoned for the Trial . 

The Right Honble. Lord Cochrane, Imperieuse. 
Capt. Godfrey, 

Capt. Newcombe, 

Lieut. Crossman, 

Lieut. Hoc kings, 

Mr. Fairfax, Master of the Fleet, 

Master of the Caledonia. 

Master of the Ciesar. 

Master of the Imperieuse. 

Master’s Mate of the Beagle. 
Mr.SpARSHOTT, Assistant Signal Oflicer of theCaledonia. 
Two French Pilots, Caledonia. 

James Wilkinson, Esq, Secretary to the Com¬ 
mander in Chief. 


Mr. Stokes, 
Mr. Raven, 
Air. Spurring, 
Mr. 




* • * 

via 

My Lord, Admiralty Office , 1 7 tk July, 1809. 

I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Ad- 
miralty to acquaint your Lordship, that directions have been 
given for assembling the Court-martial for your trial, at Ports¬ 
mouth, on Monday, the 24 th instant. 

I have the honour to be. 

My Lord, 

Your most obedient humble servant, 

JAMES BARROW. 

Admiral Lord Gambler, 


Admiralty Office , 20 th July , 1809. 

Siii ? 

My Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, think¬ 
ing it fit that you should assist the Judge Advocate of 
Ilis Majesty’s fleet, or his Deputy, in selecting and pre¬ 
paring the evidence that it may be proper to bring for¬ 
ward on the part of the prosecution, at the Court Martial 
ordered to be held the 24th instant, upon Admiral Lord 
Gambier; I have it in command from their Lordships 
to signify their direction to you to proceed to Ports¬ 
mouth, as soon as may be necessary, for the purpose 
above mentioned. 

I am, Sir, 


Your very humble servant. 


Mr, Bichnell. 


(Signed) JOHN BARROW. 



/ 


\ 


* 

.• 


I 






COURT MARTIAL. 


FIRST DAY. 




"PROCEEDINGS of a Court Martial, 
assembled on board his Majesty’s Ship 
Gladiator, in Portsmouth Harbour, which 


commenced on the 26th day of July, 1809. 

♦ ■ .. ; - 

PRESENT, 

Sir ROGER CURTIS, Bart. Admiral of the White, and Com- 

# , # j • 

mander in Chief of His Majesty’s Ships and Vessels at Spit- 
head, and in Portsmouth Harbour, President, 

Wm. Young, Esq. Admiral of Sir J. T. Duckworth, K.B. 
the Blue. Vice Admiral of the Red. 

Sir H. E. Stanhope, Bart. Billy Douglas, Esq. Vice 
Vice Admiral of the White. Admiral of the White. 


G. Campbell, Esq. Vice Ad- John Sutton, Esq. Rear Ad¬ 
miral of the Blue. miral of the Red. 

Captain John Irwin. Captain Robert Hall. 

--E. S. Dickson. -- — R. D. Dunn. 

MOSES GREETIIAM, Jun. Esq. Judge Advocate. 


The Court opened about eleven o’clock, and the 
Right Hon. Admiral Lord Gambier was brought in, 
attended by John Crickitt, Esq. Marshal of the Admi¬ 
ralty, and audience admitted. 

# o 







9 


The Order to Sir Roger Curtis, Bart from the 
Admiralty was then read, which was as follows:— 

(COPY.) 

By the Comjnissloners for executing the Office of Lord High 
Admiral of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ire¬ 
land, Sfc. 

Whereas Admiral the Right Hon. Lord Gambier has, by his 
letter to our Secretary, of the 30 th of May, 1809, requested, 
that his conduct, as Commander in Chief of the Channel Fleet 
employed in Basque Roads, between the 17 th day of March and 
the 29th day of April, 1809, may be enquired into by a Court 
Martial: 

And whereas, by the Log-books and Minutes of Signals of the 
Caledonia, Imperieuse, and otherships employed on that service, 
it appears to us, that the said Admiral Lord Gambier, on the 
12th day of the said month of April, the enemy’s ships being then 
on shore, and the signal having been made that they could be 
destroyed, did, fora considerable time, neglect or delay taking 
-effectual measures for destroying them: We, therefore, in com¬ 
pliance with his Lordship’s request, and in consequence of what 
Appears in the said Log-books and Minutes of Signals, think fit 
that a Court Martial shall be assembled for the purpose of exa¬ 
mining into his Lordship’s conduct, and trying him for the same: 
We send you herewith his Lordship’s said letter, and also his 
letter of the 10th of the said month therein referred to, together 
with an attested copy of a letter of our Secretary, dated the 29th 
of last month, and addressed to Lord Cochrane, and his Lord¬ 
ship’s reply thereto; with the Log-books and Minutes of Signals 
above-mentioned: and we do hereby require and direct you to 
assemble a Court Martial on Monday the 19th day of this month 
(if the witnesses shall be then ready, and if not then ready, as 
soon after as they shall be so) to try the said Admiral, the Right 
Hon. Lord Gambier, for his conduct in the instance herein-before 
mentioned; and also to inquire into his whole conduct as Com¬ 
mander in Chief of the Channel F leet employed in Basque Roads, 
between the 17 th day of March and the 29th day of April, 1809, 
and to try him for the same accordingly.—Given under our hands 
the 5 th day of June, 1 S 09 . 

(Signed) MULGRAVE. 

R. BICKERTON. 

Wm. DOMETT. 

R. MOORSOM. 

To Sir Rocer Curtis, Bart. Admiral 
of the W bite, and Commander in 
Chief of his Majesty’s Ships and Ves- 
' sels at Spithead, and in Portsmouth 
Harbour. 

. By Command of their Lordships, 

W. W. POLE. 


4 


Copy of a letter from Lord Gambier to the Hon. W. W. Pole, 

dated March 26, 1809. 


(SECRET) 

Sir, 


Caledonia , in Basque Roads t 
26 th March , 1809. 


I HAVE this day received, by the Encounter gun-brig, your 
most secret letter of the 19th inst. accompanied by a paper 
drawn by Sir Kichard Keats, with his opinion of the mode of 
attack upon an enemy’s squadron moored under the Isle of Aix $ 
and signifying the directions of the Lords Commissioners of the 
Admiralty to me, to take into my consideration the possibility 
of making an attack upon the enemy’s fleet, either conjointly 
with the line-of-battle ships under ray command, and the fri¬ 
gates, small craft, &c. or separately therewith. You will be 
pleased to acquaint their Lordships, that I shall apply all the 
powers and energy of my mmd to carry into effect their direc¬ 
tions as far as possible, when the means with which their Lord- 
ships have ordered me to be furnished arrive at this anchorage. 
1 will not at present detain the Encounter in her return to Ply¬ 
mouth, but will dispatch another vessel to-morrow, and will 
furnish you with a statement of the enemy’s force, position, and 
circumstances for their Lordships’ information. Their ships cer¬ 
tainly lie exposed to an attack upon them with fire-vessels with 
a hope of success. 

I have tbe honour to be, &c. &c. 

To the Hon. W. W. Pole. GAMBIER. 


Copy of a Letter from Lord Gambikr to the Hon. W. W. Pole, 

dated March 26, 1809. 

(SECRET.) 

Caledonia , in Basque Roads , 
Sir, March 26, 1809. 

IN obedience to their Lordships’ directions to me, contained in. 
your letter of the 19th instant, 

1 beg leave to state to them, that it is advisable I should be 
furnished with six gun-brigs, in addition to those that I may be 
able to collect of snch as are under my command; at present 
there are only two at this anchorage. I shall, however, order 
the Insolent and Contest to join me from Quiberon Bay, and I 
should hope the Martial and Fervent will return shortly from 
Plymouth. 

It is proper I should state, for their Lordships’ information, 
the position in which the French fleet is at present anchored* 
near the Isle of Aix, that their Lordships may be able to form 
a judgment of the success that may be expected to attend an. 
attack upon the enemy’s fleet, in either of the modes directed 
by their Lordships, in your letter above-mentioned. The ene¬ 
my’s ships are anchored in two liues, very near to each other* 
in a direction due south from the fort on the Isle of Aix, and 
the ships in each line not further apart than their own length 5 
by which it appears, as I imagined, that the space for their 
jmchorage is so confined by the shoalness of the w?*er a* no?; 

3? 



4 


to admit of ships to run in and anchor clear of each other; the 
most distant slops of their two lines are within point blank shot 
of |he works upon the Isle of Aix ; such ships, therefore, as 
might attack the enemy would he exposed to be raked by the 
lmt shot, &c. from the island ; and should the ships he disabled 
in their masts, they must remain within the range of the ene¬ 
my’s fire until they are destroyed, there not being sufficient 
depth of water to allow them to move to the southward out of 
distance. 

The enemy have taken their position apparently with the view 
not only to be protected by the strong works upon the Isle of 
Aix, hut also to have the entrance to the Charente open to them, 
that in case of being attacked by fire-ships, and other engines of 
the kind,,they can run up the river beyond the reach of them. 
The tide and wind that arc favourable to convey this kind of 
annoyance to the enemy, serve equally to carry them up the 
river. 

With respect to the attempt that may be made to destroy the 
enemy’s ships with shells, &c. I am not competent to give an 
opinion, until it is ascertained whether the bombs can be placed 
■within the reach of their mortars to the enemy’s ships, without 
being exposed to the fire from the Isle of Aix. 

I beg leave to add, that if their Lordships are of opinion that 
an attack of the enemy’s ships by those of the fleet under my 
command is practicable, I am ready to obey any orders they 
may be pleased to honour me with, however great the risk may 
be of the loss of men and ships. 

I have the honour to be, &c. 

To the Hon. W. W. Pole. GAM BIER. 


Copy of a Letter from the Right Honourable Lord Gambier, 
dated April 14, 1809, to the Honourable W. W. Pole. 

j Caledonia, at anchor in Basque Roads , 

Sin, * April 14, 1809. 

THE Almighty’s favour to his Majesty arid the nation has been 
strongly marked in the success he has been pleased to give to the 
operations of his Majesty’s fleet under my command ; and I 
have the satisfaction to acquaint you, for the information of the 
Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, that the four ships of the 
enemy, named in the margin,* have been destroyed at their 
anchorage, and several others, from getting on shore, if not 
rendered altogether unserviceable, are at least disabled for a 
considerable time. 

The arrangement of the fire-vessels, placed under the direction 
of l aptain the Right Honourable Lord Cochrane, was made as 
fully as the state of the weather would admit, according to 
his Lordship’s plan, on the evening of the 11th instant; and at 
eight o clock on the same night they proceeded to the attack 
under a a favourable strong wind from the northward, and flood 
# 

* Ville de Varsovie , of 80 guns ; Tonne re, of 74 guns ; A quit on, of 
74 guns i and Calcutta, of 56 guns. 



5 


tide (preceded by some vessels filled with powder and shells, as 
proposed by his Lordship, with a view to explosion), and led on 
in the most undaunted and determined manner hy Capf. Woold¬ 
ridge, in the Mediator fire-ship, the others following in succes¬ 
sion ; but owing to the darkness of the night, several mistook 
their course, and failed. 

On their approach to the enemy’s ships, it was discovered, that 
a boom was placed in front of their line for a defence. This, 
however, the weight of the Mediator soon broke, and the 
usual intrepidity and bravery of British seamen overcame all 
difficulties, advancing under a heavy fire from the forts in the 
Isle of Aix, as well as from the enemy's ships, most of which 
cut or slipt their cables, and from the confined anchorage got 
on shore, and thus avoided taking fire. 

At daylight, the following morning. Lord Cochrane communi¬ 
cated to me, by telegraph, that seven of the c emy’s shins were 
on shore, and might be destroyed. I immediately made the sig¬ 
nal for the fleet to unmoor and weigh, intending to proceed with 
it to effect their destruction. The wind, however, being fresh 
from the northward, and the flood-tide running, rendered it too 
hazardous to run into Aix Roads (from its shallow water), I 
therefore anchored again at the distance of about three miles 
from the forts on the island. 

As the tide suited, the enemy evinced great activity in endea¬ 
vouring to warp their ships (which had grounded) into deep 
water, and succeeded in getting all but five of the line towards 
the entrance of the Charente before it became practicable to 
attack them. 

I gave orders to Capt. Bligh, of the Valiant, to proceed with 
that ship, the Revenge, frigates, bomb , and small vessels, 
named in the margin t to anchor near the Boyart-shoa), in 
readiness for the attack. At 20 minutes past two l\M. Lord 
Cochrane advanced in the Itnpeneuse, with his accustomed gal¬ 
lantry and spirit, and opened a well-directed fire upon the Cal¬ 
cutta, which struck her colours to the Imperieuse; tlie ships 
and vessels above-mentioned soon after joined in the attack upon 
the Vihe de Varsovie and Aqiiilon, and obliged them, before 
five o’clock, after sustaining a heavy cannonade, to strike their 
colours, when they were taken possession of hy the boats of the 
advanced squadron Assoonasthe prisoners were emoved they 
were set on fire, as was also the Tounere, a short time after by 
the enemy. 

1 afterwards detached Rear-Admiral the Hon. Robert Stopford, 
iu the Caesar, with the Theseus, three additional fire-ships 
(which were hastily prepared iu the course of the day), and all 
the boats of the fleet, with Mr. Congreve’s rockets, to conduct 
the farther operations of the night against any of the ships which 
lay exposed to an attack. On the morning of the 13th, the 
Rear-Admiral reported to me, that as the Caesar and other line- 
of-battle ships had grounded, and were in a dangerous situation, 

• fl 

+ Indefatigable, Unicorn, Aigle, Emerald, Pallas, Beagle, Etna 
Bomb, Insolent gun-brig, Conflict, Encounter, Fervent, and Growler. 


6 


he tbought.it advisable to order them all out, particularly as the 
remaining part of the service could be performed by frigates ami 
small vessels only ; and I was happy to find that they were ex¬ 
tricated from their perilous situation. 

Captain Bligh has since informed me, that it was found im¬ 
practicable to destroy the three-decked ship, and the others, 
iwhich were lying near the entrance of the Charente, as the 
former, being the outer one, was protected by three lines of 
beats placed in advance from her. 

This ship and all the others, except four of the line and a fri¬ 
gate, have now moved up the Charente. If any further attempt 
to destroy them is practicable, I shall not fail to use every means 
in my power to accomplish it. 

1 have great satisfaction in stating to their Lordships how 
much I feel obliged to the zealous co-operation of Rear-Admiral 
Stopford, under whose arrangement the boats of lhe fleet were 
placed ; and 1 must also express to their Lordships the high sense 
I have of the assistance I received from the abilities and mire- 
xfutted attention of Sir Harry Neale, Bart, the Captain of the 
Fleet, as well as of the animated exertions of the captains, offi¬ 
cers, seamen, and marines under my command, and their for¬ 
wardness to volunteer upon any service that might he allotted to 
them; particularly the zeal and activity shewn by the captains 
<of iine-of-baltie-si'.ips in preparing the fire vessels. 

1 cannot speak in sufficient terms of admiration and applause 
of the vigorous and gallant attack made by Lord Cochrane 
upon the French Jine-ofrbattle ships which were on shore, as 
well as of hisjudicious manner of approaching them, and placing 
bis ship in a position most advantageous to annoy the enemy,, 
amd preserve his own ship ; which could not he exceeded by any 
feat of valour hitherto achieved by the British navy. 

It is due to Rear-Admiral Stopford and Sir Harry Neale, that I 
should here take the opportunity of acquainting their Lordships 
of the handsome and earnest manner in which both these meri¬ 
torious- Officers had volunteered their services before the ar¬ 
m's! of Lord Cochrane to undertake an attack upon the enemy 
with fire-ships; and that, had not their Lordships fixed upon 
biro to conduct the enterprize, I have full confidence that the 
result of their efforts would have been highly creditable to 
them. 

Not having had it in my power, as yet, to ascertain the 
conduct of the Officers commanding Ihe fire-ships, except that of 
the Media I or, I am under (he necessity of deferring to state how 
far they fulfilled (heir duty on this hazardous service in which 

they were engaged. 

I should feel that I did not do justice to the services of Capt. 
Godfrey, of the Etna, in bombarding the enemy’s ships ou the 
12th, and nearly all the day of the 13th, if 1 did not recommend 
bhft to their Lordships’ notice ; and 1 cannot omit hearing due 
•testimony to Ihe anxious desire expressed by Mr. Congreve to be 
employed wherever I might conceive his services in the manage- 
JOieni of his rockets would be useful ; some of them were placed 
in the fire-ships with effect, and I have every reason to be satis- 


7 


lied with the artillerymen and others who had the management of 
them, under Mr. Congreve’s direction. 

I send herewith a return of the killed, wounded, and missing; 
of the fleet, which, I am happy to observe, is comparatively 
small. I have not yet received the returns of the number 
of prisoners taken, but I conceive they amount *o between 4 
and 500. I have charged Sir Harry Neale with this dispatch 'by 
the Impeiicuse), and I beg leave to' refer their Lordships to hiss*, 
as also to Lord Cochrane, for any further particulars of whVrh 
they may wish to be informed. I have the honour to he, &c. 

(Signed) GAM BIER. 

April 15.—P.S. This morning three of the enemy’s iine-of- 
battle-ships are observed to be still on shore under Fouras, and! 
one of them is in a dangerous situation. One of these frigate® 
f L’Ind ienne) also on shore, has fallen over, and they are now 
dismantling her. As the tides will be off in a day or two, there 
is every probability that she will he destroyed. 

Since writing the foregoing, I have learnt that the Hon. Lieut.- 
Colonel Cochrane ^Lord Cochrane's brother) and Lieut. Bissef, 
of the navy, were volunteers in the Imperieuse, and rendered, 
themselves extremely useful, the former by commanding soiae 
of her guns on the main-deck, and the latter in conduct mg owe 
of the explosion-vessels. 

(COPY.) 

Copy of a Letter from Lord Gambier to Ihe Hon . W. W. Pole, 

dated 

Sir, London, 10 IhMay, 1809, 

I HAVE received your letter of the 2d inst. acknowledging the 
receipt of the list, containing the names of the officers and mere 
employed in the fire-ships and explosion vessels on the night os 
the llth ult. with ray observations on the result of ray enquiry 
respecting their conduct on that occasion j and signifying that 
you are commanded by their Lordships to acquaint me, that, in 
in order to have before them, full and complete information of 
the proceedings of the several ships employed by me, on live va¬ 
rious branches of the very important operations carried om 
against the enemy’s fleet in Aix Road, it is their Lordships'* di¬ 
rection, that I should call upon Rear-Admiral Stopford, Captain 
Bligh, Captain Lord Cochrane, and any other officer I may 
have entrusted with any part of that service, to report to me 
their proceedings, together with such observations and remarks 
as they may have made whilst they were executing my orders 
against the enemy ; and that I should transmit the same to their 
Lordships, wiih any observations i may think proper to make 
thereon. 

You will be pleased to acquaint their Lordships, that I have 
written to those officers to make reports to me accordingly, and 
thall lose no time in transmitting them to you as soon as they 
are obtained, but some time must elapse before they can reach 
me. 

From communications I have since had with their Lordships, 
I am led to understand, that a more full and detailed account 



3 


than I have transmitted, of the proceedings of the fleet under 
mv command, during the whole of its operations in Basque 
Roads, would he desirable; I shall, therefore, in making such 
a statement, endeavour to omit no incident that may he in any 
degree connected with those operations, or serve to elucidate 
the various movements arid proceedings of the fleet, persuaded, 
that doing so, cannot fail to promote the satisfaction which, in 
common, with the Officers and men under tn v command, 1 feel 
upon that occasion, and on the success which has resulted 
from it. 

Their Lordships are aware, that soon after I had taken the an¬ 
chorage of Basque Roads, 1 stated to them the strong position 
of the enemy’s fleet inAix Roads; that their ships were moored 
in two compact lines, and the most distant ship of each line 
within point blank range of the batteries of Isle d’Aix, explain¬ 
ing, at the same time, that they were under the necessity of 
mooring in such close order, not for the purpose of opposing a 
more formidable front, but to avoid the shoals close around 
the anchorage; and their Lordships will also remember, that I 
then pointed out the impracticability of destro.ing them by an 
attack with the ships of the line, in the position they occupied; 
hut that [ conceived them to be assailable by fireships; having 
previously suggested to Lord IMulgrave the expediency of 
sending out 20 or 30 vessels for that purpose. 

This suggestion was anticipated by their Lordships, and they 
were pleased to order 12 sail of fire-ships to join me, and to 
direct me to fit out eight others on the spot. Upon the arrival 
of Capt. Lord Cochrane, whom their Lordships had ordered me 
to employ in conducting the execution of the service to be per¬ 
formed by the fire-ships, I was induced, at his suggestion, to 
add the Mediator to the number. 

These preparations were completed on the 11th ultimo at 
night, and having previously called on hoard the Caledonia the 
Commanders and Lieutenants who had volunteered their ser¬ 
vices, and who had been appointed by me to command fire- 
vessels, I furnished them with full instructions for their pro¬ 
ceedings in the attack, according to Lord Cochrane’s plan, and 
arranged the disposition of the frigates and small vessels to co- 
opetatein the following manner. 

The Unicorn, Aigle, and Pallas, I directed to take a station' 
near the Boyart shoal, for t he purpose of receiving the crews of 
the fire-ships on their return from the enterprise, to support the 
boats of the fleet which were to accompany the fire-ships, and 
to give assistance to the Imperieuse, which ship was still further 
advanced. 'Che Whiling schooner, King George, and Nimrod 
cutters, were fitted for throwing rockets, and directed to take 
a station near the same shoal for that purpose. 

The Indefatigable, Foxhound, arid Etna bomb, were to take 
a station as near the fort on the Isle of Aix as possible ; the two 
former to protect the bomb vessel, whilst she threw shells info 
the fori. 

Tile Emerald, Dotterel, and Beagle,sloops, and Growler, Con¬ 
flict, and Insolent gun-brigs, were stationed to make a diversion 
at the east end'd' the Isle of A lit. 


9 


The Redpole and Lyra I directed to he anchored by the 
Master of the Fleet (one near the Isle of Aix, and the other 
near the Boyart), with lights hoisted, to guide the fire ships in 
their course to the attack ; and the boats of the fleet were 
ordered to assemble alongside the Caesar, to proceed to assist 
the fire ships, under the superintendance of Rear-Admiral 
Stopford. 

With these pre-concerted movements the fleet was at this 
time unmoored, in readiness to render any service that might 
be practicable; hut being anchored in a strong tide-way, with 
the wind fresh from the N.W. upon the weather tide making, 
it was again moored, to prevent the ships falling on board each 
other. 

At about half past eight P.M. the explosion-vessels and fire¬ 
ships proceeded to the attack ; at half past nine the first explo¬ 
sion-vessel blew up, and at ten most of the fire-ships were ob¬ 
served to be on tire; the enemy’s forts and ships firing upon, 
them. Many of the fire-ships were seen to drive through their 
fleet, and beyond the Isle of Aix. 

Shortly after day-light. Lord Cochrane, who, in the Impe- 
rieuse, lay about three miles from the enemy, made the signal 
to me by telegraph, that seven of the enemy’s ships were on 
?hore, and that half the fleet could destroy them. It was visi¬ 
ble from the Caledonia what ships were aground, and that two 
or three had made their escape up the Charente. I immediately 
orde.ed the fleet to be unmoored, and at half past nine weighed 
and run up nearer to the lsie of Aix, with the view, when the 
time of tide should render it advisable, that some of the line-of- 
battle ships might proceed to attack the enemy’s ships on 
shore; but the wind blowing fresh from the N.N.W. with a 
flood tide, l judged it unadvisable to risk any of them at 
that time in so perilous a situation. The fleet was therefore 
anchored. I made the signal for each ship to prepare, with spare 
or sheet cables oui of the stern ports, and springs on them, to 
be in readiness for any of them to go in that I might judge ne¬ 
cessary ; in the meanwhile I ordered three additional fire-ships 
to be prepared. 

Observing the Imperieuse to advance, and the time of flood 
nearly done running, the Indefatigable, Unicorn, Ai^le, Emerald, 
Pallas, Beagle, Etna, and gun-brigs, were ordered, by signal, in to 
the attack” at 2.20 P.M. the former opened her fire upon the 
enemy’s ships aground, and the others as soon after as they 
arrived up. I then ordered in the Valiant and Revenge to sup¬ 
port them, and they soon joined in the action. 

The enemy’s ship Calcutta struck her colours at 4.10 P.M. 
and the Ville deVarsovie, and Aquilon, in about an hour after¬ 
wards; all three were taken possession of by the boats of the 
advanced squadron, and set on tire as soon as the prisoners were 
removed : a short time after Le Tounere was set on fire by the 
enemy. 

Perceiving, towards the close of day, that there were some of 
the enemy’s grounded ships lying further up towards the Cha¬ 
rente, which appeared to be exposed to further attack, 1 seut 

e 


10 


in the three additional fire-ships, arid all the boats of the flee?, 
will) Mr. Congreve’s rockets, accompanied by the Caesar and 
Theseus, under the direction of Rear-Admiral Stopford, with 
discretional orders, for his acting as he should think fit, and 
according as circumstances should render it expedient. 

On the following day (the 13th) the Rear-Admiral, perceiving 
that nothing further could be effected by the line-of-battfe ships, 
which had grounded, as had also some of the frigates, and 
how imminent the danger was in which they lay, and being 
satisfied that the remaining part of the service could be per¬ 
formed only by frigates and smaller vessels, he most wisely 
took advantage of a providential shift of wind, and returned 
■with the line-of-battle ships to Basque Road. Captain Bligh, 
on his return, reported to me, that it was found impracticable 
to destn y the enemy’s three-decked ship, and others, which 
were lying at the entrance of the Charunte, as the former (which 
was the outer one) was protected by three lines of boats placed 
in advance from her. 

During the remainder of the 13th, the Elna was employed in 
throwing shells, the Whiling schooner in firing rockets, and the 
other small vessels in firing upon the enemy’s ships on shore, 
when the tide permitted. 

On the 14th, at day-light, 1 observed three or four of the 
enemy’s ships still apparently aground at the mouth of the river. 

1 ordered Captain Wolfe, of the Aigle, to relieve Lord Cochrane 
in the Imperieuse, in command of the small vessels advanced, 
and to use his utmost endeavours lo destroy any of the enemy’s 
ships which were assailable. At 2.50 the Etna bomb, and small 
vessels in shore, began their fire upon the enemy’s ships at the 
entrance of the Charente, and continued lo do so during the 
remainder of the day. 

On the 15th, in the morning (the day on which I dispatched 
Sir H. Neale to their Lordships, in the Imperieuse), three of the 
enemy’s liue-of-batlle-ships were observed to be still aground 
under Fouras, and one of them in a dangerous situation ; one 
of their frigates (L’lndienne), also onshore, had fallen over, 
and the enemy were dismantling her. 

It blew very strong from the westward the whole of the 15th 
and 16th, so that no attempt could be made to annoy and harrass 
the enemy ; on the latter day their frigate, which was on shore, 
was discovered to be on fire, and blew up soon after. 

All tbe remainder of the enemy’s ships got up the river by the 
nth, except one (a two-decker), which remained aground under 
Die Town of Fouras; in the afternoon of this day it was ob¬ 
served, that another of the enemy’s frigates had got on shore up 
the river and was wrecked, which was afterwards confirmed by 
the Master of a neutral vessel from Rochelle. 

On tlm 19th it blew too violent for any of the small vessels to 
act against the enemy; but, on Hie 20th, the Thunder bomb 
having arrived, and the Weather having become more moderate, 

1 sent tier to assist the Etna, in bombarding the enemy’s ship, 
on shore near Fouras. The Etna had split her 13-inch 
mortar on the 15th, consequently had only her 10-inch effective % 


II 

and the Thunder’s 13-inch was also rendered unserviceable, thig 
day, from the same cause. 

The following day I went in my boat into the road, on board 
the Aigle and Pallas, to reconnoitre the enemy’s ship above- 
mentioned, and ascertain what further operations could be car¬ 
ried on for her destruction: that evening, and the succeeding 
days, the wind was too violent and unfavourable. 

On the 23d I gave directions to Captain Wolfe to put. two 
of the Aigle’s 18-pound long guns into each of the four gun- 
brigs, and use every means in his power to drive the enemy out 
of the ship near Fouras, and attempt to set her on lire: the 
whole of the 24th was employed in this attempt: the 10-inch 
mortars throwing their shells occasionally, but without success ; 
and, as Captain Wolfe reported to me, that this attack made 
very little impression upon the enemy, and that the ships and 
vessels which were advanced above the Boyart Shoal, in order to 
carry on these operations, were in a situation much exposed to 
attack from I he enemy’s gun-boats, &c. 1 considered any further 
attempt would be fruitless, and therefore withdrew them from 
their advanced position. 

The enemy’s ship continued aground near Fouras until the 
night of the 2Sth, when, having lightened her very consider¬ 
ably, and applied great exertion to get her alloat, the spring 
tides having set in, they succeeded in their attempt, and got her 
up the river. 

Their Lordships will perceive, from the foregoing statement, 
as well as from their own knowledge of the local situation of the 
scene of action, that I was obliged to have a second object in 
view: for besides the destruction of the enemy’s ships, the 
greatest care was required that his Majesty’s fleet should not be 
sacrificed : the state of the tides and wind were most materially 
to be attended to, and, without reference to the chart of the 
anchorage nothing can better exemplify the limited space and 
danger of the navigation, than the circumstance of one of the 
enemy’s line-of-battle ships having, on their fleet entering the 
roads in February last, run on shore on the shoal of the Palles, 
and being there totally wrecked. 

There are some circumstances mentioned in my letter of the 
14th ultimo, which I have not thought it necessary to repeat or 
enlarge upon. 

When it is considered with how little, or comparatively no loss, 
this most important service has been performed, their Lord- 
ships, l am persuaded, will agree with me, that there is great 
cause for rejoicing at Ihe result of the undertaking. 

1 have the honour to be, Sir, 

Your most obedient humble Servant, 

(Signed) GAMBIER. 

Copy of a Letter from the lion. W. W. Pole, to Captain the 
Right Hon. Lord Cochrane, dated 

My Lord, Admiralty-Office, 29th May, 1S09. 

LORD Mulgravc, having acquainted my Lords Commissioners 
©f the Admiralty, that he had communicated to you the intention 

c 2 




12 


of his Majesty’s Government to move the Thanks of both Houses 
of Parliament to the Commander-in-Chief, and the Officers* Sea¬ 
men, and Marines of the Fleet employed on the late service iu 
Basque Hoads; and that your Lordship had declared that you 
should feel it to be your duty to oppose any Vote of Approba¬ 
tion to Lord Gambier for his conduct on that occasion ; I am 
commanded by their Lordships to signify their directions, that 
you state fully to me, f- r their information, the grounds on 
which your Lordship objects to the Vote of Thanks being; 
moved to Lord Gambler, to the end that their Lordships may 
be enabled to judge how far your Lordship's objections may be 
of a nature to justify the suspension of the intended motion in. 
Parliament, or to call for any further investigation. 

I am. 

My Lord, 

Your Lordship’s very humble Servant, 

(Signed) W. W. POLE. 


Copy of a Letter from Capt. the Right Hon. Lord Cochrane 
to the lion W. W. Pole, dated 

Rortman Square , 30 th May , 1809. 

Sir, 

I HAVE to acknowledge the receipt of your letter.of yes¬ 
terday’s date, signifying the direction of the Lords Commis¬ 
sioners of the Admiralty to me, to state fully, for their in¬ 
formation, the grounds on which I object to the Vote of 
Thanks being moved to Lord Gambier, to the end that their 
Lordships may be enabled to judge how far ray objections may 
be of a nature to justify the suspension of the intended motion 
in Parliament. 

I have to request. Sir, that you will submit to their Lordships, 
that I shall at all times entertain a due sense of the honour they 
will confer by any directions they may be pleased to give me ; 
that in pursuing the object of those directions, my exertions 
will invariably go hand in hand with my duty ; and that to 
satisfy their Lordships’ minds in the present instance, on the 
point of information, regarding the late service in Basque Roads, 
I beg leave to state, that the log, and signal log-books, of the 
fleet there employed, at the period alluded to, contain the 
particulars of that service, and furnish premises whence accu¬ 
rate conclusions may be readily drawn; that as those books 
are authentic public documents, and as 1 must necessarily refer 
to them as to times and circumstances, any thing that 1 could 
offer upon the subject would, to their Lordships, be altogether 
superfluous, and appear presumptuous interruptions to their 
Lordship?’ judgment, which will, doubtless, always found 
itself upou those grounds only that cannot be disputed. 

I have the honour to be, Sir, 

Your obedient humble Servant, 

(Signed) COCHRANE. 

To the Hon. W. W. Pole, Secretary 
to the Admiralty. 



13 

Copy of a Letter from Lord Gambier to the Hon. W.Pole, dated 

Sir, London , 30 ih May , 1309. 

HAVING in my letter to you of the 10th instant detailed the 
tvhole of the proceedings of the iiect under my command in the 
attack on the enemy in the road of Aix, 

I had flattered myself that I should have received some signi¬ 
fication of an approbation of my conduct, and have had the 
gratifying task of conveying to the officers and men under uiy 
command, the estimation in which the gallantry and discipline 
displayed by them upon that occasion were held by his Majesty 
and their country. 

Understanding, however, that there are some doubts whether 
the fleet is to be so honoured, and feeling that even a doubt upon 
such a subject cannot be entertained consistently with my repu¬ 
tation as Commander-m-Chief* I request, that you will be pleased 
to move the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to direct 
a Court-Martial to be assembled as early as possible, for the 
purpose of enquiring into my conduct as Commander-in-Chief* 
and all the transactions relating to the fleet under my command, 
from the 17th March last, when the Caledonia, anchored in 
Basque Roads, to i he time of her quitting that anchorage for 
England, on the 29th ultimo. 

I have the honour to be, &c. 

(Signed) GAMB1ER. 


State of the Force of the Enemy , transmitted in Lord Gambieh’s 
second Letter to the Hon. W. W. Pole, of the 2ffi/i March , 
1809. 

Statement of the enemy’s force moored at Isle d’Aix, an¬ 
chorage in two lines very near to each other, in a direction due 
south from the Fort on Isle d’Aix; the ships in each line not 
further apart than their own length, and the most distant ships 
of the two lines within point blank shot of the works on that 
Island. 

One three-decker ----- Flag at the fore. 

Ten two-deckers (one a fifty-”1 One flag at the mizen, and 
gun ship, late Calcutta), J oue broad pendant. 

Four frigates. 

(Signed) GAMBIER* 

Caledonia, in Basque Roads, 

March 2G, 1809. 


Statement of the names of the enemy's ships in Aix Roads, pre¬ 
vious to the attack on the llth April, 1809 ; and of the killed 
and wounded in the action of the 12th of April, 1809. 

L’Oceau, 120 guns, Vice-Admiral Ailemande, Capt. Reland. 
Repaired in 1806 ; on shore under Fouras. 

Foudroyant, 80, Rear-Admiral Gourdon, Captain Henri. 
Five years old ; on shore under Fouras. 

Cassard, 74, Capt. Faure, Commodore. Three years old ; 
on shore under Fouras. 




14 


Tourville, 74, Capt. La Caille. Old; on shore in the river. 

It eg ulus, 74, Capt. Lucas Five years old; on shore under 
Madame. 

Patriote, 74, Capt. Mahce. Repaired in 1803. 

Jemappe, 7 4, Capt. Fan van. On shore under Madame. 
Tonnerre, 74, Capt. Clement de ia Koncicre. Nine months 
old : never at sea. 

Aquilon, 74, Capt. Maignon. Old. 

Vi lie de Varsovie, 80, Capt. Cuvillier, New; never at sea. 
Calcutta, 56, Capt. ia Tonie. Loaded with flour and mili¬ 
tary stores. 

FRIGATES. 


Indicnne, Capt. Proteau. On shore near Isle d'Enet, on her 
beam-ends. 

Elbe, Capt, Perrengier. 

Pallas, Capl. Le Bigot. 

Rorlense, Capt. Allgand. 

N.B. One of' the three last frigates on shore under Isle Ma¬ 
dame. 

Return of the killed, wounded, and missing:—Two officers, 
eight men, kiiied ; nine officers, 2S wounded ; one man missing. 
Total,—48. 


GAMBIER. 


Return of the names of Officers killed, wounded and missing . 

Caledonia, Mr. Fairfax, Master of the fleet; contusion of 
the hip. 

Caesar, W. Flintoft, Acting-Lieut. ; killed. 

Theseus, R. F. Jewers, Master’s-Mate ; severely wounded in 
the head and hands by powder in the fire-ship. 

Imperieuse, Mr. Gilbert, Surgeon’s Assistant ; wounded ; Mr, 
Marsden, Purser; ditto. 

Revenge, J. Garland, Lieut. ; severe contusion of the shoul¬ 
der and side. 

Mediator, J. Segess, Gunner ; killed. 

J. Wooldridge, Capt. ; very much burnt. 

N. B. Clements, Lieut. ; slightly burnt. 

J. Peari, Lieut. ; ditto. 

N.B. The last three blown ontof ihe Mediator after she was 
set on fire. 

Gibraltar, J. Conyers, Masler’s-Mate ; very badly scorched in 
the face and hands. 

GAMBIER. 

Received since the above was written. 


Etna, R. W. Charston. Midshipman, slightly wounded. 


Judge Advocate to the President —These, 
Sir, are all the letters which have been sent to 
you, either with the order, or since, by the 







Admiralty, Lord Gambier will have the 
goodness to deliver to the Court all the orders 
he received from the Admiralty w hile upon 
this service. Mr. Dyer, of the Admiralty, 
attends with one document (the letter of the 
26th of March, directing Lord Cochrane to 
be employed in conducting the fire-ships) I 
will read it from the original, and take the 
attested copy, as we cannot detach that from 
Admiral Harvey’s Court-Martial. 


Orders and Letters delivered in by Mr. 
Lavie, on the part of Lord Gambier : 

By the Commissioners for executing the mTice of High- 
Admiral of the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Ireland, &c. 

YOUR Lordship is hereby required and directed to put to 
sea without a moment’s loss of time, with the ships named in 
the margin,* together with any frigates, or small vessels, under 
your Lordship’s command, that may he ready for sea, at Ply¬ 
mouth, and proceed, without a moment’s delay, off Rochefort, 
in order to form a junction with the Ron. Rear-Admiral Stop- 
ford, commanding his Majesty’s squadron off that port. 

If the enemy’s squadron should have put to sea from P».ochefort, 
and the Rear-Admiral should have proceeded in pursuit of it, your 
Lordship is, in case you should not receive anv intelligence from 
him of his intended proceedings, to make the best of your way, 
in the first instance off Cape Finisterre, sending a frigate to look 
into Ferrol and Corunna, in order to ascertain whether the 
enemy’s squadron had entered either of those ports; and failing 
to gain information of the Rear-Admiral, or of the enemy, you 
are to proceed off Cadiz, looking into the Tagus, in your 
way thither; and not gaining there any intelligence of the 
enemy, you are, if you shall have reason to suppose that they 
have not entered the Mediterranean, to return, without loss of 
time, to Cawsand Bay, detaching, under Rear-Admiral Harvey, 
»nch ships as you may think necessary to watch the port of 
L'Orient. 

In the event of your gaining intelligence of the enemy’s ships 
having passed up the Mediterranean, your Lordship is to detach 
the whole of your squadron, with orders to the senior officer, to 

* Caledonia , Tonnant , Implacable , Resoluticn t and Bellor.a, 



16 


fall in with Vice-Admiral Lord Collingwood, returning yourself 
in the Caledonia to Cawsand Bay ; and should your Lordship 
have reason to suppose, from the intelligence you may procure, 
that Rear-Admiral Stopford has followed the enemy’s squadron 
to the West Indies, you are to use your best endeavours to 
communicate the same to Vice-Admiral Sir John Duckworth, 
with orders for him to return to Cawsand Bay, 

In the event of your Lordship finding, on your arrival off 
Rochelort, that the Vice-Admiral should have formed a junction 
with Rear-Admiral Stopford, and that the enemy’s ships should 
be still in that port, you are to send such ships as you may not 
require to blockade them to Cawsand Bay , and should your 
Lordship find that the two squadrons have formed a junction, 
and proceeded rn pursuit of the enemy, you are to return your¬ 
self to Cawsand Bay, leaving in either case, under tlie command 
of Rear-Admiral Harvey, a sufficient force to watch the 
enemy’s ships in L’Orient, 

In case the Bellona should not have arrived at Plymouth, 
when the remaining ships shall he ready to sail, your Lordship 
is not to wait, for the said ship, but to leave orders for her Cap¬ 
tain to follow you without delay. 

Given under our Hands, 1st March, 1809, 

(Signed) R. BICKERTOX, 

Wm. JOHNSTONE HOPE, 

R. WARD, 

1 ' Wm. DOMETT. 

By command of their Lordships, 

W. W. POLE. 

To the Right Hon. Lord Gambier, 

Admiral of the Blue, &c. 


(COPY) (MOST SECRET.) 

My Lord, Admiralty-Office, March 19, 1809. 

I AM commanded by My Lords Commissioners of the Admi¬ 
ralty to acquaint your Lordship, that they have ordered twelve 
transports to be fitted out as fire-ships, and to proceed and join 
you off Rochefort ; and that Mr. Congreve is also under orders 
to proceed to your Lordship in a coppered transport (The Cleve¬ 
land) containing a large assortment of rockets, and supplied 
w ith a detachment of marine artillery instructed in the use of 
them, and placed under Mr. Congreve’s orders; that the bomb- 
vessels are likewise under orders to fit for sea with all pos¬ 
sible expedition, and to join you as they may be ready; 
that all these preparations are making with a view to en¬ 
able your Lordship to make an attack on the French fleet at 
their anchorage off Isle d’Aix, if practicable; and I am further 
directed to signify their Lordship’s direction to you, to take 
into your consideration the possibility of making an attack upon 
the enemy, either conjointly with your line-of-battle ships, 
frigates, and small craft, fire-ships, bombs, and rockets; or 
separately by any of the above-named means. 



17 


Yon arc to man the fire-ships with volunteers from the fleet, 
entrusting the said ships in charge of officers of the rank of 
commander, who may happen to be present, and shall volunteer 
their services on Shis occasion: but as it is not likely there will 
be officers sufficient of that rank to command all the fire-ships, 
you are to make up the deficiency by such Lieutenants of the 
line-ot-baltle ships as shall volunteer their services, giving the 
preference to the First Lieutenants; and when the said fire-ships 
are manned by volunteers from the fleet, you are to cause their 
Original crews to be received on board the ships of youy fleet; 
and in the event of the said fire-ships being destroyed, you are 
to send home the said men, in order to their being discharged, 
furnishing them with such certificates or protections as shall 
secure them from being impressed into his Majesty’s service: 
you are also to hold out to the volunteers and the officers to 
whom the command of the fire-ships may be entrusted, every 
expectation of reward, in the event of success. 

It is their Lordships’ further direction, that you state to me, 
for their inform ition, whether any further augmentation of 
force, of any description, is in your opinion necessary to 
enable you to perform this service with full effect, that it may 
be prepared and forwarded to you without a moment’s delay, 
their Lordships having come to a determination to leave no 
means untried to destroy the enemy’s squadron. 

In order to give your Lordship every information on this im¬ 
portant subject; my Lords have directed me to enclose to you, 
a copy of a paper, drawn up by Sir Richard Keates, proposing 
a mode of attacking an enemy’s squadron under Isle d’Aix. 

I have the hononr to be, 

My Lord, 

Your Lordship’s most obedient humble Servant, 

‘ (Signed) W. W. POLE. 

P.S. The fire-ships are expected to sail from the Downs to¬ 
morrow ; and the rocket-ship from the Nore about the same 
time. Six additional transports are ordered to he forwarded 
from Plymouth to your Lordship ; and the Board of Ordnance 
are desired to send a ship with combustible matter, sufficient to 
fit the said transports as fire-ships; and also to put on board her 
an assortment of carcases for 24-pounders, and of Valenciennes 
Composition : to be used at your Lordship's discretion. 

To Admiral Lord Gambier, 
off Rochefort. 


Letter to the Commissioners for the Transport Service , inclosed 

in the preceding. 

(COPY.) (MOST SECRET.) 

Gentlemen, Admiralty , March IS, 1809. 

LORD Mulgrave having laid before the Board Ihe Petition of 
the Masters of the Transports fitting as fire-ships at Sheerness, 
transmitted to his Lordship by Sir Rupert George, I have re¬ 
ceived their Lordships’ commands to acquaint you, that you are 
at liberty to give ail assurance to the Masters as fellows 

D 



18 

1st. That if their ships should be destroyed, their crews will 
•be protected and sent to England. 

2d 1 y. That the crews will he remunerated for any clothes, or 
otherwise, which they may sustain by the destruction of the 
said ships. 

3dly. That if any of the crews arc wounded in the service on 
which they may be employed, they will receive the same pen¬ 
sions, smart money, and other advantages, as the seamen on 
board his Majesty’s ships. 

You will also explain to the Petitioners, that it is intended 
that their ships when they go upon service should be manned by 
the seamen from his Majesty’s ships; and that therefore it is not 
probable that any of the seamen belonging to the transports 
should require the provisions proposed in the third requisition 
of their petition. 

I am. Gentlemen, 

Your most humble servant, 
(Signed) W. W. POLE. 


Situation of the Enemy's Squadron under Isle d'Aix (23d April, 

1S07), with proposed Mode of illack , inclosed in the preceding . 

THE Enemy’s squadron under Isle d’Aix, which consisted of 
one three and four two-decked ships, is moored completely under 
cover of the cannon of the island, in a narrow channel, very 
close together, and with strong fasts passed from ship to ship, 
which would enable them to direct their fire to almost any point. 
Such a situation must doubt less be considered as a very strong 
defensive one, and though subject, as I conceive, to he destroyed 
by a superior naval force, it seems doubtful whether, without 
taking the island, the attacking ships could be brought off 
afterward. Not possessing any knowledge of fortification, Ido 
not feel myself capable of giving an opinion of the practicability 
of carrying the island. The fortifications are generally said to 
be strong : one part is insulated. To appearance, it lias, at 
times, been left with a weak garrison, though its established 
garrison force, I have been assured, is considerable. 

Forming a judgment, as well from observation as the best 
charts, l am of opinion (especially as the enemy has no floating 
batteries moored in advance) that their squadron is exposed to 
an attack of bombs, fire-ships, and rockets; and that if a 
serious attack of this nature was made, covered and protected 
by a squadron, I conceive the enemy must determine to move 
from this situation to defend himself—to quit it with a view to 
take up a less dangerous anchorage at the mouth of the Cha- 
rante, w hich would leave the road at our mercy to sink vessels 
in it ; or, by remaining, submit to see some of their numbers at 
least, destroyed at their anchors. Success, more important than 
any I have ventured to predict, might possibly result from it ; 
and even if the event should prove that I have too strongly 
anticipated, no disgrace, it should seem, could result from au 
attack on an enemy in his own port. 



19 


Was an attack, such as I have suggested, to be adopted, I 
presume it would be advisable to employ force every way com¬ 
petent to the undertaking ; and as the assailants must expect 
to be opposed by a strong gun and mortar-boat force, and to 
be assailed perhaps by fire-ships and fire-rafts in turn, a pretty 
considerable frigate and gun-brig force would be requisite to 
maintain a position above the Boyart; which would, in my 
opinion, be indispensable for the success of the undertaking. 

Bombs and gun-brigs, employed on this service, should be 
manned for this spurt of service beyond their usual complements ; 
should be furnished with an additional kedge anchor and hawser 
for warping; and provided with boarding-netting, and de- 
fences of that nature; for if the enemy found himself much 
pressed. I should apprehend he would make some vigorous efforts 
to board. Care should be taken that the gun-brigs so employed 
should have their long bow guns on hoard, for it is customary 
with those that cruise to leave them behind : and that class 
which have been in the custom of throwing 8-inch shells from 
68-pounder carronades, would he particularly serviceable. Per¬ 
haps a number of small vessels, prepared as fire-ships, and 
provided with chains, to chain them in pairs, would be pre¬ 
ferable to a few regularly fitted fire-ships. The chains need 
not be of very large dimensions, no more than 50 fathoms in 
length. The boats of the squadron would necessarily be em¬ 
ployed with the fire-ships, &c. and l should propose keeping the 
squadron as close to the Isle d’Aix with easterly, and to the 
Boyart with westerly winds, as possible, in order that it might 
be m constant readiness to act decisively, should an opportunity 
present itself. 

(Signed) R. G. KEATS. 

London, April 23, 180T. 

Original produced by Mr. Dyer, from the Proceedings on Vie 
Trial of liear-Admiral Harvey. 

My Lord, Admiralty-Office, 251h March, 1809. 

MY Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty having thought fit 
to select Captain Lord Cochrane for the purpose of conducting, 
under ymir Lordship’s directions, the fire-ships to be employed 
in the projected attack of the enemy’s squadron off Isle d’Aix, 

] have their Lordships’ commands to signify their direction to 
you to employ Lord Cochrane on the above-mentioned service 
accordingly 1 , whenever the attack shall take place; and 1 am to 
acquaint^you, that the twelve 'fire-ships, of which you have 
already had notice, arc now in the Downs in readiness, and 
detained only by contrary wind; and that Mr. Congreve is also 
at that anchorage, with an assortment ol rockets, ready to 
proceed with the fire-ships. 

I am' also to acquaint you that the composition for the six 
transports, sent to your Lordship by Admiral Young, and one 
thousand carcases for 18-pounders, will sail in the course of 
three or four days, from W oolwich, to join you off Rochefort. 


Admiral Lord Gambler, 
c. &c. &c. 


1 have the honour to be, &c. 

W. W. POLE. 


D 2 



20 


(SECRET.) 

Admiralty-Office, 5th April, 28(3$. 

My Loan, # 

I have received, and laid before my Lords Commissioners of 
the Admiralty, your Lordship’s two letters, No. 70 and 71, dated 
the 26th ultimo; and, iu reply, I am commanded to acquaint 
your Lordship, that the Intelligent and Encounter have been 
ordered to join you from Plymouth ; and, that Sir Roger Curtis 
is also directed to send four gun-brigs to join you 'without a 
moment’s delay ; which will make the reinforcement of six gun- 
brigs you have desired. Their Lordships have, however, com¬ 
manded me to inform you, that it is of considerable importance 
to the public service, that these six gun-brigs should be returned 
to Plymouth and Portsmouth, for the protection of the trade, 
as speedily as possible; and, they are in consequence pleased to 
direct, that you order them back the moment you can spare 
them ; without, however, thereby intending that any sacrifice 
should be made of the paramount service of destroying the 
enemy’s fleet, in aid of which they are sent, and for the accom¬ 
plishment of which, exclusively, they iiave been withdrawn from 
the convoy service. 

The Thunder and Vesuvius will sail from the Nore to join your 
Lordship in a day or two; the other bomb-vessels, that it was 
intended to send you, cannot be got ready in time. 

In reply to the last paragraph of your paper (No. 71) ; I ara 
commanded to acquaint you, that my Lords are perfectly satisfied 
that you will do every thing in your power with the force under 
your command for the destruction of the enemy’s ships; and 
that their Lordships’ directions (as signified in my letter of the 
19th ultimo , were given with a view of leaving any attack 
which might he made thereon to your own discretion ; considering 
your Lordship to be best able to form a judgment of the practi¬ 
cability thereof, from being on the spot, and seeing the situation 
«f the enemy’s force, and the dispositions they may have made 
for iheir protection. 

I have the honour to be, 

My Lord, 

Your Lordship’s most obedient humble Servant, 

(SiG.Yisn) W. W. POLE. 

Admiral Lord Gambier, 

&c. &c. &c. 

By the Commissioners for executing the office of Lord 
High-Admiral of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Ireland, &o. 

HAVING ordered the ships named in the margin* to join you 
without loss o; time, with a view to enable your Lordship to 
detach four sail of two-decked ships to cruise in such situation 
as yon may judge most advisable, for the purpose of endeavour¬ 
ing to intercept Ihe enemy’s squadron which escaped from 

* Dreadnought, Temeraire, St. Georgs, Christian Filth, Jchille r 
arspile, Lnyaucux *.. 


21 


L Orient about tlie latter end of February last, in the event of 
its attempting lo return to that port ; and also four other two- 
decked ships, to cruise in the situation you shall judge most 
eligible tor intercepting I tie enemy’s 9 aid squadron, in case it 
should try to get into Brest; attaching to each of those squad** 
rons as many frigates and smaller vessels as your Lordship can 
spare from other services. Your Lordship is therefore hereby 
required and directed, as soon as you have the means of so 
doing, to make detachments accordingly, with instructions to 
the senior officers thereof, to cruise diligently on the stations 
respectively allotted them, spreading their squadrons as much as 
may be prudent, consistently with the stale of the leather, 
and executing every means in their power to get sight of, and to 
intercept, the enemy’s said squadron, in case of its trying to 
enter either of the ports of Brest or L’Orient. They are to 
continue on this service until they receive further orders, or 
shall procure such satisfactory information of the enemy as 
shall authorise them to rejoin your Lordship. 

lour Lordship will likewise give such directions as you may 
consider expedient to any of your detached cruizers which, 
from their situations, may be likely lo fall in with the enemy’s 
ships, for pushing to the two squadrons before-mentioned, to 
give notice of their approach or situations. 

Given under our hands, 14th April, 1S09, 

(Signed) MULGRAVE, 

C. BICKERTON, 
Wm. domett, 
R.MOORSON. 

By command of their Lordships, 

W. W. POLE. 

To-the Right Hon. Lord Gambier, 

Admiral of the Blue, &c. 


4 Admiralty-Office, I9lh April , 1809. 

Mv Lord, 

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admi¬ 
ralty to acquaint you, that the ships named in the margin * have 
been ordered to cruise between the latitude of 39 deg. and 45 
min. north, and 32 deg. ami 3T min. west, for the protection of 
the trade of his Majesty’s subjects, and for the purpose of en¬ 
deavouring to intercept the L’Orient squadron on their return 
to Europe; and that your Lordship is not to consider the said 
ships as any longer under your command. 

I am further commanded by their Lordships to acquaint you, 
that it is their intention you should send the squadron otF 
L’Orient directed bv their order of the 14th instant, but that 
the squadron, which by the said order you were directed to send 
off Brest, need not lie detached by your Lordship; my Lords 
proposing to send four sail of the line lo that station, so soon as 
they cun be got ready, with orders to their Commanders to re- 

* ImpctueuXf Dejiunce, Christian VII. War spite. 



22 


main there for the purpose of intercepting the L’Orient squadron, 
and to consider themselves as being under your Lordship’s tom* 
inund while they are employed on that service. 

I have the honour to be, 

My Lord, 

Your Lordship’s most obedient humble Servant, 

(Signed) W. W. POLE. 

Admiral Lord Gambier. 


Mv Lord, Admiralty Office, 22 d April , 1809. 

I RECEIVED yesterday, by Sir Harry Neale, and lost no 
time in laying before my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, 
your Lordship’s letter of the 14th instant, together with its 
iuclosures; and I am, in reply, commanded by their Lordships 
to congratulate you on the brilliant success.of the force under 
your command, in the attack of the enemy’s ships in Isle 
ri’Aix Roads by fire-vessels, and subsequently by detachments 
from yoilr fleet, which terminated in the capture and destruc¬ 
tion of four of the enemy’s ships; and to signify their Lord- 
ships’ direction to you to express their approbation of the great 
exertions of Rear-Admiral Stopford, Sir Harry Neale, and the 
several officers mentioned by your Lordship as having been most 
actively employed, and having particularly distinguished them¬ 
selves upon this important service. , 

Their Lordships considering that the state of the enemy’s 
force, in consequence of the brilliant success of the fleet under 
your command, is now so much reduced as to render your fur¬ 
ther presence unnecessary, have commanded me to direct you 
to proceed to Spithead in the Caledonia. 

1 am further commanded to acquaint your Lordship, that my 
Lords have ordered Rear-Admiral Sotbeby to proceed in the 
ship hearing his flag off L’Orient ; and I am to signify their 
direction to you, to detach the four ships named in the margin* 
to join the Rear-Admiral on that station, the said squadron 
being intended to carry into execution their Lordship’s order of 
the 14th, and their further directions contained in my letter o.f 
the 19th instant. You are to leave Rear-Admiral Stopford, 
with the remainder of the ships and vessels now off Rochefort, 
in the command at that station, with orders to keep a close 
■watch upon the enemy’s force, and to seize every opportunity 
that may offer for attempting to complete their destruction. 

My Lords are the more desirous that your Lordship should 
lose no time in repairing to Spithead, as your presence may 
accelerate the arrangements for the Court-Martial on Rear-Ad¬ 
miral Harvey. 

1 have the honour to be, my Lord, 

Your Lordship’s most obedient humble servant, 
(Signed) W. W. POLE. 

T.S. Rear-Admiral Sotheby is directed to follow such orders 
as he may receive from your Lordship. W. W. P. 

* Defiance , liellona, Illustrious, and Gibraltar. 





2 3 


Judge Advocate— These are all the paper?, 

1 believe, which it will be necessary to read, 
ll* you please, we will now have the Masters 
to produce the Ships Logs of the Caledonia, 
Caesar, Imperieuse, and Beagle. 

President—X ou had better have the Master 
of the Caledonia first. 

Mr. THOMAS STOKES, Master of the Caledonia, sworn. 

Examined by Mr, BiclmelL 

Q,. Be pleased to produce the log-books of his Majesty’s ship 
Caledonia. 

(The Witness produced them.) 

Q,. Were the contents of these hooks written by you, or under 
your daily inspection ; and are the contents of them true to the 
best of vour knowledge or belief ? 

w ^ r> * 

A. They were written by one of the Mates’, under my inspec¬ 
tion, and to the best of my knowledge and belief they are 
correct. 

Q,. You made your daily inspection ? 

A. Yes: sometimes 1 was acting out of the ship, in fire ships, 
for several days ; those days I did not inspect them. 

Q,. You inspected them while the circumstances were within 
your recollection ? 

A. Yes, certainly. 

Q. Produce a sketch or drawing of the anchorage at Isle 
d’Aix, with the relative situations o( the British and French 
fleets, and other particulars on and previous to the 12tn of April 
last. 

(The Witness produced it.)* 

Q,. Did you prepare this drawing, and from what documents, 
authorities, and observations; and are the several matters and 
things thereon delineated accurately described, according to the 
best of your judgment and belief ? 

A. I prepared that drawing partly from the knowledge I gained 
in sounding to the southward of the Palles shoal, and the an¬ 
chorage of the Isle of Aix ; the outlines ot the Chart are taken 
from the Neptune Fran^ais ; and the position of the enemy’s 
fleet from Mr. Edward Fairfax and from the French Captain of 
the Ville de Varsovie; and the British fleet from my own obser¬ 
vations. 

* See the two Plans corresponding with that produced bp Dir, Stokes t 
which accompany this Publication, 


Q. Are the malters arid things therein delineated nccnra-tely 
described according' to the.best of vonr knowledge and helict ? 

A. They are. 'there is one thing it may he necessary to 
explain respecting l ; s chart : it cannot be expected, that frond 
the opportunities 1 had of sounding in this place, I could ac¬ 
curately point out the distance between the sands-: therefore, 
for any thing respecting that, I must refer the Court to the 
chart which I copied from a French manuscript, which wall be 
produced here; and that 1 take to be correct. 

President —There was a large chart you lent me ? 

A. Yes; tiiat is tliechart I allude to; this chart I produce as 
containing the various positions. 

Judge Advocate* —This chart is produced to save a great deal 
of trouble, as to the relative situation of the two fleets. 

President— 1 should think you had better finish the docu¬ 
ments of the Caledonia now, by calling in Mr. Hockings.—■ 
Q. Does your Lordship wish to ask Mr. Stokes any question 
now? 

Lord Gambier —Not at present. Sir; I should wish to ask by- 
and-by. 

President—T his is merely documentary—it may be better tq 
complete this first. 

Lord Gambier—1 shall not want him to-day. 

[ i he Witness withdrew. 


Lieutenant HOBERT HOCKINGS, of the Caledonia sworn. 
Examined by Mr. Eicknelf. 

Q. Were you Signal-Lieutenant on board his Majesty's shin 
the Caledonia ? 

A. I was. 

Q. Be pleased to produce /he signal-log of that ship. 

A. This is it. (producing it.) 

Q. Were the contents of it written by you ? 

.A. No ; they were not; they were written under my direction. 

Q, The contents were written by you, or under your direction ? 

A. They were; they were written by the Mate of the Signals 
under my inspection. b 

Q. Are Hie contents of them accurate and true, l© the best of 
your knowledge and belief? 

A. Yes; they are, to the best of my knowledge. 

President— Your Lordship wishes to ask no question at 
present of Mr. Hockings? 

Lord Gambier —None, at present. 


[The witness withdrew* 



25 


Sir. JOHN SPARLING, Master of the Imperieuse, sworn. 

Examined by Mr. Bichnell. 

Q. Produce the log-book of his Majesty’s ship the Impc- 
rieuse. 

(It was produced.)* 

Q,. Were the contents of it written by you, or under your in¬ 
spection ? 

A. By myself. 

Q,. Are the contents of it accurate and true, to the best of 
your knowledge and belief? 

A. Yes. 

President —I remember to have sent for you upon that log, 
and you told me, that there were some of the circumstances 
which you wrote down, but that you did not observe the trans¬ 
actions every one of them yourself, because you were employed 
up on other duties? 

A. I did. 


President —Then I should think you should qualify that in 
your reply ; you did say to the best of your belief; but I thought 
it proper to mention, that being employed upon such a variety of 
services, you were not actually and visibly a witness to the 
things that are there noted ? 

A. Yes; I was employed most part of the time in other 
things. 

Mr. Bicknf.ll —From whom did you obtain your information ? 

A. I noted them down at the time oil other slips, and then 
Copied them in afterwards. 

Q. Then it is all from your own observation? 

A. Yes : it is. 

President— I thought it proper to mention this ; it having 
been stated to me, when I sent for him ; the log not being 
signed. 

Admiral Stanhope —I should wish to know how that is taken 
down ? 

Judge Advocate —lie says, it is accurate to the best of his 
knowledge and belief: 1 was about to add something, but he 
added, that he took memoranda at the time, and entered them 
afterwards. 

A. 1 carried the things in ray mind, and entered them after¬ 
wards. 

Cross-examined by Lord Gambier. 

Q. Have you made any alteration in it, or addition to it, be¬ 
fore or after your arrival in England, or do you know that any 
such have been made by any other person ? 

A. None: to the best of my knowledge. 


**- Sue-Copy of the Proceedings of the Il//r, 12 thy 1 3th, 14 th, and 15th 

of April in the Appendix , 

R 


20 

President— Hav6 you <*nst. your eye over i t since the trans¬ 
action took place; and did you observe that any other person 
had made alterations in it ? 

A. 1 have looked over it. several times; but I never suffered it 
to be in the hand of any other person but myself. 

Admiral Stanhope —I cannot help observing, that there ap¬ 
pear to have been some very important omissions, which are af¬ 
terwards entered in several parts—several very material circum¬ 
stances. 

Lord Gambier —Do you recollect going on board the Inde¬ 
fatigable, in the mouth of May last, in Plymouth Sound ? 

A. 1 do. 

Q. Do you remember asking for a sight of that ship’s log ? 

A. I do. 

Q. For what purpose, and by whose orders did you do so ? 

A. For my own information. 

Q. By no person’s order ? 

A. No. 

President —Was it by any person’s order, or by any person's 
Suggestion ? 

A. No. 

Admiral Stanhope —Then you mean to say, it was merely 
from your own desire, and not from the suggestion or intimation--' 
of any person whatever ? 

A. "Entirely so. 

Lord Gambier— -Do you recollect attempting to make a copy 
of that ship’s log, and being interrupted by the first Lieutenant, 
who forbade your doing so, and took the log from you ? 

A. I recollect wanting to take a memorandum out, of the 
length of time she was in aclion,-and the lirst Lieutenant said i 
had better not do it, as he did not think it would he of any ser¬ 
vice ; at the same time adding, that he could not suffer it without 
Capt. Kodd’s leave ^ and i said at the same time it was imma¬ 
terial. 

Q. Then you made no alteratioivin the Impcrieuse log after 
that ? 

A. No, not any.- 

Admiral Douglas —Did you, upon your return to the Ttn- 
perieuse, report any observations you had made in the ship’s log 
you had been visiting, to any officer in that ship ? 

A. Not any. 

Lord Gambier —Or to any officer belonging to her ? 

A. Not any. 

•t 

A dmiral Stanhope —Did y ou confer with your Captain, Lord 
Cochrane, upon your going on board the Indefatigable for the 
purpose before mentioned, or was it directly or indirectly with 
his Lordship’s knowledge and privity ? 

A. I do not know that his Lordship knew any thing of it- 


27 


Q. Do you mean distinctly to say that he did sot know any 
thing of it ? 

A. I do not know that he did, if Captain Rodd told him any 
thing of il £ cannot say. 

Q. The question is—previous to your going ? 

A. I did not tell him of it. 

President —The question put is, whether before you did go 
to inspect the log of the Indefatigable, Lord Cochrane had the 
knowledge of your intention so to do ? 

Admiral Stanhope —Yes, either directly from you, or indi- 
rectly by any other means whatever ? 

A. I do not know, I went of myself, I had no communication 
with his Lordship on the subject ; his Lordship went to town on 
the 21st of April, and left his ship. 

Admiral Stanhope —You have said in your evidence, that 
you went on board the Indefatigable to know what length of 
time she was in action; you must have had some motive for that 
—what was you motive for wishing to obtain that information ? 

A. I only wished to satisfy my own mind as to the length of 
time she was in action; the time she commenced and the time 
fslie ended : I thought she was a long while before she com¬ 
menced with us: 1 might have gone on board any other ship 
probably, merely for ray own information, for I always wish to 
gain information; 1 did uot think there was any impropriety in 
it. 

Judge Advocate —What was your motive for wishing to ob¬ 
tain that information ? 

A. Merely to satisfy my own mind how long she had been in 
action : as I was not on deck when she commenced firing, I merely* 
asked the Lieutenant to allow me to look at the log; I went on 
board that ship because I was acquainted with Lieutenant James, 
and thought 1 could ask him the question more freely than any 
other person ; 1 was merely on a visit to him, and asked him the 
question ; I had been acquainted with him eight or nine years. 

Admiral Stanhope —I understood this gentlemen to say he 
might have gone to any ship as well as the Indefatigable: now I 
understand you to say you went because ot a particular ac¬ 
quaintance. 

A. I might have gone to any other ship where I had an ac¬ 
quaintance to ask the question ; but being there I asked the 
question. 

Judge Advocate —'Had you an intention to ask the question 
before you went on board? 

A. I had certainly ; going to see Lieutenant James, I took the 
opportunity of asking the question which I had intended. 

President —When was it that you made this visit on board 
the Indefatigable, and where ? 


Judge Advocate— Lord 
particulars. 


Gambler's question applies to these 

E 2 


. 1 28 

Lord Gamrier—T his was about a month after the action took 
place, was it not ? 

A. It was when she was refilling in Plymouth Sound. 

President —Ithas been observed, that in the afternoon log of 
the 12th of April, there are several insertions not in the body of 
the log, but in thecolumnsfor courses and wind, and soon: how 
did it happen that there are in the log of the afternoon of the 
12 th of April, insertions of material events or circumstances iu 
the columns for winds and courses, and not in the body of the 
log ? 

A. After the action was over, I received orders from Captain 
Lord Cochrane to proceed with the boat and ascertain the depth 
of water between the Imperieuse and the French Admiral's ship 
Ocean, which occupied my time until it was quite dark ; on my 
return I wrote such part of the transactions relative to the action, 
as were then in my memory; I then having the middle watch, 
looking over my log book, as I might not have an opportunity 
of filling it up the next day, found that I had omitted these 
things which are inserted in the column for winds and courses, 
such as the killed and wounded for instance. 

President —No : you need not mention those respecting the 
killed and wounded, but what I allude to are those respecting the 
events which took place—cau you recollect what it is you in-, 
sorted ? 

A. No, I cannot exactly, hut I believe it is inserted above the 
killed and wounded; there may be something else, 1 cannot re¬ 
collect exactly what it is. 

Q. There is one fact inserted, which from the place in which 
it is inserted, one should suppose was about oue o'clock, do y ou 
recollect what circumstance it was? 

A. It was on running in. 

Q. You have no recollection of what next follows in the 
margin ? 

A. I have not; that circumstance referred to I recollect relates 
to the ship getting under weigh ; 1 was then about getting the 
anchor up. 

President —Has any thing occurred,Lord Gambicr,that would 
induce you to put any other question to this witness ? 

Lord Gambier —No, not any. 

[The witness withdrew. 


Mr. Samuel Raven, Master of the Osar, sworn. 

Examined by Mr. Bicknell . 

Q. Produce the ship’s log of the Osar. 

(It was produced.) 

Q. Was it writlen by you. or under your inspection ? 

A. It was written under my inspection. 



29 


Q. Are the contents of it authentic and true, according to the 
best of your knowledge and belief ? 

A. Yes. 

Q. You have carefully read it over, have you ? 

A. Yes, 1 have. 

Judge Advocate —The Signal Officer of the Ca?sar is not here. 

1? resident —No, but 1 believe it will be found that the signals 
are entered in the ship’s log. 

A. No: that custom has not been followed in the time of Sir 
Richard Strachan, nor has it, I believe, in Rear-Admiral Stop- 
ford’s command: they are examined by the signal-officer. 

Judge Advocate —You do not consider it to be material to 
produce the signal log ? 

President —Is there any person to verify it ? 

Judge Advocate —No: I do not apprehend Rear-Admiral 
Stopford can speak to every signal which is inserted. 

President —The Caledonia’s own signal log is as complete as 
any thing can be in every respect. 

Judge Advocate —Then we will proceed to the Beagle. 

[The witness withdrew. 


Mr. John Thompson, Master’s Mate of the Beagle sworn. 

Examined by Mr. Biclcnell, 

Q. That is the Beagle’s log ? 

A. Yes it is. 

Q. Were the contents of it written by you ? 

A. Yes, they were. 

Q,. Are the contents of it accurate and true, according to the 
best of your knowledge and belief? 

A. They are. 

President —This log was written by yourself? 

A. Yes. 

Q. Are the signals inserted in it? 

A. Yes: they are? 

Q. And you say, upon your oath, that you believe every thing 
in it to be correct ? 

A. Yes. 

Q. I see here, that in the column of week days and winds and 
hours, in the margin of the log it is said,—At half past eight, 
Imperieuse made telegraph signal of seven of the enemy’s ships 
aground—Imperieuse made signal possible to destroy the enemy— 
I mperieuse made signal, the enemy are preparing to heave off. 
How does it happen, that this is inserted in the margin of tin* 
log amongst the columns, and not in the body of the log? 

A. I wrote that at the same time the log was written. 



/ 


30 

Q. Why did you not put it in the body of the log in the nar¬ 
rative ? * 

A. 1 made a mistake in copying it from the log-board. I left 
it out, and afterwards inserted it when 1 found my mistake. 

President —I should wish to have the question inserted in the 
minutes. How does it happen, that an insertion of very male, 
rial circumstances, stated to have occurred at half past eight A.M. 
on the I9th of April, was made in the marginal columns, instead 
of the body of the log. 

A. In copying from the log-board, I missed those signals; and 
after reading over the log boaid again, 1 copied them into the 
columns of week-days. 

Q. Who wrote the leg-board—who kept the account of events 
on the log-book? 

A. The Master: and I copied it into the log. 

Q. Is this your hand-writing? 

A. Yes, it is. 

Q. Were the events recorded in this log-book, which you say 
too wrote yourself, inserted therein, day by day, as the circum¬ 
stances occurred, or is this a copy of any other log-book that 
was kept at the time? 

A. No : it was written from the log-board every day at twelve 
o’clock at noon. 

Q. This book was filled up day by day, as the circumstances 
occurred? 

A. Yes. 

(j. Have I been fortunate enough to express myself clearly to 
you?—my question was, whether or not there was another log 
kept that w as written according to llie circumstances ; sometimes 
in bad weather; sometimes in good weather; sometimes in the 
midst of hurry, in the transaction of business and action, anil 
those sort of things; was this log-book written under such cir¬ 
cumstances. and the events recorded written day by day, as those 
circumstances occurred ; or, is this a transcript of any other 
blotted, blurred, coarse log-book, that you thought would not 
look so well before the Court ? 

A. No. 

Q. Were these things written day by day, as they occurred ? 

A. Yes: every thing was written every day at twelve o’clock, 

Q* Then what is called the log of the 61h of April, was 
written on the 6th of April ? 

A. Yes. 

Q. And what is inserted here, as of the 7th, was written on 
the 71!», in this book ? 

A. Yes. 

Q. Is this the identical book into which it was copied from the 
board ? 

A. Yes. 


CL And there never was any other log-hook kept ? 

A. No. 

Q. Who kept this ? 

A. I kept it myself. 

President —It is written so fair and so neat, that it bear* 
every mark of being a fair copy. 

Judge Advocate —I tell the Gentleman, I am sure no impu¬ 
tation is meant upon him. 

President. —No; not the least : but it is kept so neatly ami so 
well, that l really thought this must be a fair copy taken from 
the original log, which is generally blotted and blurred. I 
meant not the most distant imputation upon the witness. Would 
Lord Gambier wish to ask any question of the witness? 

Lord Gambier —No : 1 have none. 

Judge Advocate —We propose now to call my Lord Coch- 

fane. 


Captain the Right lion. Lord Cochrane, sworn. 

Examined by J\lr. Bic knelt. 

Q. Was your Lordship entrusted, under the direction of Ad¬ 
miral Lord Gambier, with the conduct of the tire-ships and other 
vessels to be employed in ttie attack of the enemy’s squadron oif 
fhe Isle d’Aix, in April last? 

A. I was. 

Q. On what day did your Lordship arrive in the Imperieuse, 
and join the Admiral in Basque Roads? 

Ai It is marked in the log of the Imperieuse, which I have in 
my pocket. In my own private log, which, as it is a copy of 
what I wrote myself, 1 therefore can vouch for. I cannot swear 
to this log (the ship's log), because I dut not write it myself; it 
appears here to be on the 3d of April, but as to the day I really 
cannot be positive; I think from my recollection that was the 
day. 

Q,. What was the strength of the enemy’s fleet at that time, 
and in what direction was it moored,, and in what manner de¬ 
fended and protected by the works in the Isle d’Aix, and by the 
shoals at the entrance of the harbour ? 

A. The enemy’s fleet appeared to consist of nine sail of the 
regular line, besides one ship of three decks, and the Calcutta, a 
&0 gun ship, four frigates, and there was another large vessel; I 
do not know what she was, she appeared to be a large merchant 
vessel or store-ship. They appeared to be moored, as near as I 
could judge, north and south, or nearly so: I thought at first 
they inclined considerably more to the north-east and south¬ 
west; they were defended by their own cannon, the vessels being 
in a very strong position; they were flanked towards the north 
by thirteen cannon in the Isle d’Aix, besides the mortars on that 
Island; the frigates were stationed to the south-east of them, 



apparently for the purpose of flanking the other side of them# 
ami as a protection against boats or fire-vessels between Aix and 
the Boyart. I do not know of any shoal; the water is not steep 
at Aix, but shelves gradually oil' at the entrance of the harbour. 

Q,. At what distance from the enemy, and in what direction 
was the British squadron moored on the evening of the 11th of 
April, immediately previous to the attack by the fire-ships, and 
what was its strength ; and was the anchorage or position taken 
by the Commandcr-in-Chicf, in your judgment, properly chosen 
for observing the motions and proceedings of the enemy’s ships, 
and for carrying into effect the plan for their destruction ; and 
how were the wind and tide at that time? 

A. I think that would be better explained by the positions put 
upon paper, than merely stated ; 1 have put it down upon this 
plan. 

(Ilis Lordship delivered in a plan.) 

Loro Cochrane —Does the expression enemy here, mean the 
ships of the enemy ? 

Judge Advocate —Theshipsof the enemy. 

A. To the best of my judgment, the British fleet were distant 
from the French between eight and nine miles—I think nine. 

Q. Was that the first position of the English fleet when your 
Lordship arrived, or afterwards ? 

A. I mean between the time of my arrival, and until the 
morning of the 12th of April. I believe that the British squadron 
unmoored that, night, but I do not from my own knowledge 
know it. The position chosen by the Commandcr-in-Chief was 
a very good position for blockading the enemy, and for ob¬ 
serving any material movement of their squadron. Having al¬ 
ready mentioned my opinion of the distance, it must be obvious, 
that the destruction of the enemy couid not be effected, w hile in 
that position, b )’ the ships there placed, as already mentioned—■ 
the wind was not the same oil the evening of the Hth, as it was 
on the morning of the 12th. At eight o'clock, on the evening 
of the lllh, the wind must have been about due north, I think * 

I did not take exactly the point of the wind, hot I think it must 
have been thereabouts; the tide, at the same hour, began to 
run towards the south-east. 

Mr. Bicknei.i. —Yon have not mentioned the strength of the 
British squadron, which is part of the question ? 

A. I believe there were eleven sail of the line (but 1 cannot 
speak positively), besides frigates and brigs, and one bomb. 

President —You said the tide began to run to the south-east : 
3rtlv.it the commencement of the flood ? 

A. 1 believe it just began at that time. 

Q, The flood tide makes to the south-east ? 

A. Yes: it does: and \ think it had just began to run—ife 
might be about ten minutes, or a quarter of an hour. 

Q. Did it appear to your Lordship, that the Admiral gav« 
every assistance in his power, towards carrying into eflect such 


33 


propositions as your Lordship made to him, for preparing, ar^ 
ranging, and sending the fire-ships against the enemy ? 

A. Every possible assistance, as well as Admiral Stopford and 
the Captains of the fleet. 

Q. Were the frigates and other small vessels, which were ad* 
%'anced previous to the attack on the 11th, properly placed by 
the Commander-in-Chief, for affording the most effectual assist¬ 
ance, or being otherwise useful in the service to be performed ? 

A. Very judiciously placed. 

Q. It appearing, by the signal-log of the Caledonia, and other 
log-s, that you made the following communications *o the Com- 
mander-in-Chief, on the morning of the 12th, five hours 48 
minutes A.M.:—“ half the fleet can destroy the enemy ; seven on 
shore;” 6 40, “ eleven on shore 7-40, “ only ' wo afloat9-£5, 
“enemy preparing I o haul off.” Was it your Lordship’s opinion, at 
the time of making the first-mentioned signal (hat it would 
Lave been expedient for the Commander-in-Chief to send in l.aif, 
or any of his ships of the line, to effect the purpose of destroy¬ 
ing the enemy's ships, considering the state of the wind and tide 
at that time, and the shoal water in the inner-harbour; and, if 
so, was there a probability, in your Lordship’s judgment, that 
such ships could have got off again in safety ? 

A. The Imperieuse being the nearest ship, placed by his Lord- 
ship, for the guidance of the fire-ships, and having had the 
charge of those vessels, I thought it proper to communicate to 
his Lordship, the state in which they appeared to me to be, which. 
I did by the signal mentioned in the question, 

[Lord Cochrane made this answer, looking all the time at 

a paper in his hand.] 

President —Is it not usual, when minutes are referred to by- 
witnesses, to ask whether they were minutes made at the Ime, or 
subsequently upon reflection ? 

Judge Advocate —Certainly; When did your Lordship make 
these minutes ? 

A. These are observations made at the time, which I am 
willing to swear to. 

President —I only ask for the correctness of proceeding ac¬ 
cording to the usage of Courts-Martial, not with a view to 
reflect upon your Lordship. 

Lord Cochrane —So I understand. 

Judge Advocate —This is not the original paper, But a 
copy ? 

A It is a copy of the minutes I made at the time : I believe I 
am correct as to the time ; but the log-books of the ships will 
shew ; hut as to the circumstances I am perfectly correct. 

Judge Advocate —The original your Lordship ha,. 

A. The original, 1 do not recollect whether 1 have ; hut Lord 
Mulgrave desired to have the log of the Imperieuse, and I gave 
him a copy of this, uot in my owu hand-writing, but written 
by a Clerk. 

f 


I 


34 


■President —The circumstances stated occurred to your Lorrtt 
ship at the moment when you recorded them ; but this is a tran¬ 
script and a fair copy of it, exactly as it was worded before? 

A. This is exactly as they happened; some are transposed ; 
they were put down on different slips ot paper as they occurred ; 
and here they appear in the shape of a regular log ; one op 
two I have inserted since I came on shore, which I shall remark 
when I come to them ; but all the circumstances are known to 
the whole of the fleet; and 1 may appeal to the logs of the 
whole fleet tor them. I could not, in the midst ot firing, sit 
down to write these circumstances. 

President —The circumstances which happened, and which 
were put on slips of paper, are now cast more into the shape 
of a narrative. 

Judge Advocate —Ilow long after the action was that copy 
made? 

A. This copy was made in London ; but it was made from the 
notes I made at the time. 

Admiral Stanhope —Lord Cochrane swears, that all which 
he now states is correct; therefore 1 do not think it is material 
where it comes from. 

Mr. Bicknell —Is it necessary, that your Lordship, in giving an 
answer to this question, should refer to that paper ? 

Judge Advocate —You state that you communicated to Lord 
Gamflier by signals ? 

A- I believe by the signals mentioned in the question. 

Admiral Stanhope —This is a log-book made up by Lord 
Cochrane; not kepi by him. 

A. It is intended for public use. I am ready to produce it to 
the Court. It is my opinion, that a much smaller force than 
half the fleet would have been sufficient: the signal was directed 
by the Caledonia to be repeated ; I ordered the signal to be made 
that two sail of the line were enough; which I have since unden- 
stood was not made, but that the officer repeated the previous 
signal : the fact was, that he thought it would be an insult to 
make that signal, and therefore he repeated the signal previously 
made, leaving it to the discretion of the Commander-in-Ch ief 
to send what proportion of the force he thought proper. 

Admiral Young —To whom did you give the direction to 
have the signal made? 

A. 1 believe it was Lieutenant Baumgardt, who was on board 
from one of the other ships: from the time the first signal was 
made in the morning until about eight o’clock, it was ebb tide; 
the tide was going to windward; about eight o'clock it was low- 
water; there was anchorage out of the range of shot or shell for 
at least six sail of the line: the Imperieuse passed, in going in, 
close to the Boyart. It was then nearly high water. 

Q, What time is this? 

A. Towards two o’clock, or nearly half-past one in the morn¬ 
ing; coming out, it was also high water, in both of which courses 




35 


there was sufficient depth for vessels of any size, at any time of 
the tide, but not having been there myself at low water I cannot 
say that that is the fact; the rise and fall is from ten to twelve 
feet. 

Admiral Douglas —You do not recollect the depth of water 
you had in passing in and out ? 

A. The buoy we had very close to the Boyart was, I think, at 
six fathoms, the impression upon my mind was, that there was 
depth enough at any time of the tide ; 1 have here a narrative 
of the whole of the transactions. 

President— I think your Lordship said just now that you 
thought there was water enough for ships of any draft at any 
time of the tide ? 

A. Yes. 

Q. Have you an authenticated chart, or any evidence which 
can be produced, to shew that there is actually such a depth of 
w ater ? 

A. It was actually from the soundings we had in going in, 
provided the tide does not fall more than twelve feet, which I am 
not aware of; I do not think it falls more than that; 1 studied 
this chart some days before, the tide appears by the French, 
chart to flow at three hours twenty minutes full moon, the rise 
and fall of the tide is, I understand, from ten to twelve feet, it is 
so mentioned in the French chart, 1 have no other means of 
judging. 

Judge Advocate —This chart is not evidence before the 
Court, because his Lordship cannot prove it is accurate. 

President —No ; it is nothing more than to shew upon what 
grounds his Lordship forms his opinion of the rise and fall of the 
tide. 

A. With respect to the depth of the water, if the rise and fall 
of the tide is not more than from ten to twelve feet, then I think, 
there is depth enough at any time of the tide, I think the ships 
could have got out as safe as the others did afterwards. 

President —You say that there was room enough for six sail 
of the line to lie without the range of shot or shells; do you 
mean that at any time of the tide ? 

A. Yes; to that I can speak positively that there was; we 
were there at all times of the tide, it was the height of the 
springs and the tide of ebb, and there was five and a quarter fa¬ 
thoms under our bottom, and from five to six fathoms tor a dis¬ 
tance rouud about us sufficient for that purpose. 

Q. You mean sufficient for six sail of the line? 

A. When I say six sail of the line, that was the impression 
upon my mind ; but 1 believe you might put a dozen or twenty 
there. 

Q. Out of the range of shot and shells ? 

A. Yes; 1 mention six, and I am sure I am within the mark j 
there would have been sufficient room for cables on each side. 

f 2 


36 


The Judge Advocate reading over flint part respecting 
a dozen or twenty sail of the line lying out of the 
range of shot and shells— 

Lortn Cochran e—T hat wa§ merely conversation, I should not 
wish to swear to that, only to the other part; it was merely in 
answer to a question which was not taken down. 

Judge Advocate— Your Lordship wishes that to be struck 
out ? 

Lord Cochrane— “Yes ; the bearings of this place are the 
wreck on the Palles, I think on with the town of Foras, and the 
windmill open at tlie point of Isle d’Aix ; but the bearings are 
correctly noted in the log which 1 hold in my hand, and which S 
oflfjr to the Court. 

(Lord Cochrane delivered it in.) 

Q,. Are all the circumstances and entries made in this log 
stated accurately, to the best of your Lordship’s knowledge and 
belief? 

A. They are. 

Q. Did the Commander-in-Chief, in consequence of the sig¬ 
nals mentioned in the last question, afterwards, and at what 
time, weigh, with the large shins under his orders, and how near 
to the Isle of Aix, and at what time did he come to an anchor ? 

A. He weighed, I think, about eleven o’clock, and anchored 
about half an hour afterwards, having both wind and tide in his 
favour; the position taken up by his Lordship was nearly that 
which I offer to the Court in Chart No. 2 ; in which is shewn the 
situation of the enemy from day-light in the morning of the 
12th, until the two French ships which remained at anchor cut 
or slipped, upon his Lordship’s standing towards them. It may 
be necessary to mention to the President, that on receiving a 
letter from the Secretary of the Admiralty, stating that a Court 
Martial was to take place, as 1 then had sufficient recollection of 
all these things, as it respected time, I wrote them down, and 
that l offer them to the Court ; that which I have w rittea goes on 
as a narrative. 

Mr. BfCKpt elu— It will be better, I should think, to go on 
with our examination. Q. Was the position the Admiral then 
took the most advantageous that could be taken for observing 
the transit i ons then going forward, and for sending ships, in the 
most prompt manner, to attack the enemy’s ships, or for the 
support of those a'reidy advanced upon the enemy, and might 
that position have been taken at an earlier period, with advan¬ 
tage to the service ? 

A. Certainly. It was a good position for observing the transac¬ 
tions of the enemy. 

President — 1 presume that question refers to the second an¬ 
chor ge; ground, which your Lordship has spoken of. 

A. It »va« a very good position, but there was no attack niads 
till two o’clock. 


37 

President —The question I understand to go, whether that 
was a good position tor sending ships to attack the enemy ? 

Judge Advocate —And for carrying into effect the service re¬ 
ferred to by your Lordship’s signal, namely, the destroying the 
enemy, and could it have been taken at an earlier period with 
advantage i 

A. It was not a position for attack. 

President —The question does not appear to go, whether it 
was a proper position for attack, but for sending ships to attack 
the enemy ; or to support those which might attack the enemy ? 
that is what vou 'mean, is it not. 

Air. Bicknell —Yes. 

A. If I fully comprehended the question I would answer it 
directly, but Ido not, for there were no vessels then sent for at¬ 
tacking the enemy. I have got a narrative which will state every 
thing to the Court, for it is impossible to answer all these ques¬ 
tions. It must be obvious, that when vessels are within three or 
four miles, that is not a good position for attack. 

President —The question does not apply to that; but whe¬ 
ther that was a good position to place the fleet, to detach vessels 
from to attack. 

A. I have no hesitation in saying, certainly it was a good po¬ 
sition for that purpose—certainly it was a good position for ob¬ 
serving the transactions of the enemy ; and being near, assist¬ 
ance might have been sent to any vessels, bad an attack been 
made upon the enemy ; that position might have been taken at 
day-light, when an attack might have been made with advan¬ 
tage to the service. 

Q,. It appearing by the log-book of the Imperieuse that you, 
having previously sent a boat and buoyed the channel into the 
inner road of Aix, weighed at half past eleven A. M. on the 
12th of April, and ran into'the harbour in company with •*he 
./Etna Bomb and a Gun Brig, and that at 2 P.M. you anchored 
in 5 fathoms water and commenced close action with the Ville 
de Varsovie, Calcutta, and Aquilon ; did you weigh and ad¬ 
vance towards the enemy, as before mentioned, by signal from 
the Commander in Chief, or did you do so without orders by 
signal or otherwise ? 

A. I think it necessary, if l am permit ted by the Court, to read 
in answer to this question remarks which I threw together in 
conse<| ence of a letter which I received from the Secretary of 
the Admiralty. 

President —I do not know what may be the opinion of the 
Court, but I confess it appears to me, that the more regular 
course w ould be for Lord Cochrane to answer that question, if it 
is in his power to do it, not by reference to any correspondence 
he had with any other person, but what is the conviction in his 
Lordship’s mind; that is my idea of what should be given in an* 
swer to that question, 


58 

JuDG-fc Advocate —"I was only waiting till his Lordship had 
finished what he had to say, to observe, that if that minute was 
made at a considerable distance of lime after the transaction, 
he cannot refer to it. 

Lord Cochrane — I will finish what I have to say, and then 
submit it to the Court.—In consequence of a letter I received 
from the Secretary of the Admiralty, stating to me that a Court 
Martial was to take place, I wrote these remarks, which contain 
all the transactions which took place in Basque Roads, and are 
expresslv in answer to the above question: the lmperieuse had 
been detached the night before, I having the charge of the fire 
ships to elfect the destruction of the French Fleet, and the Im- 
perieuse had not been recalled from that service. 

President —I still retain the same opinion, that where you 
can have the evidence stated by word of mouth, you are bound 
so to take it, and that you cannot with propriety receive as evi¬ 
dence any thing which has been thrown together as a communi¬ 
cation to another person : that is my idea. If the Judge Advo¬ 
cate, who is our legal adviser, thinks I am erroneous, I will sub¬ 
mit with the greatest satisfaction in the world ; but here is Lord 
Cochrane, who wrote this, in Court, he does not say that his re¬ 
collection is not sufficient to state what is there set down, and I 
think it is only in Ilia shape it can be received. 

Judge Advocate —Certainly, the rule is, that wherever 
persons shall have committed to paper, immediately, or within 
a day or two after the transactions have passed, lie is per¬ 
mitted to look at those memorandums ; but if he has made 
those memoranda at a distance of time afterwards, when it is 
possible that they may not have been made so correctly as if 
they were written a day or two afterwards, it is the constant 
practice to refuse the witness leave even to look at those 
memoranda. 

President —I never in all my experience knew the docu¬ 
ment of a witness permitted to be received when he was present 
himself to be examined. 

Admiral Young —I take it to be a great indulgence to per¬ 
mit them to be referred to, if made even the next day. 

Judge Advocate— Certainly. 

J 

The first part of the question was again read over to 
Lord Cochrane. 

A- No, that is not correct—-it was one o’clock. 

Peesident —Here is the part of the log-book to which the 
question refers—“ At eleven 30 weighed and ran into the har¬ 
bour, in company with the AStna bomb and a gun-brig, the 
enemy making sail up the Charente.” 

A. That is not tiie case. 

President —It so stands on the lo£-book. 

Judge Advocate— Then that entry in the Imperieuse’s log¬ 
book is not correct ? 

A. It is not correct by any means. 


39 


Admiral Stanhope —Here are two logbooks procured m 
Court : 1 want to know, whether it is understood, that the 
Captain has a log-book, distinct from the ship’s log, and if so, 
which is to he taken to be correct; for Lord Cochrane states, 
that he will not answer for the correctness of the ship’s log. 

Judge Advocate —He goes further; for he says it certainly 
is not correct. 

President —And that is what is sworn to by the Master. 

Lord Cochrane —We were not above half an hour in going 
in, certainly. 

Mr. Bicknell—W hen you went in on the 12th, did you 
weigh and advance against the enemy, as before-mentioned, pur¬ 
suant to a signal from the Commander-in-Chief; or did you do 
so without orders from him, by signal or otherwise? 

A. I did so in compliance with what 1 considered to be the 
spirit of the orders 1 had received—the doing of it was my own 
act undoubtedly. 

Mr. Bicknell—I s that inserted respecting the incorrectness 
of the log-book ? 

Judge Advocate —I have not inserted it, but I will do it if it 
is wished. 

Lord Cochrane' — I have no doubt of it; the fires were put 
out, and there were no bells rung, that there might be a diffi¬ 
culty in ascertaining the time. 

President —It will be ascertained at once by the evidence of 
Captain Godfrey. 

Judge Advocate —I have taken it down thus:—“ The entry in 
the log-book, that 1 weighed at half past eleven A.M. is not 
correct.” 

Lord Cochrane —It will probably appear by the log-books 
of the lleet, that I weighed at one o’clock. 

President —In company with the .-Etna ? 

A. The iEtna rather preceded us. 

Mr. Bicknell —It appears also, by the logs before the Court, 
that you made the following communications to the Commander- 
in-Chief on the same day “at 1-30 P.M. enemy’s ships getting 
under sail; at 1-40, enemy superior to chasing ship, hut inferior 
to the fleet; at 1-45 in distress, and in want of immediate 
assistance.” 

A. These signals I must explain, because I really did not in¬ 
tend to make such signals. 

President —That explanation will of course form a part of 
your answer. 

Judge Advocate —The question grounded upon this is, What 
was the nature of the distress of your ship; and did any, and 
what frigates come to your assistance in consequence thereof, 


/ 


40 


by signal from the Commander-in-Chief; and was there any un- 
necessary delay in that respect ? 

A. I enquired by hailing the ^tna bomb, what attack was 
meant to be made upon the enemy. The Commander replied, 
he was ordered to bombard them. I directed him to go close, 
and that we should protect him. It was then one o’clock : the 
French three-decker swung to her hawsers, and the last of their 
ships began to move. 1 bad the charge of the fire-ships, which 
had failed of their expected purpose. I knew what the tongue 
of slander was capable of; and though 1 admit that the feelings 
of my Lord Gambler for the honour and interest of his country 
■were and areas strong as my own, set personal considerations 
were enough ; the expected ions of m country—the hopes of the 
Admiralty—and my own prospecis were about to vanish- 

Judge Advocate— -I am very sorry to interrupt the proceed¬ 
ings of the Court, but having spoken on the paper his Lordship 
has in his hand, I must beg to have the opinion of the Court 
whether he may refer to it or not. J am guided only by a 
sense of my duty. 

Lord Cochrane —I am bound to state the whole truth—I do 
not think J can deliver the whole truth, unless I am assisted by 
these notes 1 have iaken, after being acquainted by the Secretary 
of the Admiralty that this Court-Martial was to take place. If 
I am to state the whole truth, 1 must use these notes. 

Judge Advocate —How long atterwards did your Lordship 
make these notes ? 

A. In June. 

Admiral Young —There appears to be a peculiar impropriety, 
in that which is at all times improper, that any notes not made 
«! the time should be used : these are not only not made at the 
time when his Lordship knew for certain they were to be used in 
file bringing his Commander-in-Chief to trial—therefore, if there 
are any notes which, more than any others, it would be improper 
to use, I should think these are the notes. 

Judge A dvocate— These notes being made in the month of 
June, and the transaction being in April, it is contrary to all 
law that they should be used. 

A dmiral Young —The Court must be satisfied with his Lord- 
ship’s giving (which they know he will do) all the facts within 
his knowledge. 

Loro Cochrane —These memoranda contain nothing but what 
is in the log-book. 

Admiral Stanhope —I think in the letter written by Lord 
Cochrane to the Admiralty, in answer to that in which he is de¬ 
sired to produce satisfactory information to them, so as to enable 
them to judge whether to suspend the Vo'e of Approbation, or 
to take such steps as the circumstances may require, his Lordship 
does nothing hut refer them to the log-books of the fleet, which 
Ins Lordship there says will be found sufficient. Alter this, my 
Cochrane having noticed that a Court-Martial is to take 



41 

/ 

comrnits to paper such things as he thinks it right to state, 
and he wishes to have them introduced ; which appears to me, 
undei any circumstances, improper, but more especially when 
coupled with that letter. 

Lord Cochrane— The Lords of the Admiralty did, what I 
considered a very improper thing: they questioned me as to my 
conduct in Parliament.; and 1 thought that letter a "very proper 
answer to their letter on that subject. 

President— We will not enter into that : the only question is 9 
whether his Lordship can refer to minutes of transactions made 
at such a distance of time; I think the Judge Advocate has st> 
c.eirlv explained it, that there can be no doubt:—I had a doubt 

at first, but I think we must take the evidence my Lord Cochranes 
can give now. 

Lord Cochrane —If my log is put into my hand, I cam 
equally answer the questions. This is all from the log. 

President —I only wish to prevent the introduction of such a 
custom, which I think may he attended with very great evils. 

(Lord Cochrane’s log was handed to him.) 

Judge Advocate —These I understand are copies also ; whea 
were they made ? 

A. They are ail copied from notes I made at the time. 

Q. Has your Lordship the possession of those notes, from 
which you made them ? 

A. it was principally from the copy of the ship’s log, corrected 
by iny own notes. 

President —Weie the notes from whence that was taken 
written at the time of the occurrences, or immediately after- 
\vards ? 

A. Yes. 

Judge Advocate —But is this a correct copy of it; if not, it 
is still objectionable. I understand his Lordship to say there are 
still some little alterations? 

A. There is one circumstance about hailing the Indefatigable, 
which is not mentioned, but every one of the ship’s company 
knows I did hail her; but none of these circumstances are in the 
least material to Lord Gambier. 1 swear that is correct to the 
best of my knowledge. 1 weighed anchor and ran in, and went 
beyond the posssbility of return ; I ordered sail to be made after 
the sternmost ships of the enemy : in standing in I made a signal 
that the chace was superior to the chasing ship, because the Ville 
de Varsovie and Calcutta were both afloat, and immediately af¬ 
terwards that we wanted assistance, which signal is absurdly 
coupled with the words “ being in distress.” When we brought 
up on ihe Palles, we opened our fire upon the Calcutta and Ville 
de Varsovie; the Calcutta was broadside on; the Vide de Var¬ 
sovie lay with her stern towards us, she being under sail, and the 
Aquilon was in the same position. 


c 


42 

President—D o you mean by the same position, being tintTeff 
sail ? 

A. By having her stern towards us she was aground. The 
latter did not tirefora long time, they were employed in clearing 
away their stern, to get guns oul ? when we anchored it was 
about two o’clock ; some brigs had anchored as marked in the 
chart No. 2, for the protection of the bomb, and they were firing, 
but too far off to he of any use. 1 made the signal for those 
to close, bnt as there is no flag to express brigs only, without 
frigates or larger vessels, most of w hich were commanded by my 
seniors, I explained, as far as lay within my means, that this 
signal was intended for them, by firing upon them from the main* 
deck ; for the quarter deck^shot, which t elevated myself, did not 
reach them. This signal, I was afterwards informed, gave con¬ 
siderable offence, and so soon as I heard that from Sir Harry 
Neale, I declared to my Lord Gainbier, that it was not my in¬ 
tention in the slightest degree to hurt his Lordship’s feelings. I 
had then no time to express, by a tedious telegraphic communica¬ 
tion, what I meant to convey; we were all busily employed, 
■when it was reported to me that several sail of the line and fri¬ 
gates were coming to our assistance ; I do not remember the 
first ships that came down, the Revenge, 1 think, was ihe first 
line-of-battie ship; about three the Revenge and several frigates 
came within hail. 1 hailed them to anchor, or they would 
ground immediately, we having taken our berth upon the very 
edge of the shoal. It was then falling tide: several, when an¬ 
chored, opened their fire upon all the ships that were within 
reach, to wit, the Ville de Varsovie, the Aquilon, and the 
Calcutta. I made a signal that the Calcutta had struck; and 
sent a boat to inform those who were firing at her, that our boat 
was then oiv board of her; upon which- Ihe Indefatigable and 
others (I think there was one other) turned their tire to Ihe 
Aquilon and Ville de Varsovie. i ordered our people to cease 
firing: there were then ships enough to destroy the enemy with¬ 
out the Imperieuse. Our people were much fatigued; they 
therefore rested themselves, with the exception of those sta¬ 
tioned to repair the rigging; Ihe other slops continued to fire 
on the Ville de Varsovie and the Aquilon until they struck, which 
was, I think, about six o’clock. The Calcutta was set on fire; 
the enemy, in their consternation, kindled the Le Tonnerre; 
when the Aquilon and Ville de Varsovie were hoarded, our boat 
was employed shifting the' prisoners ; the French were deserting 
several of their ships, with every boat that belonged to them, 
and pulling and sailing for the Rochefort river. An attempt was 
intended to have been made this night to burn the enemy's ship 
called-(he Ocean : Caplain Bligh volunteered upon this service: 
€ap{. Maitland regretted that, on account of Capt. Blight 
having previously undertaken it, he was deprived of that op¬ 
portunity to distinguish himself. 1 was too much tired to un¬ 
dertake it myself. I could scarcely stand from extreme fatigue: 
They were not so- much so. The reason why it was not done, 
1 have only learned since seeing the public dispatch in the 
papers* 


4.3 


President—W hal is the question ? 

(The question was read over.) 

Judge Advocate— This appears to be more a narrative of the 
transactions. 

Lord Gambtf.r — It is an answer to all the parts of the ques¬ 
tion, except the last, as to whether there was any unnecessary 
del at in the frigates coining. 

A. I flunk I have mentioned that the frigates arrived at three 
o’clock. 

Lord Gawbier —At what time was the signal made? 

A. I was so much occupied at the time, that I really cannot 
say. 1 th.nk it was about, ten minutes before we brought up, 
to the best of my recollection. 

Judge Advocate —It appears by the log to have been 1.45. 

A. Certainly, toe two times cannot he correct; it must have 
been taken by two different watches; the vessels had to come 
three miles—they could not have come that in the time. 

Judge Advocate —Does your Lordship say, they could not 
come after the time mentioned here, 1.45.? 

A. 1 dare say that may be about the tune. 

Judge Advocate—T he only part of that question then unan¬ 
swered is, whether there was any unnecessary delay? 

A. As the French had taken their boats to land the people, 
they were almost all ashore that night, and the next morning 
there were two or three chasse-marees in their stead, lightening 
the enemy’s ships, by receiving various articles from on board 
of them. 

Judge Advocate —I believe this question only goes to the 12th? 

A. Then the direct answer is, that there was no delay what¬ 
ever, to the besL of my belief, after Ihe signal for assistance was 
made, on the part of mv Lord Gambler, in ordering vessels to 
our assistance; but had the attack been made in the morning, 
when the tide was falling, until past eight o’clock, and when the 
enemy’s ships were all, with the exception of two, fast aground ; 
the three decker and two others, as shewn in Chart No. 2, lying 
close together, heeling inwards, with their masts and yards ap¬ 
parently locked, in which position they continued until one 
o’clock; it is my opinion, that seven sail of the enemy, includ¬ 
ing the three-decker, might have been destroyed with facility, by 
two sail of tiie line, assisted bv the frigates and smaller vessels; 
and that after the hour of half-past eleven, when the enemy’s 
two ships remained at anchor, until the British fleet weighed, 
that the frigates alone, assisted by the smaller vessels, might 
have destroyed the whole of the above-mentioned ships, the 
rear of which aflerwaids were attacked. 

g 2 


I 


44 


On the answer of Lord Cochrane being read over, when 
the Judge Advocate came to the words, “ this signal 
I was informed, gave considerable offence;” Lord 
Cochrane desired to have the following words inserted : 
—as this signal expressed more than was meant, to 
wit, dose with the Admiral : being informed that it 
gave considerable offence.” 

When the Judge Advocate came to the words, “ and 
that after the hour of half-past eleven;” Lord Coch¬ 
rane desired to have the words, ‘‘ and during the 
rising tide,” inserted before them. 

[ Adjourned to to-morrow morning nine n clock* 



• < 






( 






SECOND DAY , 

THURSDAY the 27th of JULY, 1S03. 


The Right Hon. Lord Cochrane called in again. 

Examined by Mr. Bicknell . 

Q,. Did it appear to your Lordship that there was any unneces¬ 
sary delay on the part of the Commander-in-Chief, from day¬ 
light on the morning of the 12th of April, when your Lordship 
made the signal, “ I hat half the fleet could destroy the enemy’s 
ships,” till the l m per reuse and other frigates went in to the attack 
of the enemy ’s ships on the afternoon of that day ? 

A. Yes; when 1 expressed by signal to the Commander-in- 
Chief, shortly after day-light in tlie morning, that part of the 
British fleet was enough to effect the destruction of the enemy, 
there being only two sail of the enemy’s ships capable in any 
degree to resist an attack, 1 did expect that an endeavour would 
have been immediately made to dsslodge these two ships from 
the situations in which they remained, by an attack by two or 
three sail of the line, which were quite sufficient for that pur¬ 
pose ; the tide and wind were, from day-light in the morning 
until past eight o’clock, both going the same way, and ships of 
the line by passing near to the Boyart and putting their helm-a- 
lee, their fore and main-top sails being to the mast, would have 
brought their heads towards the north east, which would have 
enabled them, at a distance at which the shot of Aix would 
have been of no effect, to have brought ail their guns to bear 
upon the enemy's two ships. 

President — Which two ships do you now allude to ? 

A. The two which siill remained at anchor (they are marked 
in the Chart which 1 have given in to the Court) until they ap¬ 
proached them, or until so far down to leeward that they would 
have been enabled, by put; ing their helms up, to run under their 
sterns, between them and the ships on shore, and thereby capture 
them, or force them to cut and run a ground likewise, and then 
effect both their destruction and the destruction of the other 
vessels which were on shore; and which 1 have already staled 
might have been destroyed by the endeavours, in my opinion, 
of two sail of the line, aided by the frigates, at any period 
previous to half-past eleven o’clock in ihe forenoon of the 12th 
of April, and by the frigates alone before one o’clock, when the 
Trench three-decker svtung to her hawsers, and when the last 




48 


of {heir ships began to float; I speak of (lie line-of-battle ships .; 
some of the frigates did not float, for the two ships which had 
remained at anchor, and cut on the approach of the British fleet, 
had also grounded, there not being, even at twelve o’clock, at 
half tide, water enough for them to effect their escape up the 
middle of the Channel leading to the River Chareute. 

President- —I beg to ask a question lor explanation ; what 
was the tide, an ebb tide or a Hood tide, on the morning of the 
12th? • . ' 

A. '1’he ebb tide was running till twenty minutes past e : ght 
o'clock ; the ebb tide-runs out towards the north-west. 

Q, Dow was the wind ? 

A. The wind was about north-west. 

Q. Then how could the wind and tide be running the same 
way ? 

A. 1 talk of after ten o’clock. 

President —Then there is a lit! le obscurity, not in yourrepre- 
sentalion, but in my comprehension, I dare say ; 1 think you had 
better make that more distinct. 

A. I have expressed it here, iil! past eight o’clock. 

Q. The wind and tide were going contrary ways till past eight 
o’clock ? 

A. Prom eight o’clock til! twelve they were running the 
some way ; I think that it was twenty minutes after eight that 
it turned : the tide and wind were fiom eight to twelve running 
t lie same way. 

Lord Gavibier —That explanation should stand upon the 
minutes. 

Judge Advocate —A witness lias a right when his evidence is. 

* read over, to correct any mistake tie has made. 

President —Do you wish to make any further correction ? 

Lord Cochrane- —-\o, none at all. 

(The Judge Advocate read the rest of the answer.) 

‘Judge Advocate —By “till half past eleven o’clock,” you 
mean from leu to half past eleven? 

, A, l mean at any period after day-light. 

President —What were the circumstances fhat induced vnur 
Lordship to believe, that from half past eleven o’clock, to one 
o’clock, the frigates alone were capable of destroying the ene¬ 
my’s ships; I lake it from the narrative which has just been 
given ? 

A. The helpless situation of the enemy ; they being aground ; 
and the same conviction that led me afterwards to consider the 
risk in attempting it exceedingly small. 

Q. It, in .your Lordship’s judgment, the frigates alone were suf* 
ficient to effect the destruction ol the enemy’s ships between 
s ball past eleven and one, why might they not as weil have per- 


\ 

47 

formed that service between any period of the morning and 
eleven o’clock; the short question is, if they could do it alter 
eleven, why could not they do it before ? 

A. At eleven o’clock the British tleet weighed and stood to¬ 
wards the enemy, whereupon their two ships which continued 
still at anchor, cut and ran aground ; the British tleet brought 
up about half past eleven o’clock ; I was ignorant what my 
Lord Gambier’s plans might he, and though I concluded that the 
tires for cooking had long previously been out, yet l imagined 
that this might possibly have been (I mean the anchoring) to 
give the seamen something to eat and drink. 

President —Really I very humbly beg your pardon, but I 
do not see how this can be an answer. 

Lord Cochrane —If, when it is written, it shall appear not an 
answer to the question, then 1 humbly submit it may be struck 
out. 

Admiral Young— -Y es, but if the Court is of opinion theirtime 
is taken up with any thing which is not relevant, they may l ap¬ 
prehend stop it, when they see that ; that which you are sa\ing 
has no sort of connexion ; they may i conceive determine whe¬ 
ther it shall be taken. 

Lord Cochrane —I apprehend that cannot be seen till the 
Court see what it is 1 am about to say; 1 will, if the Court will 
permit me, finish what I have to say :—To give the seamen 
something to eat and drink previous to gomg into action; and 
though I regretted the time, that appeared in my mind to have 
been already lfist, as well as what we were evidently losing, 
by even half an hour’s delay, in making some kind of an at¬ 
tack, by a couple of sail of the line, or by the frigates only ; 
vet I consoled myself, by the supposition that his Lordship in¬ 
tended a grand blow on the island and on the ships at once, al¬ 
though I thought this neither necessary in order to effect their 
destruction, or prudent with the whole tleet; I could not in 
any other way account for a proceeding, that thus enabled the 
helpless French ships to endeavour their escape undisturbed in¬ 
to the River Chnrente : twelve o’clock arrived, no signal was 
made to weigh anchor; half pasl twelve, still no signal. 

Admiral Young —This is really very improper : this has no 
sort of connection whatever w ith the question which is asked, 
and is only a series of observations to the disadvantage ol the 
prisoner. 

Lord Cochrane — 1 wish to speak the truth, the whole truth, 
and nothing but the truth. lk 

Admiral Young —This really has nothing at all to do wit 1 
the question which is asked you, which arises merely out o 
the statement which you have made. 

Lord Cochrane —If the question is put by a person ignorant 
of tire whole proceedings, and which does not lead to get the 
truth, and the whole truth, I hold that I am to give the whole 


48 

truth ; and that I must depart from an express answer to the 
question, in order to give it. 

Mr. Bicknell— This is a question put by the President, and 
not by me. 

Admiral Young—You say, that at a riven hour of the 
morning, two sail of the line were necessary to destroy the 
ships of the enemy; and, you say also, that at a subsequent hour, 
only two frigates were necessary to destroy them : the short point 
is, why you thought that only those were necessary at that 
period, and not at I he other ? 

Loro Cochrane —In three times more I shall finish what 1 
have to say. 

Admiral Stanhope —Would it not be better, at once, to 
clear the Court and decide upon this ? 

President —My feeling is, that Lord Cochrane should now be 
heard out, till he has terminated his answer : and then it will be 
a question with the Court, whether it shall remain upon the 
minutes. It does not appear to me to be at all relevant ; but, X 
think Lord Cochrane should finish till he comes to the very point 
in question, and answer that point afterwards: it may then he 
for the consideration of the Court, how much of it shall stand as 
evidence. 

Admiral Sutton —I really should wish the Court should be 
cleared upon it. 

(The Court was cleared.) 

(After about 20 minutes, the Court was re-opened.) 

President —Lord Cochrane,—the Court have deliberated 
upon the very digressive manner in which you answered, or were 
proceeding to answer the question put. You will not he inter¬ 
rupted in concluding in the manner in which you shall propose to 
conclude it ; but the Court have also commanded me to say, 
that in all succeeding questions, they must require you to give a 
short and decisive answer to the question put to you. There is 
another thing, my Lord, 1 am commanded to observe, that in 
commenting-on the question you were called upon to reply to, 
you said the question was proposed by ignorance, or some words 
to that effect. I believe I am not incorrect; there were some 
words, as to ignorance, made use of. Now my Lord, if that 
question had been proposed to you, by the Solicitor for the 
Admiralty, and if it should he admitted, that being Solicitor for 
the Admiralty, and not a sea-officer, he might not have pro¬ 
posed a question in strict language; yet, 1 am sure, that your 
Lordship will see, that applying the term of ignorance to an 
officer appointed bv the Admiralty, should not be done in atrial 
of this kind. It was, however, a question proposed by me'; and, 
according to the forms of the Court, handed to the Judge-Advo- 
cate, by tlie Solicitor, to be proposed to your Lordship; and, I 
think, considering ail the circumstances together, it was, in no 
smalt degree, indecorous to the Court, to make use of such au 
expression. 


1 


49 


Lord Cochrane —Had I used the expression in the sense sup¬ 
posed by the Court, I should be reprehensible ; but, I believe I 
said it would leave the Court in ignorance, if I answered merely 
to the question put to me—in ignorance of those things which 
ought to lie known to the Court—that was, as to raj reason 
for not weighing at half-past eleven o’clock, and that it would 
tend to criminate myself t that it would he said, why, if the 
frigates were equally capable of weighing at half-past eleven as 
at one, did I not do it ? aud 1, therefore, found it necessary to 
give that explanation. 

President —That w as not the impression made upon my mind, 
or that ot any one of the Court; for it did not infer that the 
reply you should make would he involved in ignorance, unless 
you elucidated it; hut, the observation was, that, if persons, 
ignorant of the circumstances, proposed questions, they would 
not be informed. 

Lord Cochrane —Then that was really not my intention. 

Admiral Young—W ith respect to the answer you are giving, 
on a supposition that another question would be asked, the an¬ 
swer you are giving would be very proper when that question was 
asked ; but it is in no measure an answer to the question now 
asked ; but Y that question w i as not put, there is no reason what¬ 
ever for giving that answer. 

Lord Cochrane— It appeared to my mind, the evident in¬ 
ference w r as, why did you not yourself get under-weigh at eleven, 
o’clock ? 

President —My question (for I call it mine, notwithstand¬ 
ing all that has passed)—my question was simply that which, 
was explained—“ if the frigates could do the thing at two, 
why could they not have done it at tea?” I think we had 
better now proceed. 

(The question and answer w-cre read over to Lord Cochrane, 

and he proceeded.) 

I ordered the cable to he hove taut up and down—the sea¬ 
men remained at their bars—the ./Etna bomb passed. I en*^ 
quired, by hailing, if any attack was intended to be made oa 
the enemy ; and was answered by the Commander (I think 
it was Captain Godfrey), that he was directed to bombard the 
enemy. I think there was a brig coming after him. I desired 
him to go close ; ami immediately hove the anchor to the bows. 
The impression upon my mind was, having seen no signal made 
to indicate an attack (that is to say, made about that time), 
that no further attack, except that of throwing shells, was in¬ 
tended. The Calcutta, Varsovie, and most of the other sh ps 
were pressing sail to force them on towards the Charente, and 
out of our reach. The Imperieuse, though we did not com¬ 
mence to fire upon the enemy until two o’clock, was then only 
in time by firing upon the Calcutta, to cut away, or to cause 
them to break (from the Confusion into which they were thrown) 
a hawser, that lay from a weather port. The same cause (that 

H 


• 50 

is, flie confusion of the enemy) forced the Varsovie on shorty 
and thereby prevented the escape of those two ships, which were 
the last with the exception of the Aquilon, which vessel, though 
near, was a little further up ; and they on board the Aquilon, 
were in such confusion, that it was upwards of an hour* i think 
an hour and a half, before they could get one single gun out of 
the stern-ports of that vessel. The whole of the enemy’s ship9 
of war were, at two o’clock, in the position shewn in chart No. 
3, which I shall present to the Court; and the British fleet are 
there put down as it appeared from the Imperieuse, from the 
anchorage which she took up, and in which anchorage she con¬ 
tinued until one o’clock, close to the Boyart shoal, just within 
the longest drop of shells from Oleron. The Isle d’Aix, though 
nearest, did not fire at all. 

(His Lordship delivered in the chart.) 

(The question was again read over, at Lord Cochrane’s desire.) 

f f 

Judge Advocate— Your Lordship’s answer goes to subsequent 
proceedings ? 

A. The reasons, if there are any, why the frigates might not# 
previous to the hour of half past eleven o’clock, have attacked 
the enemy, will be found in the preceding narration, wherein it 
appears, that two sail of the line still continued at anchor until 
the hour of half-past eleven o’clock * which two ships, it ap¬ 
peared to iny mind, it would have been better to attack by op¬ 
posing to them two or three sail of the line, instead of a greater 
number of frigates; although it was my opinion, that the frigates 
themselves would have been quite equal to the task ; and this 
opinion, founded upon the situation in which they were, and 
the confusion in which they appeared to be, I expressed, a little 
after day-light, in the morning, in conversation to the officers, 
and, I think, to Captain VYolfe, who then came on board ; who 
likewise expressed to me his opinion. 

Judge Advocate —I am afraid that is not evidence. 

President —Nor is the conversation with the officers any 
evidence. Iam very sorry, Lord Cochrane, to interrupt you. 

Lord Cochrane —Only it gives the Court an opportunity of 
proving the fallacy of what 1 state, by their calling these 
persons. 

President —No, it really is not evidence j it is from facts the 
Court must form their opinion. 

The latter part of the answer was struck out from the 
words— s ‘ equal to the task j” and Lord Cochrane 
proceeded. 

The enemy’s two ships were employed all the morning at¬ 
tempting to get their top-masts up ; which, in the course of six 
hours from day-light in the morning, 1 do not think they had 
quite effected, at the time that they made sail on the approach 
of the British fleet, and ran aground in the middle of the chau- 


51 

fceUcading to the Charente. One, I think, had only her main top- 
tail and foresail set: I think it must have been about half an hou$ 
after the British fleet anchored. That shews the sta.e and 
condition, which caused an impression upon my mind, that they 
were not in a state to fight properly, as they otherwise would 
have done. 

Mr. Bicknell— It being stated in the log-book of the Impe-. 
rieuse, that at four P.M. of the 13th of April, the m-shore 
squadron worked out, the ebb tide having made, and not water 
for the bomb to lie afloat; and it being noted in the log-book of 
the Imperieuse, that, on the same afternoon, yo.ir Lordship 
answered a signal of recall from the Caledonia, and made tele¬ 
graph signal to her; and it not appearing bv the signal-log of 
the Caledonia that any such signal of recall was' made; your 
Lordship is desired to state whether you are cerium that such 
signal of recall was made, and at what time; and whether the 
ill-shore squadron came out in consequence ; and what was the 
purport of the telegraph signal your Lordship made to the Com- 
inander-in-Chief ? 

A. On the morning of the 13th of April, the ships of the line 
which were in the inner anchorage, one of ihem bearing the 
flag of Admiral Stopford, weighed and worked out of the inner 
anchorage, by order, to the best of my belief, from Admiral Stop- 
ford, whose ship shewed some lights, which I understood was a 
signal for that purpose. 

Admiral Sutton— A signal for recall ? 

' A. A signal to work out—they had grounded. 

Q. A signal to the ships under his command ? 

A. A signal to the line-of-battle ships. 

Q, That was the Revenge and the Valiant ? 
r A. They were the only two ships I saw ; others came in in 
the night, and went out in the morn>ng, and l did not observe 
them; 1 was attending to the ships that were burning. The 
Ciesar did not come in till it was dark, at nigh , 1 saw her going 
out again in the morning: this, I understood, was a signal for 
the line-of-battle ships, most of which having grounded, conti¬ 
nued until low water. 

Admiral Sutton —It appears this was a night-signal you are 
alluding to—Does the question allude to a night-signal or a 
day*signal } 

Lord Cochrane — I am going to contradict a part of onr log, 
for it is false if it is supposed the bomb grounded during the 
night. 

President —It is merely stated ; that respecting the bomb 
does not at all refer to the question proposed, which is this— 
It appearing in the log of the Imperieuse, that suen a signal was 
mane to her by the Caledonia, and in the signal-log of Ihe Ca¬ 
ledonia no such signal appearing, are jou certain that such a 
signal was n>ade from the Caledonia to the Imperieuse; and 

H Z 


what was the signal your Lordship made to the Caledonia by 
telegraph?—Lliat is the simple question; the other is merely it 
matter connected with the statement in the log. 

Lord Cochrane —If it has a connexion it should be answ er¬ 
ed; if it has no connexion it should be erased ; for it is not cor¬ 
rect in matter of fact ; this I understood was a signal for the line- 
of-batiie ships, most of those having grounded, having continued 
in situations iu low water, in which it was known by the chart 
that there was not water enough ; I beg to see the log of the 
Iinperieuse about this grounding of the bomb : that must have 
been the afternoon of the next day. 

President —You had better see; there is a possibility that 
these gentlemen may have erroneously extracted from the log. 

( The log was shewn to his Lordship. ) 

Judge Advocate —The entry in the log stands thus “ at four 
■weighed, the in-shore squadron had worked out, the ebb tide 
having made and not water for the bomb to lie afloat, anchored 
near the squadron, supplied his Majesty’s ship yEagle with fore- 
topsail yard then it stands against that, “ answered recall from 
the Caledonia —written in the margin “ made telegraph signal 
to ditto.” 

President— Then your question is, whether such a signal was 
made, and what sigual did you make?—the other is perfectly 
immaterial. 

Mu. Bicknell— The former part of the question may be 
omitted—ttie question goes merely to the recall. 

A. The signal of recall was reported to me to have been made 
by the Caledonia; I answered by the signal “ that the enemy 
could be destroyed.” 

t , ’ | ■ * < 

Mr. Bicknell —That is another day. 

A. I am clear with respect to the date. 

Lord Gambier —This was on the 13th; that Mr. Bicknell 
asks to. 

A. I am now deposing to the 13th ; and I was the further 
confirmed in this opinion by a demi-official letter which 1 hold in 
my hand, directed on service to me by his Lordship. 

President —Would it not be better to say whether there was 
a signal of recall made? 

A, 1 have already said there was, to the best of my informa¬ 
tion, and 1 am going to confirm it. 

Judge Advocate —At what time was it made ? 

A. It was after the bomb came back from bombarding the 
enemy: the exact time I cannot state—perhaps about four 
o clock, or 1 should think it might be towards five. 

. Admiral Douglas'— \S as it previous to your making the 
signal that you could destroy the enemy ? 

A. No: 1 answered it by that signal. 


53 


U 


/ 


Admiral Douglas —That appears to be made at twelve 
o'clock. 

fti* Lordship proceeded —I was the further confirmed in this 
opinion by a demi-official letter which I hold in my hand, 
directed to me on service by his Lordship, ordering out the 1 in- 
perieu.se, together with the bomb, and dated on the 13th, written, 
to the best of my belief, in his Lordship’s own hand, which 1 beg 
may be read to the CourL. 

(The letter was read.) 


44 MY DEAR LORD, 


44 Caledonia, 13lh April. 


44 You have done your part so admirably, that I will not 
44 sulfer you to tarnish it by attempting impossibilities, which I 
44 think, as well as those Captains who have come from you, 
“ any further effort to destroy those ships would he. You must 
44 therefore join as soon as yon can with the bomb, &c. as I 
“ wish for some information which you allude to, before i close 
44 my dispatches. 

44 Your's, my dear Lord, 

“ Most sincerely, 

“ Gambier. 

44 I have ordered three brigs and two rocket-vessels to join 
44 you, with which, and the bomb, yon may make an attempt 
44 on the ship that is aground at the ihiiles, or towards 1. Ma- 
44 dame; but l do not think von will succeed; ami 1 am anxious 
44 you should come to me, as I w ish to send you to England as 
44 soon as possible. You must therefore come as soon as the 
44 tide turns.” 


Judge Advocate —There is no direction upon this ; the cover 
is not with it. 

A. It was a letter received by me from his Lordship, ami 
sealed with his seal : to which l replied with the following letter, 
also of dale the 13th, and with which letter 1 sent a commissioned 
officer. 

(The letter was read.) 


*4 
6 t 


44 Basque Roads, 13lh April. 

44 MY LORD, 

“ I have just had the honour to receive your Lordship’s letter. 
We can destroy the ships which are on shore, which 1 hope 
your Lordship will approve of. 

44 I have the honour to be, &c. 

44 Cochrane. 

44 The Right lion. Lord Gambier.” 


Lord Cochrane —I wish to state that, on the following morn¬ 
ing at nine o’clock, l received another letter from his Lordship, 
in which his Lordship erred in the elate, it being dated the four¬ 
teenth, which letter 1 obeyed, by proceeding to his Lordship as 
soon as possible. 



President —The question is, as to whether the signal made wa* 

on the 13lh ? 

A. 1 positively swear, that to the best of my belief, it was 
made ; 1 made a signal that the enemy could be destroyed ; I re¬ 
ceived his Lordship’s letter on the 13th, and I returned the an¬ 
swer which has been read by a commissioned officer; on the 
morning following I also answered the signal of recall, which I 
saw myself made on board of the Caledonia, which I answered 
by the interrogatory signal, to know if we should unmoor; by 
which, without any repetition pf the former signal, I did con¬ 
clude that his Lordship would have understood what was intend¬ 
ed ; the signal of recall was repeated, which was answered by 
the Imperieuse, being unmoored, hove short; and as the tide was 
done we were permitted by his Lordship to remain until the ebb 
tide began to set, and I received the letter which I hold in my 
hand from his Loidship, directing me to proceed to the outer 
anchorage, and stating that Captain Wolfe was to relieve me. I 
got this on the morning of the 14th, and to the best of my belief 
it was written that day, because it came by a rocket-boat imme¬ 
diately from his Lordship. 

( The letter was read. ) 

t 

“ Caledonia, 13th April, 

“ MY DEAR LORD, 

“ li is necessary i should have some communication with you 
“before I close my dispatches to the Admiralty : I have there- 
“ fore ordered Captain Wolfe to relieve you in the service you 
“ are engaged in : 1 wish you to join me as soon as possible, that 
“ you may convey Sir Harry Neale to England, who will he 
* charged with my dispatches ; or you may return to carry on 
the set v ice where you, are. I expect two bombs to arrive every 
“ moment; they will he useful in it. 

“ Yo.ur’s, my dear Lord, 

“ Most sincerely, 

“ Gambier. ” 

President —It appears by the letter of the 13th, of Lord 
Gambier to your Lordship, that he desired to see you when the 
tide turned ? 

A. It was on the 14th I was to stay til] the tide turned. 

President —What steps did you take in consequence of that 
letter on the 13th—Did you join, or attempt to join Lord 

A. His Lordship permitted me to stop, and on the 14th also 
permitted me stop, because in fact it was impossible to get out ; 
on the 14th, i am convinced I did not make the signal That the 
enemy could he destroyed, because 1 thought it would he disre¬ 
spectful io his Lordship, having the day before conveyed to his 
Lordship my firm opinion on that subject, both by signal and by 
let er. 1 thought a repetition (though I continued of the same 
way of thinking ) would have appeared to his Lordship disre¬ 
spectful ; I therefore made the interrogatory signal. 


55 

loud (tambier —Is that an answer to the question ? 

A. It is in contradiction to the Caledonia’s Log, “ that I 
made that signal on the morning of the 14th.” I made the sig¬ 
nal, conceiving his Lordship would understand it, “ Shall we un¬ 
moor,” and was answered, as I have already stated, in the affirma¬ 
tive, or l think by the direction to weigh. 

Jodoe Advocate —It appears by the log of the Imperieuse, 
that at three P.M. of the 14th of April, the /Etna, with brigs 
iu company, were bombarding the ships in the Charanle. When 
were they withdrawn from the service, and by whose orders? 

A. 1 had just delivered the orders to the bomb, when the Officer 
came in and sent her and the brigs in, but I do not think I was 
in the harbour when they came out, for the same tide that 
brought them oul, must necessarily carry me out also ; but if it 
is necessary to have any deposition as to the grounding of the 
bomb, I can answer that now. 

President —That was considered as a matter of no import¬ 
ance, and was expunged from the former question. 

A. I sent them in to bombard the enemy ; I believe they came 
out after the Imperieuse had weighed and the Aigle had taken 
her anchorage ; I fancy they came out as they did before, by 
nobody’s orders, when the tide set in their favour to get out. 

President —Lord Cochrane does not know bv whose orders, 
and therefore we will take no more than comes within his 
kuowledge. 

A. The day before I told them to come out, when the tide 
permitted them to come. 

President —That may be put down certainly ; that as you 
gave them that order on that day, it is natural to expect they 
would do so the next day. 

A. The day before l told them to come out on the ebb tide, hut 
they did so a little after high water. I believe the mortar was 
split, and I think that was their reason ; I think the thirteen- 
inch mortar was split on the evening of the thirteenth : but they 
were always receiving some damage: they were knocked about a 
good deal. 

Q. Your Lordship having, in your letter to Mr. Secretary 
Pole, iu answer to his letter, requesting you to point out, for the 
information of the Lords of the Admiralty, any instances in 
which you thought the Commander-in-Chief had not dune his 
duty (both of which letters have been read to the Court), referred 
their Lordships generally to the ship’s-log and signal-logs therein 
mentioned; your Lordship is requested to inform the Court, 
whether you thereby meant to draw their Lordships’ attention 
to any other parts of those documents, than those to which you 
have been already interrogated and given your sentiments? 

A. Their Lordshipshaving directed me to explain my reasons, 
I referred their Lordships to the logs and signal-logs of the 
squadron, considering them to be, under every circumstance, the 
best source whence their Lordships could possibly derive informa¬ 
tion. It was not my desire, unless I had been pressed, to have 


56 


drawn their Lordships’ attention to any part of these or any othef 
documents ; 1 considered the affair in Basque Roads, in every 
respect as past, and (whatever my opinion might have been) 
incapable of all remedy ; had it been a matter in which the future 
interests of my country were involved, I should not have 
hesitated one moment in pointing out. 

Judge Advocate— The question is, whether your Lordship has 
any tiling eise to point out ? 

A. I am going to state that. 

President —The question seems to he (your Lordship having 
given an opinion upon various transactions) whether you have 
any thing further to offer to the Court ? 

A. Then I will answer it in one word : I should not have hesi¬ 
tated in calling their attention to every part of these documents, 
and of any others of which I might have been possessed. I have 
now also to call to the attention of the Court this : that had the 
frigates, on the morning of the 13th, instead of leaving the 
inner anchorage, in company with the ships-of the line, remained 
there, full opportunity offered that day to destroy several sail of 
the enemy, which were not out of reach of vessels, properly placed, 
at proper times of the tide ; or of smaller vessels* during every 
part of the tide: and I have seen nocause to alter my opinion. I 
have also to call the attention of the Court to the circumstance, 
that Captain Seymour, of the Pallas, hailed in passing the 
Imperieuse, to know if he should remain in the inner anchorage; 
and was directed by me to do so, if he had no orders to act other¬ 
wise ; for I did imagine it possible (though not all likely), that 
the signal of reca ll had been made without our seeing it. The 
bomb and brigs observing the Imperieuse at anchor, and the 
Pallas bringing up, anchored likewise. Here we lay out. of reach 
of shot or shell, in five and a quarter fathoms water, al tiie 
dead of ebb, these being spring tides ? and there was anchorage, 
as I have already stated, for at least six sail of the line. 

Judge Advocate —That is what is already stated in the evi* 
donee: it is not necessary to slate it again. 

Lord Cochrane —I wish also to call the attention of the Court 
to my reason, alter the Imperieuse was refitted, on the evening 
of the 13th, and after the receipt of the letter (marked A), 
during the evening of that day, or on the morning following, 
previous to the second signal of recall being made, for not having, 
wiih that ship and the Pallas, attacked the enemy, that I felt, 
alter the letter above alluded to, expressing the opinions of my 
my Lord Gaiubicr and of the Captains who had come from the 
inner anchorage, that without any subsequent encouragement, 
a heavy, a very heavy responsibility, would lie upon my shoul¬ 
ders in case of any disaster, which, in military operations, is 
sometimes unavoidable: if l had had my cable shot away, for 
instance, I might have been sunk : all these things are possible, 
though not at all probable. I think there is nothing further to 
vhich i have to call the attention of the Court: there is nothing 
further that 1 immediately recollect. 


57 

fort. Bic knell — I have no further questions to ask Lord 

'Cochrane. 

Lord Cochrane —I have nothing further, except the orders 
given to Captain Wolfe, who superseded me in the inner an¬ 
chorage, with lull powers, by any means to effect the destruction 
of the enemy. 

President —Is that addressed to your Lordship, or to Captain 
Wolfe ? 

A. Of course, when I was relieved, I called for a copy of the 
order he had received, that is dated by mistake the 13th of 
April, but delivered on the 14th. 

Lord Gambier— That might he the same mistake’a* the 
other—rightly da.ed, but not immediately delivered. There 
was no mistake : it might he dated the 13fh, but not delivered 
immediately : a letter might he dated a week before it was de¬ 
livered. 

A. The order was shewn to me on the 14th, by Capt. Wolfe, 
w hen he superseded me. 

Admiral Stanhope —Is this meant to supply the place of what 
before was said about its being dated by mistake? 

Judge Advocate —They both stand upon my minutes. 

Loro Cochr ane —Sir Harry Neale’s letter to me also is dated 
the 14t:h, so that there appears to have been a mistake in the 
ship as to the day: that is a private letter to me, which I have 
in iny pocket. 

On the evidence being read over, his Lordship desired 
that that part of it, as to the mistake in dating the 
letter, might be preceded by the words “1 believe.’* 

Admiral Stanhope —It is with a view to that which your Lord- 
ship has said that I said what I did ; there can be no disposition 
in any person to suspect your Lordship of saying any thing but 
what you strictly beiieve. 

Lord Cochrane —My reason for explaining this in the latter 
part, was to shew that we did the day before make the signal, 
“ that we could destroy I he enemy but to say positively, we 
did not make the signal to destroy the enemy the next day. When 
I made the interrogatory signal the next morning, I thought 
Lord Gambier would conclude my opinion was the same as it 
was the day before, without any harshness ou my part in making 
it. 

President — I beg permission of the Court to ask one or two 
questions.—When did your Lordship first discover that in the 
inner road of Aix or of Basque, there was anchorage sufficiently 
capacious to contain six sail of the line to ride, without being in 
range of shot, or shell ? 

A. I had been in possession of the French charts, which I have 
not found to be defective, in any material point, for a period of 

1 


% 


years; ;md from those charts I had at all time* drawn my contu¬ 
sions, with respect to the depth of the water or oiher circum¬ 
stances, which relate to navigation upon that enemy s coast. 

President —That coast of the enemy, 1 suppose yon mean? 

A. I refer to the French coast. The Spanish charts also are 
exceedingly good; I always go by them, and on them in this 
case, as in all others, 1 placed my dependancc. I went in—on 
my way l found them correct. I knew by the chart, that when 
in pursuit of the Calcutta I was to find a bank; I found it, au<f 
anchored upon it, and this 1 did knowing what 1 was about. 

Admiral Young —Was the bank the anchorage? 

A. I could not get so close as I w as desirous of going. 

Q,. When did you discover that there was this anchorage in 
tleep water? 

A. I have, said, that in going in I found the soundings correct 
in my track close by the Boyart, and that in fact I had that 
confidence in the chart, that I had said to Admiral Keats, when 
we were off there, and to Admiral Thornborough, that there 
could be no difficulty in going in there and destroying the 
enemy’s fleet, and I took the chart on board Admiral Thorn- 
borough’s ship. It was at that time that the plan went to the 
Admiralty for destroy ing the French fleet. I will only say, by 
which it has long appeared to me, that this anchorage might, 
if any object was in view, be taken. 

President—- In the chart that your Lordship consulted upon 
this occasion, are the soundings so marked as to afford a space 
sufficient for six sail of the line not within range of shot or shell? 

A. That conviction was upon my mind, and is upon my mind; 
but by referring to the chart, which is exactly the same as others 
which have been in my possession, those soundings are marked; 
the Court can, by referring thereto, decide the question. 

Q. When you found by experience, upon going into Aix: 
Roads, that the soundings were correctly laid down in the chart 
you made use of, in which you state you placed great confidence, 
and from whence you drew a conclusion, that there was safe an¬ 
chorage for six sail of the line—Did you make any communica¬ 
tion of that important fact to the CoiAmander-in-Cbief ? 

A. The Commander-in-Chief had the same charts, I believe, 
a's I was in possession of, upon which, as I have already staled, I 
formed my conclusions with respect to the anchorage above al¬ 
luded to ; he had also French pilots on board, upon whose reports, 
from previous experience, I knew the Commander-in-Chief to rely 
above all other authority. In reconnoitring the fleet the first 
day, when so near as to induce the enemy to open a fire from 
almost his «hole line, I reported to the Commander-in-Chief 
the ruinous state of the Isle d’Aix, it having the inner fortifica¬ 
tions completely blown up and destroyed, which I not only as¬ 
certained from the deck with perfect precision as to the side to¬ 
wards us, but also as to the opposite side, from one of the 
of the ship. There were only thirteen guns mounted- 


59 


Admiral Young —Will you consider, my Lord Cochrane* 
before you go on, how far this is relevant ? 

Lord Cochrane —I am only going to say the impression 
which l knew was upon his Lordship’s mind, notwithstanding I 
vouched for these facts with my own eyes, and notwithstanding 
these French pilots had not been there for several years: there 
were only thirteen guns mounted on that side on which I had 
formerly seen, to the best of my recollection, about lifty. In 
making these observations to his Lordship, for his information, 
he stated his perfect reliance upon the opinion of the pilots, and 
assured me that the Isle d’Aix was exceedingly strong, and that 
(\ think) it had three tier of guns mounted tow ards the shipping. 

I then observed to his Lordship, that the circumstances I had 
related fell within my own observation, which did uot alter his 
Lordship’s opinion : 1 noticed also the little confidence which 
was to be placed in these pilots, and said to his Lordship, as well 
as to Sir Harry Neale, that 1 never yet had a pilot. 

JunGE Advocate —-Can this relate to the question which is 
asked ? 

Lord Cochrane —Yes; I conceive so, as my reason for not 
communicating to his Lordship. 

President —Lord Cochrane states this as his reason for not 
taking a particular line of conduct ? 

Lord Cochrane —I have felt that if I had answered yes or no 
to all the questions which have been put to me, I ought to be 
hung; and that if a Court-Martial was held upon me, and only 
the answers yes or no appeared to those questions, I should be 
hung for them. 

Judge Advocate —I believe nobody has desired your Lord- 
ship to answer merely yes or no. 

Lord Cochrane — I answered that I never yet knew a pilot, 
particularly a French pilot, who did not find a shoal wlierever 
ttiere was a gun; and his Lordship, on the day of my leaving 
Basque Roads, which was the 16th or the 15th, still continued 
of the same opinion with respect to the Isle d'Aix, notwith¬ 
standing my assurances then, when I had had tull time to make 
my observations upon every part of it ; and as the whole of the 
frigates, with the exception of the Pallas, had withdrawn ; and 
as it was evident to the knowledge of his Lordship, as well as 
to the knowledge of every one of those officers, that those fri¬ 
gates might have continued where the Imperieuse and Fallas 
then were; I held their being placed in that situation a matter 
for his Lordship’s decision. I naturally conceived that as even 
these were not ordered to return (I conceived in my own mind, 
for I did not express it to any body), that as those were not or¬ 
dered back, again, his Lordship did uot require any information 
of which he was uot possessed. 

i 2 


t>0 


Admiral Young—I t should seem* from a part of your answer* 
that your soundings to discover the position for six sail of lht> 
line was after the burning of the enemy’s snips ? 

A. By the soundings which I made, I was only confirmed in 
my opinion of the correctness of the French charts; our’s arc 
abominable, and not fit to be delivered out. 

Q. Is it necessary, in order to arrive at that anchorage, to 
pass the shoal of the Palies ? 

A. You are between the Palies and the shore opposite, just 
as at ^pithead, you are between the Isle of Wight and the 
shore of England. The shoal of the Palies bouuds the ancho¬ 
rage towards the East, and the island of Oleron towards the 
west, but you do not pass either of them, you anchor between 
them. 

Admiral Young— That last question maybe put out, I will 
put another.—Can ships arrive al that anchorage at all times of 
the tide ? 

A. By following the track which I judged best to take in the 
Imperieuse, that being furthest off from the fire of the enemy, 
I do believe, as I have already stated, that ships of the line 
may pass in at any time of the tide. I sat upon the netting, 
attending to the lead during the time we were going in ; it was 
then high water, and having remarked that the rise and fall of 
the tide was stated at, I think, about ten feet upon that chart, 
the impression upon my mind was that I should not with a ship 
of the line hesitate to go in ; I think the impression upon my 
mind at the same time was, that at low water it would not be 
proper to take the very heaviest ships, those with three decks, 
in ; that at the dead of the ebb there was no occasion to bring 
in a three-decker to batter a parcel of ships. I think what we 
carried over the shoal v.as a quarter six; the high water was 
just turning then ; I do not think we had any less than a quarter 
six. I was very near to the Boyart; I wanted to get out of the 
way of the battery of the enemy ; 1 think I could have thrown 
a penny-piece upon the Boyart without difficult). When l 
speak of the three-deckers, I should mention that the Gibraltar 
drew as much water as the three-deckers, and therefore the 
observation equally applies to her. 

Q,. Was it at the time of spring or neap tides you passed in ? 

A. 1 think it was two days or one day previous lo the full 
moon. 1 think that it was within a day, or that it was that very 
clay lull moon, and they expected the very next day to be the 
highest tide. 

Q. All the information your Lordship has of the rising or 
falling of the water was obtained from the charts only, and 
without any sounding or experience of your own ? 

Lord Cochrane—I beg to ask for an explanation. Do you 
mean as to the rise and fall of the tide, or the soundings ? 

Admiral Young — The rise and fall of the tides. 



61 


.AV I hart remarked, when cruising before upon that coast, 
the rise ami fall about Sable d’Oionue, which is not far distant* 
to be about ten or twelve feet : at the highest of the tide it was 
stated to me there, that it was not above ten or twelve feet at 
the highest tides. 1 frequently landed upon the beach, which 
confirmed iny observation; and 1 thought afterward, when the 
French ships lay aground, that they sued about ten feel. The 
copper was wet about as high as 1 could reach: 1 could not 
reach to the top of the copper, in fact. The Aquilon, on board 
of which I was, had sued about ten feet: it must have been the 
dead of low water when I went with the Frenchman to get out 
his things; I think about eight in the evening, or a little after 
eight in the evening of the i3th. 

Q,. You have said, that if the ships of the line had brought to 
with their heads to the north-east, near the Boyart shoal, they 
might have engaged the two French ships that remained at 
anchor, without being within reach of s ml or shell trom the 
Isle d’Aix. Thai is what you have said, is it not ? 

A. I mean without risk of shot or shells: they might fire 
twenty or thirty pounds of powder without an eighty-gun ship 
being in much danger. 

Q. You now say, without danger from shot or shells from the 
Isle d’Aix—Would they have been nearer to those ships than to 
the Isle d’A ix ? 

A. I should not have thought of bringing any ship’s broad¬ 
side to an enemy, when at a distance so great as from the Isle 
d’Aix to the Boyart, hut should have continued in the same 
course that ships would do in going to the inner anchorage, until 
the enemy’s shot began to tel!, and then l should have brought 
the broadside of the ships to bear in the manner before-described, 
having their head towards the northward and eastward. It may- 
save another question, if l go on to say,-—or if their shot did 
not tell at all, so as materially to injure, I should probably have 
proceeded to bring the larboard-guns to hear, by passing upon 
the side opposite to the Isle d’Aix, until I had placed my ship or 
ships in such a situation, as not only to capture or destroy these, 
but those also which were lying as in chart No. 2. 

Admiral Young —My question goes to an observation of your 
own, that the ships might have been brought up close to the 
Boyart shoal, and engaged the enemy \s ships without any danger 
from the Isle d’Aix; the telling of shot depends upon the skill 
and coolness with which the men lire. 

A. And a great deal upon the distance. 

Admiral Young —My question is, whether the distance was 
such as to create danger ? 

A. I observed several of the shot going down directly in this 
way into the water (skewing il). 1 would lie there for a week 
and they not hit me twice. 


62 


<1. At the same time that yon could hit the ships lying at 
anchor, was there any danger of your being hit by the batteries at 
Isle d’Aix ? 

A. Then I should have proceeded to the other side; I should 
have proceeded to a broadside if it bad been necessary, and one 
was just as good as the other. 

Cl. You afterwards said, that after a time they might have 
put their helms up and run under the sterns of the ships that 
were at anchor, and there engage both those ships and the ships 
that were on shore.—I wish to ask whether that was a situation 
in which any of our ships were at any time placed ? 

A. I have sax! that provided I found it more expedient, I 
would have done so. 

Admiral Young —The question I mean to ask is, whether 
any of our ships were placed in that situation at any time? 

A. I am going to mention, that the Valiant was there ; the 
Valiant anchored here (shewing it); but there is a great depth of 
water; there is no less than sixteen or seventeen fathom of 
water where the French ships lay; the Valiant and several of 
the ships which joined the Imperieuse (I think it was all except 
the Indefatigable) about three o’clock P.M. on the 12th of 
April, placed themselves in the position, or rather passed the 
position above alluded to, and went on towards the end of the 
shoal, which in the case stated in the question would not have 
been necessary. 

Admiral Duckworth —Tour Lordship having stated, that if 
two or three sail of the line in coming in had borrowed close 
upon the Boyart, had then lain their main or fore-topsails aback, 
and after a period which I suppose must allude to having taken 
the tide under their lee, so as to enable them afterwards to have 
borne up, to have gone under the lee of the enemy’s two line- 
of-battle ships then afloat, was there space enough for cither one 
or two or tnree sail of the line to have taken up an anchorage 
with even part of their broadsides tp bear on those two ships, 
without taking the ground ? 

A. I did not consider the tide under the lee as a point essential. 

A.dmiral Duckworth —Your Lordship might state that, for 
that was only mv idea of what you meant. 

A. It is a direct answer to the question, I did not consider the 
tide under the lee as a point essential to the bearing-up ; there was 
sufficient room, I can speak with positive certainty ; for we in 
the Imperieuse, when working out from the position which we 
occupied, as shewn in chart No. 3, tacked repeatedly, and tra¬ 
versed all the space between the shoal of the Boyart and the 
buoys of the enemy. 

Admiral Young —By the buoys of the enemy, do you meaft 
the enemy’s ships ? 

A. Yes. 


63 

President—D o you mean the buoys of the ships driven on 
shore ? 

A. The buoys of six or seven sail of the enemy, where they 
had been anchored in line; I should not have stood so far to¬ 
wards these buoys had it not been that the enemy seemed little 
inclined to disturb us, which I attributed to the ruinous state of 
their works, and concluded therefrom that they were in want of 
powderorother military stores: I should not have chosen, however, 
any distant station, but should probably have brought up along¬ 
side of them, and on that side directly opposite to Isled’Aix. Tne. 
three-decker and the other ships that were on shore, two of 
which appeared to have their masts locked in with her’s, (they 
were touching each other, and I think they must be locked in 
together,) could have given no material disturbance in such a 
position, and these three might have been destroyed ; holes might 
have been made in the bottom if we chose, or they might have 
been filled with water by one 7 4, had she been sent to attack 
them, or even by a frigate or two, while the two French line-of- 
battle ships were occupied at their anchors, as is above supposed, 
had they persevered contrary to what afterwards was the case in 
that situation. 

On the answer being read over, after the words “ want 
of powder or other military stores,” fiord Cochrane 
desired to have inserted the following words:—“ [ 
concluded also that it might be from consternation 
on the attack upon their ships, and the destruction of 
them.” 

Admiral Duckworth —Your Lordship says that vessels might 
have come and taken up a position between the ships lying at 
anchor, and those aground— I ask, whether there was room in 
that inside space to take up a position so as to affect the ships 
a-float. 

A. Yes : it was in reference to your question that I have gone 
into this narrative. 

Q. I do not mean between I he Boyart and where these ships 
lie, but between those ships that were afloat and the others ; 
whether there was room to take up a position from which to 
cannonade that ship? 

A. It is taken for granted in the question, that the spare was 
narrow between, which was not the case; and theretore I was 
led into that which was a short digression. The three ships 
that were on shore, from what I afterwards saw, must have 
been a pretty long cannon-shot from the ships that were afloat— 
a very long cannon-shot. 

Admiral Young —The Revenge and Valiant were sent in to 
aid you—Were they recalled by signal ? 

A. I have since learned it, but I did not know it: I under¬ 
stood that there were three lights hoisted. 1 was very sleepy, 
and was not much pleased with the officer of the watch uakiii 
me, to tell me that there were three lights hoisted, which 




Understood afterwards was an order for the line-of-battle ship# 
to weigh. The Caesar and another ship I do not think I ever 
saw; they went out very early in the morning. Some persons 
were kindling the two line-of-battle ships near us, and not know¬ 
ing that their magazines were drowned, my attention was taken 
ii<» in the preservation of the Imperiense. 1 concluded, from the 
ships getting under weigh immediately afterwards* that the 
signal was for that purpose; and I was told, l think, some days 
ago, that that was the purpose of if. I did not myself see any 
signal, except the lights above referred to was that signal, and 
I do not know by whom the signal was made: the impression 
on my mind was, til! two days ago, that Capt; in Beresford’s 
ship was chosen for the flag of Admiral Stoptord, on account 
of its being a less draught of water, but I cannot say. 

Q. Was the signal made in Aix Roads, or in Basque Roads? 

A. It was made in Aix Roads; for it was reported to me to 
be Admiral Stopford, who, I thought, had hoisted his flag on 
board the Theseus. When I arrived at the outer anchorage, I 
mentioned to my Lord Gambler, that, as there could be no 
jealousy with respect to Admiral Stopford, it would he a matter 
essential to the service t o send the Admiral in with the frigates 
or other vessels, which his Lordship thought best, as his zeal for 
the service would accomplish what l considered yet more credit¬ 
able than any thing that had been done. I apologized for the 
freedom I used with his Lordship, and staled, that I took that 
liberty as a friend; for it would be impossible, things remaining 
as they were, to prevent a noise being made about it in England. 

1 said,—My Lord, you have before desired me to speak candidly 
to you, and I have used that freedom. 1 have no wish or desire 
but for the service of our country. To which his Lordship re¬ 
plied, that if I threw blame, it would appear like arrogantly 
claiming all the merit to myself. I assured his Lordship I had 
no such intention, aed mentioned to him, at the same time, 
that it was not my desire to carry the dispatches, or to goto 
London with Sir Harry Neale on the occasion. His Lordship 
immediately afler delivered to me an order directing the above. 
When I weighed, I had the satisfaction to have it reported to me, 
(I do not remember positively whether 1 saw it. or not) that the 
signal had been made for Admiral Stopford, which 1 concluded 
to be for the purpose of going in with the frigates. 

Admiral Young —Was it a signal for the Admiral to goto 
him ? 

A. The signal, I think, was made for Admiral Stopford to 
come on board the Caledonia, but that was immediately after I 
left his Lordship. I immediately remarked to the officers about 
me, that now the business would be done. 

Admiral Young —We should not hear what passed between 
your Lordship and others. 

A. The signal was made for Admiral Stopford; but whether 
to execute tire above purpose by the frigates, or other means, 5 
do uot, from my own knowledge, know. 


69 


(On the latter part of the evidence being read over,) 

Admiral Young —The words would seem to imply that you 
had seen (he lights; which is not what you mean ? 

A. 1 did not see them : (hey were reported to me. 

President—I t may be understood, though it is not so clear as it 
might be made. Lord Gambier,—the Court have no further 
questions to propose to Lord Cochrane : has your Lordship any 
wish to propose any questions to him ? 

Lord Gambier —At present I have none: but I shall have 
some questions to propose to Lord Cochrane, at some other 
time. 

President —You do not wish to propose any, by way of cross- 
examination, now ? 

Lord Gambier —No, Sir, I do not. 

Lord Cochrane —I will only add, that I again respectfully 
mentioned that which I had before staled to Lord Gambier, 
when l took my leave of him on going on board the Imperieuse. 

Mr. Bicknell — I would submit to the Court, whether it is 
necessary that I should call any more witnesses on the part of 
the prosecution. I mean to ask a general question of my Lord 
Gamhier’s Captain and some others, whom I understand Lord 
Gambier means to call as his witnesses.—! propose, therefore, 
taking the opportunity of their being so called. 

President —-If you do not wish to call any more witnesses ora 
what is called the prosecution; perhaps his Lordship, not being 
aware that it would end so abruptly (it being now announced, 
by Mr. Bicknell that he wishes to call no other witnesses), will 
wish to take till to-morrow morning. 

Lord Gambier —I should think it would be advisable, that any 
questions proposed to be put on the side of the prosecution, as 
to any thing which can criminate me, should be put before Ljbegin 
my defence. 

Mr. Bicknell —It is not, as to any particular circumstance 
which will criminate your Lordship ; it is only a general ques¬ 
tion. 

Lord Gambier —I should wish to know what that question 
is, because it may be necessary for me to explain in my defence., 
the point referred to by that question. 

Mr. Bicknell —With the permission of the Court I will call 
Admiral St op ford now, and put the question to him; the question 
will be the same to the other officers. 


[The witness withdrew. 


Rear-Admiral the Hon. Robert Stopford called in* 
Examined by *ftlr . BicknelL 

Q. Having beard the orders from the Lords Commissioner* 
of the Admiralty to the Commauder-ici-Chief to attack the 
fehemy’s fleet in Basque Roads, and the letter stating the result of 
such attack, and the charges preferred against his Lordship read, 
you will be pleased to state to the Court, whether you know of 
any neglect or unnecessary delay on the part of the Commander- 
in-Chief, in taking effectual measures for the destruction of the 
enemy’s ships, or any deficiency in any part ot his Lordship’s 
conduct between the* 17th day of March and the 29th day of 
April, 1809 ; or whether it appears to you, that he used every 
means in his power to carry into effect the above-mentioned 
orders ? 

Admiral Stopford —Is it necessary I should enter into a de¬ 
tail of the events, or answer that in short ? 

President —The question is a very general question. 

Judge Advocate —If you think it necessary to state any 
thing to the Court, you will of course enter into the detail of 
that. 

A. Under all the circumstances of the case, viewed in every 
point which I am capable of, and giving to the Commander-in- 
Chief the free use and exercise of that discretion which every 
Commandcr-in-Chicf must possess, in the execution of those 
measures for which he alone is responsible, I do not think there 
was any delay or deficiency on tiie part of the Commander-iu- 
Chief, in executing the service entrusted to his Lordship’s care. 

Admiral Young —Was the fleet in Basque Roads unmoored 
previous to the going in of the frigates on the 11th ? 

A. The first part of that day they were unmoored* 

Q,, Do you know why they were unmoored 5 

A. In the conversation lhad with the Commander-in-Chief, at 
the time of unmooring, on board 1 fie Caledonia, I understood it 
was for the purpose of being ready to take advantage of any 
favourable circumstance in which the fleet could act : 1 must 
also add, that there were some conversations which, however, 
had no practical effect, as they were not carried into execution ; 
respecting making a shew of the fleet getting under weigh, in 
order to deceive the enemy, as I apprehend, for the purpose of 
preventing the enemy’s boats from coming out to intercept the 
lire ships that were to go in that evening. 

Q. W as the fleet moored again in the course of that day ? 

A* Yes ; the signal was made and the fleet moored, except the 
Cresar, near about sunset on that day ; the reason the Ciesar was 
not moored, was on account of her having the launches and the 
boats of the fleet hanging by her: I veered two cables for her 
greater security, considering the freshness of the breeze another 


n 


tcnson why the Caesar was not moored was, she was lying at one 
extremity of the line, and could have sheared in that direction, 
without risk of running on board any other ship. 

Q,. Do you know what induced the Commander-in-Chief to 
order the fleet to be moored again ; or if you do not know hi* 
reason, did you see any sufficient cause for its being done ? 

A. 1 he Com inander-m-Chief did not at the time communi¬ 
cate to me his reasons for mooring the fleet, but from the close 
order in which some part of the fleet were originally moored, and 
considering also the strength of the tide, l think there might 
have been some risk of the ships nearest to each other, gettm<r 
on board ot each other, had they remained at single anchor. ** 

Q. The morning after the fire-ships were sent in against the 
enemy’s fleet, some signals or telegraphic communications were 
made from the Imperieuse, to the Commander-in-Chief-—Do you 
recollect what they were ? 

A. I must in the first place acquaint the Court, that I must 
speak upon this subject of the signals more from recollection 
than my signal-log, for the signal officer of ihe Caesar was sent 
in one of the fire-ships at that time, and had not returned, and 
the si .-nals made were not put down corredly. I do sufficiently 
know the signals made to speak to them with a tolerable de°ree 
of accuracy, but it is from recollection and from information of 
ihe Captain. 

Q,. Officially reported to you by the Captain of the Caesar ? 

A. Yes; the first signal reported to me to have been made by 
the Imperieuse was, as well as I can recollect, “ Seven of the 
enemy’s ships on shore, the fleet can destroy them;'’ soon 
afterwards the same repeated, with “ Half the fleet can destroy 
them:” I cannot say exactly the number of the enemy’s ships 
stated. That was the first part of the morning. Does the 
question go to what signals were made in the course of the day ? 

Admiral Young —Any other in the course of that day ? 

A. These were from half after six to nearly eight o’clock, aff 
nearly as I can recollect. I do not recollect any other signal 
made by the Imperieuse till she was under sail, between half 
past twelve and one o’clock, or thereabouts, the same day, and 
standing in towards the enemy, the Imperieuse made a signal 
“ that the enemy’s ships were superior to the ships in chase, but 
inferior to the fleet united;” also, “ that the Imperieuse was in 
distress, and wanted immediate assistance;” which was made 
the first of those two I cannot take upon my self to say. 

Q. Did you see, or was it at any time in the course of that 
day officially reported to you, that the Imperieuse had informed 
the Commander-in-Chief, by telegraph or signal, “ that two 
sail of the line would be sufficient to destroy the enemy.” 

A. No such signal was ever reported to me to have been made, 
or any such communication to have been delivered, to the Com* 
njander-in-Chief. 

K 2 


Ct, Was any official information given to you of the Con*- 
mander-in-Chief having recalled the Iinpericuse on the morning 
of the 12th ? 

A. No such official communication was ever made to me. 

Q. The Revenge, the Valiant, and the Osar, are stated to 
have been sent into the Road of Aix—Did they go iii ? 

A. They went in at different times of the day, the Caesar som6 
hours after the Revenge and V aliant; a fourth ship, the iheseus, 
weut in a hltie before the Ccesar. 

Q,. Were they recalled by signal, or by any other means, by the 
Commander-in-Chief? 

A. They were recalled by no order from the Commander-in- 
Chief, but came out, apart of them by directions from me—the 
Theseus and the Valiant ; and 1 must also add, that I ordered the 
Revenge to come out, hut I am not sure whether Captain Kerr 
received my orders ; the ship came out: the next morning. 

Q. What was your reason for calling those ships from the ser¬ 
vice'on which they were ordered, without directions from the 
Comnjfaoqer-in-Cnicf ? 

A. The imminent and evident danger to which the ships were 
exposed, by a longer continuance in that anchorage ; also the 
certainly that they con'd not be employed With effect in the 
further destruction of'the enemy’s ships. 

Q,. Did you consider the danger to which they would have 
been exposed by remaining there to be occasioned by the enemy’s 
batteries, or the badness of the roadsted, or both ? 

A. From both. Theprecedirigevening, when the Ccesar wasgoing 
in, the ship got ashore, and remained thfere 3 hours within range 
of shot from the enemy’s batteries, and this contrary to the ex¬ 
pectation of the pilot, who told me there was sufficient wafer 
there. The Captains of the Theseus and Valiant also informed 
me, on that evening, that their ships had been aground. 

Q,. On what shoal was the Ccesar aground? 

A. It must either have been a continuation of the Boyart 
shoal, or else a separate bank in the direction of that shoal; at 
the time we got ashore, it was nearly dark, and the enemy did 
not perceive our situation—that we were on shore ; and there¬ 
fore only one shot from the batteries went over the ship after 
she struck the ground; if it had been day-light, I should have 
despaired of getting the ship off. 

Q,. Did you know, that within the road of Aix there was an 
anchorage capable of containing six sail of the line, perfectly 
out of the reach of shot or shells from any of the enemy’s 
batteries ? 

A. Previous to our frigates going in, I certainly did not know 
it, although some pilots were of opinion there was, and others 
that there was not ; and respecting the number of ships that 
place was able to contain, 1 have understood it never contained 
more than lour ships with live fathom at low water, out of C«e 


range of shot or shells. I must add, that had I known of that 
anchorage before l went in with the Caesar, I should have ex¬ 
pected little good to arise from any of the ships going there, as 
it was completely out of the reach of aunoj.auce to any of the 
euemy’s ships that were on shore. 

Q One of the reasons you have given for withdrawing the 
ships from the Road ot Aix was, that tiie^y could not he em¬ 
ployed with effect in the further destruction of the enemy’s ships 
'—Were yon, before ii was dark, in a situation, from which you 
could so see the enemy’s ships, as to feel quite satisfied that ships 
of the line could do them no more mischief? 

A. Before l went in, and in going in, 1 observed the enemy’s 
ships which had not struck, had gone in 50 near to the batteries 
of the Isle d’Atx ; and being also in a part of the anchorage with 
which we were very imperfectly acquainted, except from having 
seen a French ship wrecked on the Pailes shoal ; .some weeks 
before I was of opinion, that both with respect to the naviga?- 
tion, and the exposure from the batteries, the ships could not 
have been employed with effect, without imminent risk of their 
safety. < • . > 

Q. You have commanded a squadron fpr a considerable.time 
in Basque Roads ? 

A. 1 have. • . >r i n><. •• •<!»*> - '» 

tip 

Q,. Have you had an opportunity of ascertaining correctly how 
much the tide rises at sflnng 'tides ? ♦. » 

A. We generally estimate it from 18 to 21 feet, according to 
the set of the wind at the time of full moon, the north-west 
winds making the tide higher. 

a - * 7. , ?• . ,• . - i 

• * * ’ 

Q. When the Imperieuse made the'signal in the morning, 
that the enemy’s ships were on shore, anckthe fleet, might destroy 
them, would you, with the experience you have had as a fldg- 
oflicer, have thought it prudent or proper to lead in the fleet to 
destroy them ? * 

A. In my opinion, the dislodgment from their anchorage of 
the enemy’s ships by fire-ships, removed but a very small part of- 
the obstacle which ever existed in my m ind, and in those of other 
officers who have commanded before me, towards the British 
Fleet going in to attack them ; the difficulties of the navigation, 
and our imperfect acquaintance with it, with the wind right in, 
would, 1 think, have made me unworthy of command, if i had 
risked a fleet or a squadron entrusted to my charge, in a situa¬ 
tion where our’s would have been only the loss, and the enemy’s 
ail the advantage. 

Q. When the Imperieuse afterwards made a signal, or in¬ 
formed the Admiral that half the fleet would be sufficient to 
destroy the enemy, would you have carried in half the fleet ? 

A. In this and the former answer, I must be considered as 
speaking of the state of (he wind chiefly ; that my conduct, as 
commanding officer of the squadron, would have been governed 
chiefly by tiie state of the wind. 


u 

Admiraz, Young— My question was, under the circumstances 
at the time ? 

A. With the wind as it then was, and with the broadside of 
three ships still commanding the passage, I think I should hate 
been so crippled in going in, and also so crippled in endeavourin 
to work out, with a passage a little more than a mile and an ha 
in breadth, that 1 think I should not have risked the attack, had 
they been under my command. 

Q,. When the Imperieuse made the signal of being in distress, 
and wanting immediate assistance, were any ships immediately 
sent to assist her ? 

A. I will not pretend to say, whether the frigates that were 
ordered in by the Commander-in-Chief were ordered in before or 
after that signal; hut there were several of the vessels under 
way nearly about that time going in. I do not recollect any 
signal having been made immediately by the Coromander-in- 
Chief, in consequence of that signal of the Imperieuse. 

President— Lord Gambler, do you choose to ask any questions 
of Admiral Stopford ? 

Loud Gambier —Not at present. 

President —Whom else do you call to ask this general 
question ? 

Mr. P'Icknell— 1 think I need not go any farther in calling 
witnesses. 

President— But you reserve to yourself a right of putting 
this general question to the witnesses called by Lord Gambier ? * 

Mr. Bickneix—Y es.—The case is now closed on the part of 
the prosecution. 

President 1 —No; the Court will wish to ask one or two ques¬ 
tions to-morrow morning. 

£Adjourned to to-morrow morning nine o'clock* 




THIRD DAY, 

FRIDAY the 2Slh of JULY, 1809 . 



Captain Lord Cochrane called in again. 

Admiral Sutton —Are the charts produced in Court by your 
Lordship, namely No. 2 and No. 3 , copied or taken from the 
chart. No. I, which your Lordship produced in Court ? 

A. They were copied by a pencil, and afterwards a pen passed 
over to make black lines. 

Q,. From No. 1 ? 

A. Yes; from No. 1. The soundings are not marked upon 
this; it was merely to shew the positions of the fleets; there 
was a large sheet of black paper put between, and it was 
scratched over. 

Q. Do you mean by black paper, oiled paper ? 

A, I do not know, it is such paper as they have for copying 
letters. 

Q. Are these two charts a fac simile of No. I ? 

A. They were taken from that by a person whom I paid for 
the purpose; his name l do not recollect, but he is a common 
chart-drawer in London ; and I marked the positions of the 
French ships upon it when he had done. 

Q, Did he do that in your presence ? 

A. He did some of it at the table with me, and he took Qn© 
home with him ; I have one which he sent down to me by th© 
mail, drawn from a copy which he took himself; but these are 
two which he did actually take from the chart itself. 1 put in, 
the positions of the French ships (which ships were at the hour 
mentioned on these charts in the positions in which they appear) 
as nearly as it was possible to do it ; and the British fleet wai 
taken as it appeared from the Imperieuse when anchored at the 
end of the Boyart shoal, about half past eleven o’clock, on the 
morning of the 12th. 

Q. Are the representations of the ships marked by your Lord- 
ship, or by the person who made the chart? 

A. Positively they were marked by myself, he had nothing to 
with it i they were never seen by any body who could take 




advantage of inserting any marks, they were seen by none 
except those in whom I could place the most implicit confidence* 
The frigates which appeared to be near the Imperieuse, and 
close to the Boyart, had weighed with the Imperieuse in the 
morning, and were at that hour with the licet. 

Q. There being no scale upon cither of these copied charts* 
nor no marginal indication of degree, by what scale or rule did 
your Lordship place the figures of the ships as represented here? 

A. By the scale of the chart, of which they are copies, which 
is the same in size, and now before the Court, marked No. I ; 
the distance of the brigs from the Imperieuse I measured by the 
flight of shot, and I believe it to he nearly correct ; the distance 
of the Calcutta, Varsovie, and Aquil on was ascertained by the 
point blank range ; our shot did not reach the Tounere. 

Admiral Sutton —I only asked your Lordship by what rule 
or scale it was done; l do not wish to go further than the ques¬ 
tion I put, and that, is answered. 

Lord Cochrane — I wish to shew the mode in which I measured 
the distance, and what I measured by the eye. 

Admiral Sutton —Certainly, if you think it will explain it. 

Lord Cochrane— Our shot did not reach the Tonnere, which 
the enemy kindled themselves; the three-decker was towards the 
north-east, a little further off, she having warped over by haw¬ 
sers, and got into that position by I he force of sail ami other 
means; for she had a parcel of boats a-head of her palliim her 
aiong, perhaps she might have hawsers also: when I say the 
Aquilon was within point blank range, she might he a little other¬ 
wise ,* but 1 remember to have brought the horizon above her— 
the people were firing right over. 

Admiral Young —There are references, but there are no 
marks. 

Lord Cochrane —I had some doubt as to the propriety of 
laying them at all before the Court, and I have not marked 
them ; there is one marked, I think, and the references would be 
the same So hofh. 

President— There are several references there without any 
mark to shew to what they apply. 

(Lord Cochrane made the marks upon the charts.) 

Lord Cochrane- I did not intend that these charts should re¬ 
present the soundings at all. 

President— No, so we understand, merely as outlines to mark 
the positions. 



Rear Admiral the Horn. Robert 5?toppord, called in again. 

made by the Imperieuse 
enemy’s ships were on 
fleet in consequence of 

A. Shortly after the signal was made by the Imperieuse, the 
Commander-in-Chief made the signal to unmoor; but I cannot 
speak to the exact interval of time between the two signals: 
afterwards the signal was made to weigh, and the fleet moved in 
consequence nearer to the Isle d’Aix, as the Commander-in-Chief 
informed me, tor the purpose of being more in a situation to 
observe himself the motions and proceedings of the enemy, and 
with the intention of going in with the fleet, if the wind had 
shifted so far to the eastward as to allow the fleet to come out 
again, for which event the Commander-in-Chief expressed the 
greatest impatience and desire. 

Q. At what time wa3 it the Commander-in-Chief informed 
you of his reasons for going in ? 

A. It was some time between the hours of eight and ten in the 
forenoon of the 12th, when I was on board the Caledonia. 

Q,. Did the fleet anchor again ? 

A. The fleet anchored rather more than three miles, or about 
three miles, from the Isle d’Aix. 

Q,. At the time when the fleet anchored again, would it have 
been prudent or proper to have sent half of it in to destroy the 
enemy ? 

A. For the reasons I yesterday stated in my evidence, in 
answer to that question, I think it would not; but the Cora- 
mander-in-Chief desired the /Etna bomb, and the other smaller 
vessels to proceed in to bombard the enemy’s ships that were 
lying on shore, giving directions also to the Captains of the 
Valiant, Revenge, Beliona, and some other ships whose names 
I do not exactly recollect, to advance towards the Boyart shoal, 
in order to support the operations of the bomb-vessel, 

Q,. Did the ships and vessels so ordered to advance proceed 
wilhout anchoring when the fleet anchored? 

A. The /Etna and smaller vessels immediately proceeded to 
bombard the ships without anchoring ; the line-of-battle ships 
did not proceed till subsequently ordered by signal * they an¬ 
chored. 

Q,. Yon have said directions were given to some other ship* 
to proceed : were those directions by signal, or in what manner? 

A. To the Captains on board the Caledonia by the Com- 
mander-in-Chief in person, and in my hearing. 

Q. Were the directions given the same to all of them, or 
was any distinction made between the directions given to the 

L 


Admiral Young —When the signal was 
in the morning of the 12th, jf hat the 
shore, was any thing done by tile British 
it ? ' > 


Captains of Hie linc-of-batlie ships and the directions to thi 
Captains of the smaller vessels i 

A. As they were directions which could only be executed 
according to the skill of the Pilots, who were sometimes ex¬ 
tremely ignorant; the orders given to the Captains of the line- 
■af-batlle ships were, of course, given discretionally to them, to 
go in as far as they thought safe, or as tar as they could Confi¬ 
dently depend upon their Pilots. 

Q,. At the time of hearing those orders given, did you under¬ 
stand it to be the intention of the Commander-iu-Chief that 
every ship, of every description, so ordered, should go in as 
soon and as far as the discretion of the Captain would admit ? 

A, From the general signal having been made for ships to 
prepare for battle, with springs on their cables, and to bend 
their sheet cables through the stern ports, also from the con¬ 
versation I had with the Commandcr-in-Chief, and witnessing his 
impatience and disappointment at circumstances not allowing 
him immediately to go in with the fleet, it was ray full convic¬ 
tion that such were the Commander-iu-Chief’s intentions, that 
the ships should go in as far as they could, and as soon as they 
could. 

Q. Do you kuow from the Captains of those ships of the 
line their reasons for not goin>g immediately in ? 

A. I do not recollect evert to have heard those reasons dis¬ 
tinctly stated. 

President —What were the ships or vessels that did accom¬ 
pany the ditua when she went in ? 

A. By name, as well as I recollect, they were the gun-brigs s 
the —- 

President —I do not think it necessary to enumerate all their 
names ? 

A. Chiefly gun-brigs, aud some men of war brig3. 

Q. Will you add whether any frigate or frigates went in ? 

A. Afterwards every frigate went in, in consequence of signals 
frtora the Commander-in-Chief * tiie brigs went in first and the 
frigates afterwards. 

Q. How long after the brigs, sloops, the gun-brigs, and the 
AAua went in, was it that the frigates went in by general signal rt 

A. I do not think it could exceed half an hour. 

Q. At what time did the line-of-battle ships go in, and which 
were the bne-of-battle ships ? 

A. I think it was between- 

President —I mean how long after the frigates: the exaefi 
moment of time is not so material ? 

A. I do not think it was half an hour when the Valiant usd 
&nd Revenge went in. 




O,. Being two of the ships previously appointed ? 

A. They were two of the ships previously appointed, and 
which were ill advance. 

Admiral Sutton —When the fleet came to an anchor, at the 
distance you have mentioned from the Isle d’Aix, what was the 
state of the weather ? 

A. Fine weather, a fresh breeze from north to north north 
west, 

Q. And the tide running? 

A. Flood tide. 

Q,. At the time of the fire-ships being sent in on the evening 
of the i 1th what was the state of the weather? 

A. Squally, with strong breezes from north to north West, 
and so much sea that few boats could poll against it. 

Q,. If report was made to you, how did it continue till day¬ 
light in the morning? 

A. Being up ail the night, I observed the wind to be still fresh 
till twelve o’clock ; it moderated a liille during the night, and 
freshened up again about day-light in the morning. 

Q. You mention the frigates being sent in after the brigs and 
the smaller vessels—Did they proceed by signal ? 

A. All but the Lmperieuse. 

Q. Did the line-of battle ships proceed in by signal? 

A. They did. 

President —Does your Lordship wish to ask any question of 
Admiral Stopforil ? 

Lord Gambier —With respect to my own conduct, I have no 
wish, but I think it is due to the officers of the fire-ships, to put 
a question as to their conduct, which, I aver, was highly me¬ 
ritorious. 

President —The question as to their conduct is not the matter 
of enquiry before the Court; but if your Lordship has any wish 
to put a question to shew their meritorious conduct, I am sure the 
Court will make no objection; it is not relevant to the business 
before the Court, but 1 believe I can say the Court will not 
object to such a question. | 

Lord Gambier— -I would ask Admiral Stopford, if, it blowing 
a gale of wind from the northward, with a high sea, the night 
extremely dark,j(ffith great difficulty, if any communication to 
be kept up fro if ship to ship; in his opinion, was the service 
upon which thrfse officers and men were employed in the fire-ships 
extremely hazardous, and attended with so much danger as to 
give reason to apprehend that they could not return ? 

President —I think it should be added, on the evening of the 
Hth of April ? 

^ Lord GAMDiER^Certaiuly. 


80 


A. Being directed, on the evening of that night, to take the 
direction of the launches, and all the boats of the fleet, they 
were assembled on board of the Caesar: but there being so much 
wind and sea that 1 thought they could not act with effect in 
supiiort of the fire-ships, I directed the Captain of the Caesar, 
about sunset on that evening, to go to the Con\inander-in-Chief, 
and suggest to his Lordship, from me, the propriety of the boats 
remaining on board the Ca*sar till I though, they could act with 
effect, of which his Lordship approved; and 1 selected a boat 
belonging to the Hero, the best rowing-boat I could find, to go 
to the Impcrieuse, to acquaint Lord Cochrane of such intention 
of keeping the boats, and desiring his Lordship to send me word 
back by the boat if he wanted any other assistance; the weather 
was so bad as to prevent the boat returning that night. With 
respect to the hazardous undertaking of the fire-ships, that was 
too much exemplified in what befel the fire-ship fitted out by the 
Caesar: she went in before the explosion-vessel, and before the 
Mediator; getting near the French fleet, she brought to, seeing 
no other vessel near her, until the explosion-vessel blew up close 
to her, killed two men on hoard of her, and damaged and 
indeed ruined one of the boats in which the men wore to come 
away from her; f he men were therefore crowded in the remain-, 
ing boat, by which they had to come away ; the acting lieutenant 
and one man tiled in the bottom of the boat from fatigue, and 
the others were picked up by the Lyra, which drifted in towards 
the French fleet, nearer to the French ships than any other 
vessel of the fleet. 

Lord Gammer — I am sorry to detain the Court-- 

Admiral Young —Before your Lordship proposes another 
question, will you give me leave to put one upon this subject—• 
As that which occurred to the fire-vessels did not pass under your 
observation, inform the Court how you came by a knowledge 
of it ? ° 

A. From the individual and frequent examination of the 
officer and every man who returned; and comparin'? their ac¬ 
counts together, the result of which I communicated to the 
Commander-m-Chief, which left no doubt in my mind of such 
being the fact, 

Q. Did you receive it as the official report of the commanding 
officer of the boat ? 

A. 1 did, as nearly as I can recollect. 

Lord Gammer —I feel it necessary to make an apology for 
entering into this, which may appear extraneous matter; hut I 
am sure every officer will enter iiuu my feelings upon the occa¬ 
sion. I will only ask Admiral St op ford whether, under the cir¬ 
cumstances at the time as before-mentioned, it was not sur¬ 
prising, that so large a proportion of the fire-ships passed through 
the enemy’s fleet, and that so small a number failed. 

A. Every circumstance was extremely favourable for the fire¬ 
ships acting, and therefore! look it'for granted, that when 



81 


«»nce placed property, they must inevitably go down upon the 
Enemy’s ships. This has no reference to the men coming away—- 
so far it was unfavourable. 

President—W as the situation of the Caesar near to the ren¬ 
dezvous of the fire-ships previous to their being sent upon 
service? 

A. The Csesar did not change her situation before these opera* 
lions took place, and I do not, think was in a nearer situation 
than the ships of the squadron in general. 

President —I only thought that, probably, from the boats 
being lodged with you, you might be nearer than the oilier ships 
*—Did you observe generally the manner in which the tire-ships 
were conducted towards the enemy ? 

A. As far as my observations went that night, the fire-ships 
seemed all to have answered the purpose of harrassing the 
enemy; although l did afterwards hear that some of them were 
set fire to at too early a period. 

Judge Advocate —What the Admiral heard is not strictly 
evidence. 

The latter part of Admiral Stopford’s answer wag 
erased. 

President —From your own observation, did it appear to 
you, that every fire-ship was conducted with equal ability and 
resolution towards the enemy ? 

A. It was impossible for me or any person, I think, to form 
any opinion of the conduct of every fire-ship: in the general 
blaze of fire which took place, many objects were so confounded, 
that it was out of the power of any person accurately to ascer¬ 
tain the conduct of the fire-ships at the two distinct times of 
being under command, and being left to drift—therefore 1 cau- 
jiot answer that question satisfactorily to my conscience. 

President —Nothing more can be required of Admiral 
Stopford, than that knowledge which you possess from the ob¬ 
servation you were enabled to make, from what you really did 
observe—Did it appear to you that any fire-ships were set fire 
to at too great a distance from the enemy ? 

A. Some were certainly set fire to before it appeared to me 
that they had run so near to the enemy as others had ; but it was 
impossible for me to say whelher they were too far from the 
enemy or not ; the enemy’s lines soon began to be scattered; 
they cut, and the ships might be going in property for one part 
of the line, though improperly for another, which 1 might he 
then looking at ; 1 can speak only so far as my observation 
goes. 

Admiral Sutton — What time was it when you passed the 
Boyart shoal in the Cavsar i 

A. It was just dusk. 


82 


tfc. At what distance did you pass from it ? • 

A. We passed as near to it as we could, to avoid the batteries 

of the isle d’Aix. 

Q,. It had been supposed that you could brush it quite close 
to that part which shews itself, therefore I was desirous of 

knowing ? ... . 

A. 1 think wc passed it within less than a quarter of a mile ot 
the part which shews itself, or is visible at near low water. 

Q. Did it happen that a report was made of the depth of 
water at that lime ? 

A. Wc carried in about, eight fathom; shoaled suddenly to 
five fathom ; and the next casts were on shore. 

Q,. Did you rereive any shot from the Isle d’Aix ? 

A. For one mile of distance in the passage the shells were 
crossing us from each side, from Oleron and from isle d’Aix, but 
they crossed us more from the Isle d'Aix side. 

Q. Did it happen at that time, that a judgment could be 
formed by the fire presented to you from Isle d’Aix, of the force 
opposed to you in passing by the battery of Isle d’Aix ? 

A. They did not fire their guns fast, but they used in gfcnefaf 
single shot, occasionally ; and I think for the mortars* four were 
kept playing upon us. 

Q. Did the single shot pass far ? 

A. The shot from Isle d’Aix passed over the ship not far. 


Mr. John Spurling, Master pf the Irnperieuse, called in again* 

Examined by Mr. Bicknell. 

Q. Did it appear to you at the time of the attack upon the 
enemy’s ships which had got a-ground (the Irnperieuse being one 
of the attacking ships) that there was a sate and sufficient an¬ 
chorage for ships of the line in the inner road of Aix (without 
the range of shot and shells from the batteries on shore) to have 
enabled them to destroy the two ships of the enemy which were 
seen at anchor on the morning of the 125 .li of April, and the other 
ships that had grounded; and, if so, be pleased to point out 
such anchorage to the Court, and the depth of water : and how 
many line-of-baltle ships might have anchored there, and by 
wliut means you obtained such knowledge ? 

A. On the morning that the Irnperieuse retreated out of the 
reach ot the Varsovie and the Aqnilon (the morn Lug of the 13 th), 
both the Aqnilon and Varsovie having been on fire, we worked 
from the Palles shoal, where the Irnperieuse was at anchor at the 
time ol the action, in five fathoms water; it was high water 
when we anchored, which was about two o’clock ; in standing 
towards the Island of Aix, the sounding given bv the men at the 
lead, to the best of my recollection, from six and a half to seien 



8,3 


fathoms; the depth might be more towards the Island, but as we 
did not stand very close, I could not ascertain : when we an¬ 
chored (which was out of the reach of shot and shell) we lay in 
five and a half fathoms at low water ; there was then (about the 
distance from three to four cables nearer towards She Palles than 
the Imperieuse had anchored) a good berth for tliree or four sail 
of the line to anchor in in five and a half or six fathonhs dead 
low water ; the marks for such anchorage I look myself, which 
are the stern of the wreck which is on the Valles, the Jean Bert 
directly on with the square tower of Fouras, and the windmill or 
telegraph, I cannot exactly say which, on the ting-staff of the 
Island : 1 think it was a telegraph, 1 think there had been uo 
windmill there. 

Q. State the means by which you obtained such knowledge— 
was it by observation ? 

A. Yes ; I did not know it before, only by the appearance 
of the chart ; but I did not choose to trust to it, but wished to 
prove it. 

President —What time of tide was it when you weighed, from 
what you called the inner road of Aix? 

A. About the last quarter flood, rather nearer high water. 

Q. Was the wind fair for you to lead out towards the Isle 
d’Aix, or did you work out ? 

A. No ; we worked out. 

Q,. Did you keep your lead going while working out ? 

A. The whole of the time on both sides. 

Q. What water did you find in working out between the taH 
of the Palles shoal, and the shoal towards the Boyart, as you 
stood to and fro ? 

A. From six and a half to seven fathoms. 

Q. It being then about three-fourths flood ? 

A. Yes, very near high water. 

Q. Had you ever an opportunity of ascertaining correctly 
what is the rise of the tide in the neighbourhood of the Isle of 
Aix at spring tides: I do not mean what you may have heard, 
but what you know yourself, if you have had an opportunity of 
ascertaining it ? 

A. I had not—I did not ever try it. 

Admiral Young —When you were in six fathoms, turning out 
from the anchorage from which you retreated, how near were 
you to the batteries of the Isle of Aix? 

A. Something less than half-range of shot—half of the level 
range. 

Q. You mean that the shot would go just as far beyond 
you ? 

A. Yes: I think it would be rather further; something less 
than half the range of point blank shot. 


84 


/ 


Q. How many lacks did you make in going out ? 

A. I cannot exactly say to a single tack, but I think four ot 
live. 

Q,. Then you were four or five times, as you suppose, within 
half point blank range of the batteries of Isle d’Aix ? 

A. The last two tacks we might be farther ; because, as we 
worked out, we might be at a greater distance. 

Q. How long were you at anchor within the Isle d’Aix ? 

A. From two o’clock on the 12th, until about three or four 
o'clock on the 14 th. 

Q. Then you had time to observe the number and the state of 
the batteries on the Isle d’Aix—How many were there, and in 
what stale were they? 

A. I could not exactly observe the number nor the state, as 
my duty in attending to get the rigging of the ship repaired 
after the action, prevented my making any observations. 

Q. Did you make no observation before you began to 

engage ? 

A. Yes: on the morning of the 12th, prior to the Imperieuse 
proceeding to annoy the enemy then on shore, 1 was desired by 
Captain Lord Cochrane to lay a buoy on the Boyart shoal, which 
I did in six and a half fathoms water, a sufficient distance to 
allow any ship to tack round that buoy ; after which I observed 
on the Isle d’Aix about twenty or four and twenty pieces of 
cannon to be mounted; but well knowing the execution that 
those gunswould do would be very little to any ship passing that 
battery that made any opposition against it, they being only 
placed upon an open platform, as it appeared to me with my 
glass in the boat. 

Q. By tacking round, do you mean between the buoy and the 
shoal ? 

A. Yes; that she might shoot round. 

Q,. Did you observe any material, or any considerable part of 
the works of the Isle d’Aix to be blown up aud destroyed ? 

A. I did. 

Q. In what part of the Isle d’Aix. 

A. On the part that flanked you as you ran along the shoal in 

running in. 

Q.. Do you mean the Boyart shoal ? 

A. The shoal of the Boyart. 

President —Lord Gambier, do you choose to ask the witness 
any questions. 

Lord Gammer —I would beg to ask, whether the Imperieuse 
grounded on the night of the 12lh of April > 

A. Y r es, on the tail of the Pallcs shoal. 


/ 


85 

Q,, At your anchorage, I presume, where you had been firing 
upon the French ships? 

A. Yes; but not until the last quarter ebb. 

Q. At about what time was it she first struck ? 

A. About seven or half-past seven in the evening that we 
touched; but there was nothing to hurt her till about eighlor 
half-past eight, when she appeared to strike a great deal. 

Q,. She struck hard ? 

A. Yes; she shook a great deal, drawing a great deal of water 
aft, more than forward. 

Q Did any person whatever communicate to you, before you 
surveyed it, the anchorage before-mentioned, for three or four 
sail of the line, or was it a new discovery ? 

A I discovered it myself, being ordered to sound round the 
ship, at such a distance as I expressed iu answer to a question be¬ 
fore asked. 

Q,. Was it known before the Imperieuse went in, that there was 
such an anchorage ? 

A. Only by a view of the French chart, as we had no French 
pilot on board, nor ever took any. 

Lord Gambier —I have nothing further to ask him at pre* 
scut. 


Capt. Wolfe, of his Majesty’s frigate L’Aigle, sworn. 

Examined by J\lr. Bicknell. 

Q,. Did it appear to you at the time of the attack on the 
enemy’s ships which had got a-grouud, that there was a safe and 
sufficient anchorage tor ships of the line in the inner road ot 
Aix, without tne range of shot and shells from the batteries oa 
shore, to have enabled them to destroy the two ships of the 
enemy, which were seen at anchor on tne morning ot the 12 th. 
of April, and the other ships that had grounded ; and, if so, be 
pleased to point out such anchorage to the Court , and the depth, 
of water, and how many line-of-hattle ships might have an¬ 
chored there, and by what means you obtained your knowledge ? 

A. I knew nothing of the inner anchorage b it from the 
pilot’s information, on the day tne attack was made on the 
enemy’s ships in Aix Hoads; but alter we had got in, at ihe 
time of the attack, I think, if the ships had remained there, 
without removing to the second anchorage, tney must all have 
been destroyed by the shot and shells from the batteries in the 
Isle d’Aix. At the second anchorage-- 

President— What do you mean by the second anchorage ? 
that we may have a just comprehension.—The first was on the 
tail of the Palles ? 

A. Yes; the second anchorage I call where the squadron re¬ 
mained till they were withdrawn. 

M N O 





Q. Where the Impericuse and the other snips remained ? 

A. Yes. 

Q. That was further to the southward than where you were 

before ? r 

A. Yes; east from the first anchorage, at the distance of a 

mile or so; in the second anchorage (having been there fifteen 
days after the enemy’s ships were burnt)-, 1 think four or five 
sail of the line might have lain clear of the enemy’s batteries, 
but they must have been moored very short and very close, 
with other smaller vessels to fill up the intervals. I lay there 
with the Pallas and fifteen or sixteen brigs, gun-brigs, cutters, 
and schooners. I was sent in on the 13 th. 1 call the anchorage 

of the Isle d’Aix where the enemy lav ; hut this is a dillerent 
anchorage, of which we knew nothing before. 

President —■During the time you remained at the second 
anchorage, had you an opportunity of ascertaining what was 
the rise of the tide on spring tides ? 

A. Upon the average of the time we were there, I suppose the 
rise and fall was from fifteen, to sixteen, seventeen, and eighteen 
feet. 

Q,. During the time you continued at this anchorage, did you 
cause soundings to be taken between the Palles and Boyart 
shoals ? 

A. I received orders from Lord Gambler to assist Mr. Stokes, 
the Second Master of the Caledonia, with boats and whatever 
Mr. Stokes might require in surveying the anchorage. 

President—I more particularly allude to the supposed shoal 
water there is between these two shoals; if what you are going 
to mention comprehends what 1 particularly allude to, you will 
proceed—Would the casting your eye upon this chart give you 
a clearer comprehension ? 

A. No ; 1 have it all in my mind; I received those orders to 
assist Mr. Stokes in surveying the anchorage, which was done 
with the assistance of our Master and others, whomever Mr. 
Stokes applied for. 

Q. What was their report of the depth of wafer, at any particu¬ 
lar time of the tide, in the situation I have pointed out between 
the Palles and the Boyart, if you have a recollection of it ? 

A. I do not recollect any particular remark of Mr. Stokes or 
our Master, excepting Mr. Stokes having said he had found 
deeper water and a little more room farther to the southward ? 

President —I believe what you are stating applies more to 
the anchorage than to that which I am enquiring about; it appears 
by this chart as if there was a shoal between the Road of Aix 
and this other situation (pointing it out ); what I wish to know 
is, what water there was upon this bar or hav (shewing it unon 
the chart)} 

A. That does not come within my knowledge ; in the parti- 


87 


cular part to which the question alludes, with the exception of 
the Caesar having grounded much about the spot pointed out in 
the chart shewn me by the President, I will not take upon me 
to say lhe exact situation of the Caesar grounding: 1 speak, 
withiu half a mile. 

Mr. Bicknele —Did it appear to you that the Commander-in- 
Chief for a considerable, or for any, time neglected or delayed, 
taking effectual measures for destroying the enemy’s ships after 
they were on shore on the 12 th of April last, and the signal 
made by the Imperieuse that they could be destroyed. 

A. No. 

Q,. Did it appear to you that any blame was imputable to my 
Lord Gambier, for any part of his conduct or proceedings, as 
Commander*in-Chief of the Channel beet employed in Basque 
Hoads, between the 17 lli of March and the 29 th of April last? 

A. 1 have no recollection of any thing of the kind. 

President —From the first attack upon the enemy’s ships to 
the final cessation of hostilities against them, was every thing 
done that could he done'to effect their destruction ? 

A. I think there was, with the class of vessels that were 
present. 

Q,. Do you know then of any vessels being withheld, which, 
might have been applied to that service ? 

A. None whatever; when 1 speak of the class of vessels that 
were present, 1 mean to say there were no vessels under his Lord¬ 
ship’s command with a draft of water that could have further 
effected the destruction of the enemy’s ships; every application 
that 1 made to his Lordship, to effect their destruction, was 
always complied with. 

President —Does your Lordship wish to put any question to 
Captain Wolfe ? 

Loud Gambier —None at present. 


Captain John Tremaine Rodd, of his Majesty’s frigate the 

Indefatigable, sworn. 

Examined by Mr. Bicknell . 

Q,. Did you, before you went in to the attack of the enemy’s 
ships, or at any time afterwards, and when, know of any an¬ 
chorage within the Isle of Aix, where six, or any other and 
what number, of line-of-baltle ships could have anchored out 
of the range of shot or shell from the batteries on shore ? 

A. I never did, and never knew that line-of-battle ships could 
lie there, until 1 saw the frigates after the action move to the 
anchorage they took up. 

President —The seeing of frigates there could be no proof 
that the line-of-battle ships could lie there? 

A. No; I never knew that line-of-battle ships could lifi 

M N O Z 




there, for t do not know the depth of water \ I did not know 
that the frigates could lie there clear of shot or shell until that 

me. 

i. • l • 1 i i * f * > J 

Q. Did it appear to you that the Commander-in-Chief for a 
considerable, or any, time neglected or delayed taking effectual 
measures for destroying the enemy’s ships after they were oil 
shore on the 12th of April last, and the signal made by the 
Iroperieuse that they could be destroyed ? 

A. I know of no delay. 

Q. Did it appear to you, that any blame was imputable to 
my Lord Gambier for any part of his conduct or proceedings, 
as Commander-in-Chief of the Channel Fleet employed in Basque 
lloads, between the 11th of March and the 29th of April last? 

A. None whatever. 

President —From the first attack upon the enemy's ships to 
the final cessation of hostilities against them, was every thing 
done that could be done to effect their destruction ? 

A. i beiieve every thing with safety to his Majesty’s ships. 

Admiral Young —When you say with safety to his Majesty’s 
ships, do you mean, without their being exposed to any danger, 
or without their being exposed to more danger than the cir¬ 
cumstance's would justify. 

A. That they would have been exposed to more danger than 
the circumstances would justify. I think if they had gone up 
further, every ship would have been lost, or at least it would 
have been a thousand chances to one against them ; as it was, 
we were on ground for upwards of an hour in the Indefatigable, 
and had been striking for an hour before that ; and the pilot 
remarked to me, if I did not warp the ship out, we should be 
nearly dry ; on which I ran out two hawsers, and warped the 
ship out of the situation in which she wa3 at first, and she 
grounded again afterwards. 

Q,. That was upon the Palles shoal? 

A. Yes : and in the direction the anchor was laid, I could not 
find more than five and a half or a quarter less six fathom, ac¬ 
cording to the Master’s report to me. It was then about half 
ebb—that was after the action was over. 

Admiral Yocng 1 —Did you, on the morning of the 12th of 
April, see the Imperieuse inform the Commander-in-Chief, by 
signal or telegraph, that half the fleet would be sufficient to 
destroy the enemy ? 

A. 1 did nol. Part of the s'gnal ‘made by the Imperieuse 
about that time was reported to me, which was, that seven sail 
of the enemy’s line-of-batlle ships were on shore; but I do not 
remember the other signal; 1 was under weigh at the time, and 
occupied in working ihe ship. 

Q,. At what time did yon go into Aix “Roads ? 

A. The signal Was made from the Commander-in-Chief for 


89 


the Indefatigable to weigh at about two o’clock in the afternoon* 
I was all ready for weighing, and weighed immediately—shortly 
after. In a few minutes, a signal was made for the Indefati- 
gable to proceed to a ship that made a signal of distress, and 
was in want of immediate assistance, bearing south. The wind 
was light, and we went in with all sails royal and top-gallant 
studding-sails, and anchored about half after three within the 
distance of conversation with the lmperieuse, and commenced a 
fire upon the Calcutta. I believe some of the bow-guns were 
directed towards the Varsovie. 

. 

Admiral Young — l think you must have mistaken my ques¬ 
tion. A signal is stated to have been made by the lmperieuse 
at day-break, or soon after day-break in the morning ? 

A. I was under weigh in the morning for some other purpose, 
and had anchored at eight o’clock in Basque Roads, having come 
out from where I was stationed the evening before. 

Q. Going in to the situation you mention, near the Impe- 
rieuse, were you exposed to lire from the batteries in Isle d’Aix, 
or did you pass without range of their shot ? 

A. Their shot went over us, passed a-head and a-stern of us, 
and the shells from Oleron crossed us. 

Q,. When you were at anchor near the lmperieuse, were you 
still within shot from lhe batteries of Aix ? 

A. A shot from Isle d’Aix passed through the main-topmast of 
the Indefatigable, tne whole of which measured seven inches, and 
wounded the main-topsail yard. 

Q. Was the situation in which you were placed when at an¬ 
chor, as good a one as could be chosen for destroying the enemy’s 
ships ? 

A. For those that I was nearest to (the Calcutta and Varsovie) ; 
if I had gone further in I must have run a-grotind, by Lhe draft 
of water o: the ship; I had only between four and a half and 
five fathom water at the half cable ; tile anchor was nearly in 
seven, and nearly at the top of high water. 

Q,. Was it a situation in which ships of the line could have 
heen placed for the destruction of ttie enemy’s ships ? 

A. Not with safety to the ships, I mean not without the risk 
of the loss of the ships ; for if it had come onto blow, it would 
have been impossible for them to veer cable. 

-* * r i 

Q. Was there any other situation in the road of Aix in which 
ships of the line might have beea placed to destroy the enemy, 
without risk of their being lost ? 

A. I think not where the enemy were; they were surrounded 
with shoals, or upon a shoal. 

Q. When you were within the Isle of Aix, did you observe the 
state of the defences of the Island—of the fort ? 

A. I did ; the enemy got more guns, or shifted their gans from 
one part to the other, at least \ thought so ; I do not know 


90 


exactly the number of guns that were abreast, there appeared to 
be four hanking guns at each end of the battery, pointing to¬ 
wards the ships at different times : they certainly moved their 
guns from one part to the other. 

Q. Did you observe a considerable part of the works of the 
Island Mown up or destroyed ? 

A. The works were evidently under repair ; but 1 do not 
know of their being blown up or destroyed. 

Q. At what time did the Indefatigable leave the road of Aix ? 

A. It appears by the log that we weighed about half after 
four in the morning of the 13th, the morning after the action ; 
1 weighed in consequence of signal being made from Admiral 
St op ford. 

Q,. As the Indefatigable was going out of the Road of Aix, 
did the Captain of the imperieuse hail her, and propose that 
the Indefatigable should go on one quarter of the Ocean, that 
the Imperieuse mignt take the other ? 

A. Lord Cochrane hailed the Indefatigable as we were passing 
along, hut what he said I could not distinctly make out; i told 
him we were ordered out; he asked me, as well as I could un¬ 
derstand him, if I had been a-grouud, I replied yes ; he said, I 
should like to lake your berth (where we had been l)ing); had 
he sent a boat to me and proposed a thing of the kind, I could 
not have thought myself justified in. acting, in the presence of 
two senior officers, without orders ; nor do I know that it was 
possible for the Indefatigable, with her draft of water, to have 
got near the Ocean, where she was a-grouud. 

1 - . * * 'i vt* hi) • v. t:i • r • /.• , • 

Q. When you were called out by signal from the Road of A ix, 
could you, if you had remained there, have'destroy ed more of 
the enemy’s ships ? 

A. I do not know that we could ; I do not think we could have 
got up to them. 

• - - * « • t.’-ii?* L* ■' ■ ‘ i,; / 

Admiral Duckworth —Did you observe the position of the 
enemy’s two liue-of-battle ships that were longest alloat near 
the Isle of Aix, on the morning of the 12th ? 

A. There were two afloat. 

1 •• • ‘ 1 •' ' 4 v ‘ •• . ' . ' V/ i • I ( : t • >’ (| - 9^1 *• > 

Q. Did you observe their position ? 

A. I do not know exactly their bearings to the Island, they 
were lying there, and got under weigh, or slipt and ran up. 

Q.. Were they in a situation that line-of-battle ships, without 
being endangered and the risk of being a-ground and lost, or, 
be 1 ng within range, to be essentially injured by the batteries of 
the Isle of Aix, could have attacked them ? 

A. I do not know that they would have grounded, but they 
musl have been wholly disabled by the batteries and two line-of- 
battle ships m coining in ; I counted thirteen guus as we passed oa 
the battery. 


/ 


91 


Q. Had the Calcutta, or any of the enemy’s line-of-battie ships, 
struck to the Imperieuse before you anchored, and commenced 
the action ? 

A. Most assuredly not: several broadsides were fired at the 
Calcutta from the Indefatigable and Valiant, when Lord Coch¬ 
rane, or some person from the Imperieuse, hailed me, and said 
the Calcutta had struck. I could only see her at intervals through 
the smoke: we then desisted firing upon her, and turned the 
w hole of our firing upon the \ arsovie, whose colours were never 
hauled down till she was taken possession of by some of the boats 
of the squadron. The mode the enemy took^ to shew that they 
had surrendered, was by waving an union jack out of the mizen 
chains: on seeing that, we left oft’ firing. 

President —Does your Lordship wish to ask any questions of 
Capt. Rodd? 1 

Lord Gambier— Not at present. 

The Court was cleared. In about half an hour the 
Court was re-opened. 

' , - . 

President —My Lord Gambier,—The Court have determined 
not to call any other witnesses on the part of what may be termed 
the prosecution. Your Lordship will therefore be pleased to say 
the length of time you wonld wish for to make arrangements for 
calling your own witnesses, and the Court will be happy to 
attend to your wishes. 

Lord Gambier—I am not prepared to answer immediately. 

President —No, that cannot be imagined. 

Lord Gambier — I should feel extremely sorry to keep the 
Court assembled longer than is absolutely necessary ; but I am 
airaid l shall not be ready to proceed to-morrow morning. 

President —Then nothing will remain but to meet to-morrow 
morning for the purpose of adjourning; and of course your 
Lordship will have till the next day, or the next day afterwards 

Lord Gambier —The next day would be Monday : on Monday 
I have no doubt I should be ready. 

President —Then it would be the loss only of to-morrow ; as, 
of course, nothing could be done on Sunday. Your Lordship 
will do us the favour to meet us to-morrow morning; and you 
may then say whether you shall be ready to proceed on Monday, 

Adjourned till to-morrow morning . 


i 




/ 


92—104 

IC-' . /'iiw < d\ • " 
<{ ; r*>7 • • : r* • Ib'H i J-J. u 


FOURTH DAY, 

SATURDAY the 29lh of JULY, 1809. 


The Court having this day met, pro forma % 
the President addressed Lord Gambier in the 

following manner:— 

<* 

President —My Lord Gambler,—The Court have directed 
me to ask your Lordship, whether you are now prepared to 
state on what day you will be ready to enter upon your 
defence! 

Lord Gamrier — 1 feel much obliged for the indulgence the 
Court has granted to me. I am exceedingly sorry to be com¬ 
pelled to detain the Honourable Court until Monday; but on 
that day I shall be fully prepared to enter upon my defence. 


[Adjourned to {Monday morning nine o'clock* 





























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105 


FIFTH DAY. 

J, , k J , 


Monday, July 31, 1809. 


President. —All the Witnesses must withdraw. 

Lord Cochrane. —With all due respect to the Court, in 
some former Courts-Martial the Witnesses have been permit¬ 
ted to hear the Defence. 

President.— I never heard of such a thing in my life ; but 
the Court have ruled the point. 

Lord Cochrane.— The case of Admiral Harvey is a case 
in point. 

President. —Lord Cochrane, the Court have determined 
the contrary. 

Lord Cochrane withdrew. 

President. —Lord Gambler, will you now proceed either 
to read your defence yourself, or to let it be read by any friend 
you please. 

Lord Gambier. —It has been usual that it should be read 
by others. I will, if you please, give it to Mr. Greetham. 


Tfie Judge Advocate read Jus Lordship's 

DEFENCE. 

Mr. President, 

I thank you, Sir, and the rest of the members of 
this honourable Court, for having complied with my re¬ 
quest, that a short interval might be allowed me before 
i entered upon my Defence. 

I have also to express my satisfaction, that the whole 
of mv conduct and proceedings in Basque Roads, is 
now under your consideration, in consequence of my 

P 


106 

having applied for this Court-Martial. And although I 
cannot but lament the inconvenience occasioned thereby 
to the service, and to many individuals, I trust the ne¬ 
cessity of it must be evident to the members of this Court; 
for either I had to adopt this measure, or, by a tacit 
acquiescence in the insinuations thrown out against me 
by Lord Cochrane, have compromised, not only my 
own honour, but also that of the brave officers and men 
serving under my command. 

The proceedings of the Court will shew, whether 
any misconduct has existed in the execution of the ser¬ 
vice under consideration ; if any has existed (of which 
I am perfectly unconscious) it is right that the nation 
should know it; not as resting upon the unsupported 
opinion of an individual, but on the unprejudiced judg¬ 
ment of this tribunal. 

I was prepared, when 1 first came before you, with 
what appeared to me, a complete justification “ of my 
conduct and proceedings, as Commander in Chief of 
the Channel Fleet, employed in Basque Roads, between 
the 17th March and 29th April last,” to which your 
enquiry is directed; but I could not be aware of the 
oral testimony, that was to be brought forward in sup¬ 
port of the charge, which their lordships have, at the 
instance of Lord Cochrane, been induced to make 
against me;—namely, “ that on the 12th April, the 
enemy’s ships being then on shore, and the signal hav¬ 
ing been made that they could be destroyed, I did, for 
a considerable time, neglect or delay taking effectual 
measures for destroying them.” I was ready to admit, 
that, from the time of my observing, on the morning of 
the 12th, the situation of the enemy, communicated to 
me also by signal from the Imperieuse, some time did 
elapse before the enemy’s ships were attacked ; but 1 
was prepared to prove, most incontrovertibly, that no 
neglect, or unnecessary delay took place in effecting the 
destruction of those ships; and I have now the satis¬ 
faction to find, that out of all the officers of the fleet 
who are summoned on this trial, the. charge rests upon 
the unsupported, and I may say already refuted, test;-' 
rnony of the Captain of the Imperieuse. 

1 believe there is not a precedent to be found in the naval 
annals of Great Britain, of an officer of the rank I have the 
honour to hold, commanding a fleet which has performed 
so import&nt a service as that accomplished under my di- 


107 

recti on; approved as that service has been, by the Board 
ot A d mil alty ; and considered by his Majesty’s govern¬ 
ment as even deserving the thanks of both houses of 
parliament; being obliged, from a sense of what is due 
to his own character and honor, as well as to the pro¬ 
fession to which he belongs, to appeal to a naval tribu¬ 
nal against the loose and indirect accusations of an 
officer, so much his inferior in rank.—I am warranted 
in saying, that the execution of this service was ap¬ 
proved by the Board of Admiralty ; because, in a letter 
from their Lordships’ Secretary, dated the 23d April, 
acknowledging the receipt of my public dispatches on 
the occasion, he says he is “ commanded by their Lord- 
ships to congratulate me on the brilliant success of the 
force under my command, in the attack of the enemy’s 
ships in the Isle d’Aix Roads, by lire vessels, and sub¬ 
sequently by detachments from my fleet, which termi¬ 
nated in the capture and destruction of four of the 
enemy’s ships ; and to signify their lordships’ directions 
to me, to express their approbation of the great exer¬ 
tions of Rear Admiral Stopford, Sir Harry Neale, and 
the several other officers mentioned by me as having 
been most actively employed ; and having particularly 
distinguished themselves upon this important service.” 
And I am warranted in the assertion, that the service 
was considered as deserving the thanks of both houses of 
parliament; because, in the letter from their Lordships’ 
secretary to Lord Cochrane, dated 29th May (which is 
already before the Court), it is expressly stated, that, it 
was the intention of his Majesty’s Government to move 
for such thanks. 

Lord Cochrane, however,warned the noble Lord at the 
head of the Admiralty, that, if this measure were at¬ 
tempted, he should, if standing alone, oppose it, so far 
as regarded the Commander in Chief. Thus, without 
specifically objecting to the thanks being given for the ser¬ 
vice performed, directing his hostility personally at me, 
and making his attack as publicly, thought not so fairly, 
as if lie had at once exhibited formal charges. 

Lord Cochrane, as a member of parliament, may most 
assuredly support or oppose public measures, as he shall 
think proper. In the present proceedings however, he 
stands m the situation, only of an officer serving under 
my command, as appears by the following letter to me 
from the First Lord of the Admiralty, 

F % 


108 

Admiralty, May 29 , 18 09 * 

“ My Lord, 

i 1 - « 

“ Having, in conversation, informed Captain Lord 
Cochrane, that it was the intention of his Majesty’s 
government, to move the thanks of both Houses of 
Parliament to your Lordship, and to the officers, 
seamen, and marines, serving under your command 
in Basque Roads, Lord Cochrane declared to me, 
that in the event of such a measure being-proposed in 
parliament, lie should feel himself bound, by his pub¬ 
lic duty, to object to the thanks, as far as they 
should apply to the Commander in Chief. Under these 
circumstances it has been deemed expedient to sus¬ 
pend the motion for the vote of thanks, and to call 
upon Lord Cochrane, by the Board of Admiralty, to 
state the ground on which he has intimated to the 
.First Lord of the Admiralty, his intention to oppose 
the vote of thanks, as far as respects your Lordship ; 
that the Board of Admiralty may thereby be enabled 
to judge, how far the grounds, to be stated by Lord 
Cochrane, may be of a nature to suspend the motion 
in parliament, or to call for any.further investigation 
by the Board, or in any other way, 

“ I have felt it due to your Lordship, to give you 
the earliset information of this state of things, and to 
acquaint you, that a letter will this day be written to 
Captain Lord Cochraine, in conformity to the above 
Resolution of the Board of Admiralty ; a copy of 
which, together with the answer of Lord Cochrane, 
will be, without delay, communicated to your Lord- 
ship. 

“ I have. Sec. 

(Signed) “ Mulgrave.” 

Admiral the Lord Gambler , 

S)'c. fa. Sc. 

Whether Lord Cochrane supposed he might, with 
impunity, endeavour to lower me in the opinion of my 
country, and of my sovereign, signal marks of whose 
favour had at this instant been exclusively conferred 
upon himself; whether his Lordship thought he could 
exalt his own reputation at the expense of mine ; and 
whether he expected that his threat would intimidate 
me to silence, I know not; but if these were his ideas, 
I assure myself the result will prove to him, that they 


109 

were founded in error; for I will never permit any man 
to proceed as Lord Cochrane has done, without availing 
myself ot the means which the laws of my country 
afford, to shew the futility and injustice of such an at¬ 
tack. 

By llie letter of the Secretary of the Admiralty, to 
Lord Cochrane, his Lordship was called upon to state 
the grounds on which he had intimated his determina¬ 
tion oi objecting, in his place in the house of commons, 
to a vote of thanks to me individually, and his reply 
is already before ou. 

After making his undefined accusation against his 
admiral, he excuses himself from explanation, by a 
general reference to the log and signal books of the 
fleet, without knowing, if I tnay judge from the im¬ 
perfect state of his own log, what that general refer¬ 
ence might produce. 

Therefore, because be does not accord with me in 
opinion, Lord Cochrane, whose extent of responsibility 
has perhaps never exceeded the charge of a single ship, 
and to 'Whom, in jddgnient, I will not reduce m3 7 ex¬ 
perience to a comparison, becomes my accuser, whilst 
from my situation, I am responsible for every act of ray 
fleet, and for the fate of every ship composing it.. 

I am so confident (ahd hope it is already evident to the 
Court) that Lord Cochrane has no cause whatever for ac¬ 
cusing me of any dereliction of duty, that, it might almost 
be supposed something had occurred in my personal con¬ 
duct towards his Lordship, which had afforded him 
grounds of dissatisfaction. The contraiy, however, is 
the fact; more liberality could not have been shewn 
than Lord Cochrane received at my, hands ; and al¬ 
though a considerable degree of disappointment was 
manifested throughout, the fleet, on his arrival to con¬ 
duct the service to be performed bv fire vessels, yet 
every officer in the fleet rendered him the most ready 
assistance, not onty in valuable suggestions (the entire 
credit of which seems to have been assumed by bis 
Lordship), hut by every other means that zeal and 
courage could afford. 

Lord Cochrane, on presenting himself to me after the 
action, was general in complaint of the officers who 
commanded the other ships, engaged at the same time 
with himself, on the attack of the‘enemy; hut, having 
had equal means with his Lordship, of judging of the 


1 10 

conduct of those officers, I do aver that it was highly 
meritorious. 

At the time Lord Cochrane made this general com¬ 
plaint, I had not the smallest suspicion that there ex¬ 
isted in his mind those sentiments of disapprobation of 
my conduct , which by his proceedings since his return 
home, I am to suppose he then entertained. It would 
in such a case have been liberal, and, I think, also his 
duty, to have made a communication to me to that 
eil'ect. I should then have been enabled to have guarded, 
in some measure, against bis attack upon my character, 
on his arrival in England. 

I scarcely need observe in this Court, that however 
highly courage is to be valued in an officer, it is always 
incomplete in its consequences, without the equal exer¬ 
cise of judgment and discretion, it being the duty of a 
Commander, not only to destroy his enemy, but to ac¬ 
complish that destruction with the least possible loss 
on his part; and I submit to the Court, whether there 
ever was a service which (under all circumstances) more 
required the exercise of those qualities, than the one in 
question; the effect produced exceeded my most san¬ 
guine expectation, and 1 believe the expectations of the 
whole fleet. 

The points under the consideration of the Court ap¬ 
pear to be the following. 

Whether the lapse of time between the discovery in 
the morning of the enemy’s ships being on shore, and the 
attack, was not, under all circumstances, absolutely ne- 
cessary for the advantageous accomplishment of the in¬ 
tended service ; whether it was not my duty, as Com¬ 
mander in Chief, to he governed by a general view of 
the whole of those circumstances, rather than yield to 
the suggestion of one, and that a very junior officer ; and 
whether an earlier attack would have been attended with 
greater advantages. In short, was there not accom¬ 
plished, at the time the attack was made, all that could 
at any time have been effected ! 

It is in support of these propositions I undertake to 
shew, as indeed is already in evidence before you, that 
had I not delayed sending in the ships to the attack 
until the time I did, the loss of ships, and of the lives 
of valuable seamen, would, in the opinion of all the 
officers of the fleet, have amounted to a large proportion 
of the force so employed ; and yet it seems that I am 


Ill 

now represented as deserving of censure for having pre¬ 
vented that wanton destruction ; but I am satisfied that 
the Court will,by the result of their investigation, find that 
not a single additional ship of the enemy’s would have 
been destroyed by a more early adoption of those mea¬ 
sures, which it is imputed to me I delayed or neglected 1 

I shall now proceed, without any immediate reference 
to the evidence already before the Court, to the direct 
matter of the enquiry and charge, to which my letter 
to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty of the 
10 th May, partly applies. This letter was written, on 
my being informed, tnat ray public dispatch, of the 14th 
April, had been considered as not sufficiently explana¬ 
tory ; but even that letter proves short of what has now 
become necessary to submit to the Court, put, as I am, 
upon my defence. 

I must confess, that in relating the circumstances of 
what I felt an important service, 1 was not sensible that 
any part of my conduct would require explanation. 1 
conceived that a brief statement of the facts which had 
occurred would have been satisfactory, and I will ven¬ 
ture here to express my firm conviction, that during the 
whole period which is the subject of enquiry, and more 
particularly on the very day on which I am charged 
with a dereliction of duty; it will he found by this ho¬ 
nourable Court, that in the previous arrangement I ex¬ 
erted the utmost faculties of my mind to prevent any 
circumstance escaping me which forethought could dic¬ 
tate, and that at the time of attack, I acted with all 
the zeal for the success of the service, an officer could 
evince, whose duty it was to consider the proper appli¬ 
cation and preservation of his own fleet, as well as the 
destruction of that of the enemy. 

The squadron under my command, including the ad¬ 
vanced frigates, having been driven from their station 
offi Brest, by the continued prevalence of tempestuous 
westerly winds, it was on my return off that port on 
the 23d February, that I ascertained the escape ol the 
French fleet. 

I had no information of the time when the enemy 
escaped from their port, or of the course they had 
taken, consequently had no grounds upon which T 
-could exercise any discretion. This reduced me to the 
necessity of following my orders, which, in such an, 
event, distinctly directed me to detach the senior flag 


112 

officer, with such force as I might conclude was equal 
to the enemy, and to return myself to Caw sand Bay 
for further orders. I accordingly detached Vice Admi¬ 
ral Sir John Duckworth, with eight sail of the line and 
a frigate, in pursuit of the French fleet, on the course 
pointed out in their Lordships’ orders before referred to; 
which left me with the Caledonia alone, in the mortify¬ 
ing situation of being obliged to return to port. 

I refer back to this event, in order to shew, why the 
Caledonia, bearing my tlag, became detached from the 
fleet; a circumstance which, at the time, exposed me to 
insinuations highly painful to my feelings. 

In proceeding to Cawsand Bay, the Naiad joined me 
off Falmouth; when Captain Dundas informed me, that 
the enemy’s fleet from Brest, consisting of eight sail of 
the line, and two frigates, had entered Basque Roads on 
the 24th of February; where they had been reinforced 
by the four sail of the line, and two frigates, 'previously 
lying in Aix Roads. This communication being made 
to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, I re- 
ceived orders from their lordships on the 3d of March, 
to put to sea with the Caledonia, Tonnant, Illustrious, 
Resolution, and Bel Iona, together with any frigates and 
smaller vessels under my command, that might he ready 
for sea at Plymouth; to form a junction with Rear 
Admiral Stopford, commanding his Majesty’s squadron 
off Rochefort: and in the event of not finding the enemy’s 
ships there, to proceed in pursuit of them on a prescribed 
course, beyond the limits of my station, the information 
given by Captain Dundas affording every reason to con¬ 
clude, from the enemy’s ships having only hove to in 
Basque Roads, that they had immediately sailed from 
thence, on their original destination. 

On my arrival off Rochefort on the 7th of March, I 
found that Rear Admiral Stopford, with the Caesar, 
Defiance, Donegal, aiid four frigates, had, in the course 
of the 24th of February, been joined by Captain Reres- 
ford, with the Theseus, Triumph, Valiant, Revenge, 
and one frigate, and shortly after by the Hero ; and 
that the French Fleet had moved from Basque info Aix 
Roads, and taken an anchorage there, with eleven sail 
of t he line, and four frigates: for in the mere operation 
of shifting their birth into Aix Roads, in consequence 
of the intricacy of the navigation, one of their ships, the 
Jean Bart of 74 guns, was totally wrecked. 


113 

Judging that the occupation of Basque Roads by the 
fleet under my command, would be most effectual, 
either for blockading the enemy, or for carrying on offen¬ 
sive operations, should they prove practicable; I im¬ 
mediately ordered some of the masters of the fleet to 
proceed thither, and to take every advantage of weather, 
in sounding and surveying the anchorage; in order to 
ascertain the part most adviseable to be occupied by a 
fleet, ot the magnitude of that under my orders. 

On the 15th of March, I issued the following general 
order to the fleet 

“ GENERAL ORDER. 

te When the fleet takes an anchorage in Basque 
Roads, the starboard division will anchor in a line 
E. by S. from the Caledonia, and the larboard division 
will anchor in a line W. by S. from her. The ships 
are to be moored. The anchors to be placed E. N. E. 
and W. S.W. from each other, with the small bower 
to the westward ; and the ships are to he at the dis¬ 
tance of two cables length from each other. 

“ The frigates and brigs are to be placed one mile 
distant in advance, either towards the isle of Aix, or 
the town of La Rochelle, according to the direction 
in which the wind blows ; and some of them will be 
further advanced after the close of day, as an addi¬ 
tional guard against any attempts the enemy may 
make with lire vessels against the fleet. 

“ Every ship is to be held in constant readiness for 
action, at all times, upon the shortest notice. 

“ Every preparation is to he made, and kept in 
constant readiness, to resist and frustrate the attempts 
of the enemy, by the means of (ire ships or vessels ; 
and the ships are always to be ready to slip their 
cables, if it should be necessary, leaving buoys upon 
them. 

“ Two boats from each ship are to be held con¬ 
stantly ready, with tire grapnels in them, on board 
the advanced frigates, to tow off fire vessels. The 
boats are to go on board the advanced frigates every 
night, soon after sun set, to remain the night under 
the orders of the Captain having the charge ot the 
advanced guard ; they are to return to their proper 
ships in the morning. 

“ Two brigs are to be advanced beyond the frigates, 
with three boats on board each, which are to row 

Q 


114 


guard in moderate weather, and when the wind blows 
from the eastward; and a vigilant look out is to be 
kept upon the movements of the enemy, from all the 
ships and vessels of the advanced guard. If any of 
the enemy’s vessels approach the fleet, they are to be 
fired at; and if they are suspected to be lire vessels, 
blue lights are to be immediately burnt as a signal 
thereof. If the enemy’s ships of the line are disco-* 
vered to be in motion, rockets are instantly to be 
thrown up to apprize the fleet. In either case the 
frigates will get under sail, and act in such a manner, 
as may be most suitable to counteract the operations 
of the enemy, and assist the fleet in any way they 
may be able. 

“ Given on board the Caledonia, at anchor off 
the entrance to the Pertius D’Antioche, 15 March, 


1809. 


To the respective Captains , &> c. 


(Signed) 


“ Gambier.” 


On the 17th March, the fleet anchored in Basque 
Roads, and was moored in a line, as directed by the 
general order, with the frigates and gun brigs advanced 
towards the enemy. 

The Caledonia was anchored, Chasseron Tower bear¬ 
ing W. t N. citadel of the Isle D’Aix S. by E. 3 4 E.; 
and the enemy’s fleet, lying at the distance of about six 
miles S. E. was moored in two compact lines, and the 
most'distant ship of each line within point blank range 
of the batteries on the Isle D’Aix, with their frigates 
advanced towards the entrance to the Aix Roads. 

This compact position of the enemy was evidently 
taken, to avoid the shoals close around the anchorage. 

I’iie nearer and more distinct view I now obtained of 
the enemy’s position, confirmed mein my opinion, of 
the impracticability of a successful attack upon their 
ships by the fleet. 

1 was also satisfied, that the only way of attacking 
the enemy, was by the means of fireships; as sug¬ 
gested in my letter to the first Lord of the Admiralty, 
writen four days after my arrival off Rochefort, as 
follows:— 


“ Caledonia , off the Pertius D’An/ioche, 
1 It A March, 18 0,9. 

Ci My Dear Lord, 

“ The advanced work between the Isles of Aix and 


I Id 

' * \ 

Oleron,* which I mentioned in my last letter, I find 
was injured in its foundation, and is in no state of 
progress; that is therefore no obstacle to our bom¬ 
barding the enemy’s fleet, if you should be disposed 
•.omake an attempt to destroy it. A trial was made 
six years ago when a Spanish squadron lay at the 
same anchorage, but without effect. The report of 
it you will find in the Admiralty; it was made by 
Sir Charles Pole. J 

1 lie enemy’s ships lie very much exposed to the 
operation ol fireships; it is a horrible mode of war- 
faie, and the attempt very hazardous, if not desperate; 
but we should have plenty of volunteers for the ser¬ 
vice. If you mean to do any thing of the kind, it 
should be with secrecy and quickly, and the ships 
used should not be less than those built for the pur¬ 
pose, at least a dozen, and some smaller ones. 

“ Yours my dear Lord, 

“ Most faithfully, 

' (Signed) “ Gameier.” 

The Lord Mulgrace , Sfc. <^c. 

This letter was received by his lordship on the 19th 
March, who, indeed, had anticipated my sentiments, as 
appears by the following letter from their Lordships 
secretary, already before the Court, but which I will 
here recapitulate in order to preserve the chain of my 
narrative:— 

(most secret). <c Admiralty Office, t§th March , 1809*. 

“ My Lord, 

e< I am commanded by ray Lords Commissioners 
of the Admiralty, to acquaint your Lordship, that they 
have ordered twelve transports to be fitted as fire ships, 
and to proceed and join you off Rochefort; and that 
Mr. Congreve is also under orders to proceed to 
your Lordship, in a coppered transport, (the Cleve¬ 
land) containing a large assortment of rockets, and 
supplied with a detachment of marine artillery, in¬ 
structed in the use of them, and placed under Mr. 
Congreve’s orders. That the bomb vessels named in 
the margin (Etna, Thunder, Vesuvius, Hound, and 

* Boyart, 

' Q ; 2 


i 16 

Furv) are likewise under orders, to fit lor sea with 
all possible expedition, and to join you as they may 
be ready. That all these preparations are making, 
with a view to enable your Lordship to make an 
attack on the French fleet, at their anchorage oil Isle 
D’Aix, if practicable; and lam further commanded 
to signify their Lordships’ direction to you, to take 
into your consideration the possibility of making an 
attack upon the enemy, either conjointly with your 
line of battle ships, frigates, and small craft, fire 
ships, bombs, and rockets; or separately by any ot 
the above named means. 

“ You are to man t he fire ships with volunteers 
from the fleet, entrusting the said ships in charge ot 
officers of the rank of commander, who may happen 
to be present, and shail volunteer their services on 
this occasion. But as it is not likely there will be 
officers sufficient of that rank to command all the 
fire ships, you are to make up the deficiency by such 
Lieutenants of the line of battle ships as shall volun¬ 
teer their services, giving the preference to the first 
Lieutenants: and when the said fire ships are manned 
by volunteers from the fleet, you are to cause their 
original crews to be received on board the ships of 
your fleet. And in the event of the said fire ships 
being destroyed, you are to send home the said men 
in order to their being discharged, furnishing them 
with such certificates or protections as shall secure 
them from being impressed into his Majesty’s service. 
You are also to hold out to the volunteers, and the 
officers to whom the command of the fire ships may 
be entrusted, every expectation of reward in the event 
of success. 

“ It is their Lordships’ further direction, that you 
state to me for their information, whether any further 
augmentation of force of any description is, in your 
opinion, necessary, to enable you to perform this 
service with full effect; that it may be prepared 
and forwarded to you without a moment’s delay; their 
Lordships having come to a determination, to leave 
no means untried to destroy the enemy’s squadron. 

“ In order to give your Lordship every information 
on this important subject, my Lords have directed 
me to inclose to you a copy of a paper, drawn up by 


117 

Sir Richard Keats (in 1807) proposing a mode of at¬ 
tacking an enemy’s squadron under Isle D’Aix. 

“ I have the honour to be, 

“ My Lord, 

“ Your Lordship’s most obedient 
“ humble servant, 

“ W. W. Pole.” 

Admiral Lord Gambler^ off Rochefort. 

** P. S. The fire ships are expected to sail from 
the Downs to-morrow, and the rocket ship from the 
Nore about the same time. 

“ Six additional transports are ordered to be for¬ 
warded from Plymouth to your Lordship, and the 
Board of Ordnance are desired to send a ship, with 
combustible matter sufficient to fit the said trsnsports 
as fire ships, and also to put on board her an assort¬ 
ment of carcasses for twenty-four pounders, and of 
Valenciennes composition, to be used at your Lord¬ 
ship’s discretion.” 

Before I received this letter, and not doubting that 
the means necessary for assailing the enemy by fire ships 
would be afforded me agreeably to my suggestion, I 
used every opportunity of making myself acquainted 
with the impediments of the navigation, by sending the 
master of the fleet and the master of the Caledonia to 
sound, and survey the channel. 

On the 25th I issued the following general order to 
the fleet •— 

GENERAL ORDER. 

If at any time, one, or more, of the enemy’s ships 
should take the advantage of a favourable wind and 
tide, and attempt to pass the fleet, the Captains of 
the ship or ships nearest to which the enemy may 
pass, are immediately to cut, or slip, in pursuit of 
them, and use their utmost endeavours to bring the 
enemy to action ; but no greater number than those 
of the enemy are to continue the pursuit; and if more 
of the King’s ships should have slipt than those of the 
enemy, the sternmost are either to return, or anchor 
again immediately, and shew the distinguishing lights 
when in the presence of the enemy. 

“ Should more than four or five ships of the enemy 
attempt to pass through the fleet, the Admiral will 


113 

probably make the signal for the whole fleet to chace; 
when every ship is instantly to cut or slip their 
cables. 

“ Should any of the enemy’s frigates make the 
same attempt, the advanced frigates are in like man¬ 
ner to pursue them. 

“ Caledonia, in Basque Roads, 25 March, 1809, 

(Signed) “ Gambier.” 

To the respective Captains , fyc. 

On the 26th March, I received the Admiralty direc¬ 
tions of the 19th above referred to, and to which I 
answered as follows:— 

(secret). No. 70. Ci Caledonia, in Basque Roads, 

Q,$th March, 1809. 

“ Sir, 

“ I have this day received by the Encounter, your 
most secret letter of the 19th instant, accompanied by 
a paper, drawn by Sir Richard Keats, with his opinion 
of the mode of attack upon an enemy’s squadron 
moored under the Isle D’Aix; and signifying the 
directions of the Lords Commissioners of the Admi¬ 
ralty to me, to take into my consideration, the pos¬ 
sibility of making an attack upon the enemy’s fleet, 
either conjointly with the line of battle ships under 
my command, and the frigates, small craft, &c. or 
separately therewith. 

“ You will be pleased to acquaint their Lordships, 
that I shall apply all the powers and energy of my 
mind, to cawy into effect their directions as tar as pos¬ 
sible ; when the means, with which their Lordships 
have ordered me to be furnished, arrive at this 
anchorage. 

“ I will not at present detain the Encounter in her 
return to Plymouth, but will detach another vessel 
to-morrow, and will furnish you with a statement of 
the enemy’s force, position, and circumstances, for 
their Lordships information. Their ships certainly 
lie exposed to an attack upon them with lire vessels, 
with a hope of success. 

“ I have the honour to be, &c. 

(Signed^ “ Gambiea*’ 3 
The Hon . TV. W. Pole , Sfc. %c. 


119 

“ (secret.) 

No. 71« “ Caledonia, in Basque Roads^ 

2Qth March , 18 09 . 

<c Sir, 

“ In obedience to their Lordships’ directions to 
me, contained in your letter of the 19th instant, I beg 
leave to state to them that it will be adviseable I 
should be furnished with six gun brigs, in addition 
to those that I may be able to collect, of such as are 
under my command ; at present there are only two 
at this anchorage. I shall, however, order the Inso¬ 
lent and Contest to join me from Quiberon Bay, and 
I should hope the Martial and Fervent will return 
here shortly from Plymouth. 

“ It is proper I should state for their Lordships 
information, the position in which the French fleet 
is at present anchored near to the Isle D’Aix, that 
their Lordships may be able to form a judgment, of 
the success that may be expected to attend an attack 
upon the enemy’s fleet, in either of the modes directed 
by their Lordships, in your letter to me above men¬ 
tioned. 

“ The enemy’s ships are anchored in two lines, 
very near to each other, in a direction due S. from the 
fort on the Isle of Aix ; and the ships in each line 
not farther apart than their own length ; by which 
it appears, as I imagined, that the space for their 
anchorage is so confined by the shoalness of the water, 
as not to admit of ships to run in, and anchor clear 
of each other. 

“ The most distant ships of their two lines are 
within point blank shot of the works upon the Isle of 
Aix; such ships therefore as might attack the enemy, 
would be exposed to be raked by the hot shot, &o. 
from the Island, and should the ships be disabled in 
their masts, they must remain within the range of 
the enemy’s fire, until destroyed; there not being a 
sufficient depth of water to allow them to move to 
the southward out of distance. 

“ The enemy have taken their position, apparently 
with the view, not only to be protected by the strong 
works upon the Isle of Aix, but also to have the en¬ 
trance to the Charente open to them; that in case ot 
being attacked by fire ships and other engines of the 
kind, they can run up the river bevond the reach of 


120 

them. The tide and wind that are favourable to con¬ 
vey this kind of annoyance to the enemy, serves equally 

to*carrv them up the river. 

“ With respect to the attempt that may be made 
to destroy the enemy’s ships with shells, &c. I am 
not competent to give an opinion, until it is ascertained, 
whether the bombs can be placed within range of 
their mortars to the enemy’s ships, without being 
exposed to the fire from the Isle ot Aix. 

“ I beg leave to add that if their Lordships are of 
opinion that an attack upon the enemy’s ships by 
those of the fleet under my command is practicable, 
I am ready to obey any orders they may be pleased 
to honour me with, however great the risque may be 
of the loss of men and ships. 

“ I have the honour to be, &c. 

(Signed) “ Gambier.” 

The Honourable IV. JV. Pole. 

“ P. S. I enclose a statement of the enemy’s force. 

“ Statement of the enemy’s force moored at Isle 
D’Aix anchorage, in two lines, very near to each 
other, in a direction due S. from the fort on the Isle 
D’Aix. The ships in each line, not further apart 
than their own length, and the most distant ships of 
the twq lines, within point blank shot of the works 
on that Island. 

One three decker - - ^ Flag at the fore. 

Ten two deckers, one a 1 One flag at the mizen, and 
fifty gun ship late H. /'one broad pendant. 

M. Ship, Calcutta. ) 

Four fr igates. 

“ Caledonia, in Basque Roads, 26th March, 1800. 

" G.” 

On the 97th March, I went myself in the Unicorn, 
with Sir Harry Neale, the Captain of the fleet, and 
Captain Bedford of the Caledonia, to reconnoitre the 
enemy’s fleet, and the fortifications of the Isle D’Aix; 
which appeared, (notwithstanding Lord Cochrane seeks 
by Ifs evidence to make a contrary impression) to be 
of considerable force. 

Observing that the enemy were resuming their works 
on the Boyart shoal, with the view of affording to their 
fleet in Aix Roads additional protection, I sent in the 


121 

Amelia and Conflict on the 1st April, to disperse the 
people employed on these works, which service they 
effected. 

On the 3d April, Lord Cochrane arrived with the 
Imperieuse frigate; and by his Lordship I received the 
following directions from the Admiralty:— 

u Admiralty Office , 2bth March , 1809. 

“ My Lord, 

“ My Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty 
having thought fit to select Captain Lord Cochrane, 
for the purpose of conducting, under your Lordship’s 
directions, the fire-ships to be employed in the pro¬ 
jected attack of the enemy’s squadron off Isle D’Aix ; 
i have their Lordships’ commands to signify their 
direction to you, to employ Lord Cochrane on the 
above mentioned service accordingly, whenever the 
attack shall take place ; and I am to acquaint you, 
that the 12 fire-ships, of which you have already had 
notice, are now in the Downs in readiness, and de¬ 
tained only by contrary wind; and that Mr. Congreve 
is also at that anchorage, with an assortment of rockets 
ready to proceed with the fire-ships. I am also to 
acquaint you that the composition for the six trans¬ 
ports sent to your Lordship by Admiral Young, and 
1000 carcasses for 18 pounders, will sail in the course 
of three or four days from Woolwich to join you off 
Rochefort. 

“ I have. See. 

“ W. W. Pole.” 

To Admiral Lord Gamlier . 

That the service might proceed with the utmost 
celerity, 1 ordered eight of the largest transports, then 
with the fleet, to be selected and prepared as fire-ships, 
in lieu of the six expected from Plymouth; that they 
might be ready to act with the twelve from Woolwich, 
immediately upon their arrival. These with the Me¬ 
diator were accordingly fitted, by means of rosin and tar 
fortunately found on board some Chasse Marees recently 
captured, and other combustible materials furnished by 
the fleet. 

This service was performed under the immediate 
superintendance of the Captains ot the line of battle 
ships, who evinced the most unremitting activity upon 
the occasion. 


R 


i cm 

1 4 9 

Upon the 10th of April, at. 4. 30. P.M. the Beagle ar¬ 
rived with the twelve fire-ships from England, when I 
issued orders to the commanders of sloops, and first lieu¬ 
tenants of line-of-battle ships, to take the command of 
them, and of the other fire ships which I had prepared. 

It was found altogether impracticable to proceed to 
the attack on the night of the 10th, though much press¬ 
ed by Lord Cochrane; and it may be considered a most 
fortunate circumstance that the attempt was deferred, 
for it appears by a general order, found on hoard one of 
the enemy’s ships*, and now delivered into Court, that 
the French, to protect their fleet from attack, had equip¬ 
ped 73 launches, and other boats, in five divisions, to 
guard it from surprise during the night, and to tow 
off our fire-ships on their approach ; and the tranquillity 
of the night of the 10th, would have afforded the enemy 
full opportunity of availing themselves of this protec¬ 
tion ; but of this they were deprived, by the very blow¬ 
ing weather on the subsequent night, when the fire-ships 
were sent in. 

I have here to notice, that some days previous to the 
attack, I had, to deceive the enemy, adopted the precau¬ 
tion of ordering out of the Roads, the vessels of every 
description, that were not to be engaged in the intended 
operations. 

To assist and support the fire-ships, the following 
disposition was made of the whole force in frigates and 
small vessels: 

The Unicorn, Aigle, and Pallas, I directed to take a 
station near the Boyart Shoal, for the purpose of receiv¬ 
ing the crews of the fire-ships on their return from the 
enterprize, to support the boats of the fleet which were 
to accompany the fire-ships; and likewise to give assist¬ 
ance to the Imperieuse, which ship was somewhat fur¬ 
ther advanced. The Whiting schooner, and the King 
George and Nimrod cutters, were fitted for throwing 
rockets, and were also directed to take a station near 
that shoal. The Indefatigable, the Foxhound sloop, and 
Etna, (being the only bomb-vessel that had then ar¬ 
rived) were ordered to place themselves as near the Fort 
on the Isle of Aix, as possible ; the two former to pro¬ 
tect the bomb whilst she threw shells into the Fort. 

d he Emerald, Dotterel, and Beagle sloops, and Inso¬ 
lent, Conflict, and Growler gun-brigs, were stationed to' 
make a diversion at the east end of the Isle of A ix, The 

* See Appendix, No. IV. 


123 !. 


Red pole and Lyra I directed to be anchored by the 
Master of the Fleet, one near the Isle of Aix, and the 
other near the Boyart, with lights hoisted, and properly 
screened irom the enemy’s view, to.guide the tire-shins 
in their course to the attack. 

| explosion vessels, which had been proposed 
and prepared by Lord Cochrane, were, under his lord- 
ship & immediate direction, to precede the fire-ships in 
tile attack, j'heir explosion was to point out the pro¬ 
per time for the otlicers commanding the fire-ships, to 
set lire to their respective vessels, and to intimidate and 
prevent the enemy from towing off the fire-ships. The 
boats of the fleet, under the superintendance of Rear- 
Admit al Stopfoid, were ordered to assemble alongside 
tile Caesar, to proceed to assist the fire-ships, and I 
issued the following General Order, and gave the officers 
commanding fire-ships full instructions for their proceed¬ 
ings :— 


( M EM E. GENERAL.) 

“ Caledonia , in Basque Roads , 11M April , I8O9. 

The fire-si lips are to proceed to the attack the 
ensuing night. I he exploding vessels will close with 
the Imperieuse. The fire-vessels will move from their 
anchors at half past seven o’clock. I11 running in they 
are to leave the two lights of equal height (which will 
be shewn on board a vessel placed for that purpose) 
on the starboard hand; and iq leave fhe two lights 
perpendicular (which will also he shewn on board an¬ 
other vessel placed for that purpose) on the larboard 
hand. 

“ T he frigates, &c. which are to protect and receive 
the officers and crews of the fire-ships, will shew 
four lights perpendicular; and the Imperieuse will 
probably anchor near the Boyart, and shevy five 
lights perpendicularly. 

“ If the wind should shift before the fire-ships 
proceed to the attack, or from other circumstances it 
should be postponed, the Caledonia, or the Imperieuse, 
will fire a gun and s)iew three lights in a perpendicular 
position.” 

(Signed) (t Gambier” 

To the respective Captains, SfC. Sfc, 


With these preconcerted arrangements the fleet was 

R 2 


/ 


m 

at this time unmoored, in readiness to render any ser¬ 
vice that might be practicable ; but being unavoidably 
anchored in a strong tide way, with the wind blowing 
hard from theN.W. ; upon the weather-tide making, it 
was again moored, to prevent the ships falling on board 
each other. 

At about half past eight F.M. the explosion-vessels 
and fire-ships proceeded to the attack; at half past 
nine, two of the explosion-vessels blew up; and at ten 
most of the fire-ships were observed to be on fire—the 
enemy’s forts and ships firing on them; many of the 
fire-ships were seen to drive through their fleet, and be¬ 
yond the Isle of Aix ; the night was extremely dark—it 
blew a strong gale, with a high sea; and the service 
thereby became of such increased hazard as scarcely 
to admit of a hope of the officers and men ever returning. 

It is right I should here observe, that although from 
these, and other untoward circumstances, several of the 
fire-ships failed in their object, I could not discover 
(after the fullest investigation) that blame was imputable 
to any of the officers who commanded them. 

The explosion-vessels, conducted by Lord Cochrane 
in person, also failed in their object, as will be seen by 
reference to the small chart I now deliver into Court, 
which points out where two of them blew up. The 
third broke adrift, and did not explode. 

The situation in which, and the time when , 4 those ves¬ 
sels blew up, proved prejudicial to the eriterpfize in 
several respects. Their premature explosion, contrary 
to the expressed intention of Lord Cochrane, that they 
should blow up in the midst of the enemy’s boats, to de¬ 
ter them from towing oft* our fire-ships in their approach, 
served as a warning to the enemy, whose ships were ob¬ 
served instantly to shew lights ; and several of the offi¬ 
cers who commanded the fire-ships, not doubting that 
the explosion had taken place near to the enemy’s fleet, 
steered their ships, and set them on fire accordingly, by 
which means several were in flames at a greater dis¬ 
tance from the enemy than was intended, and so as to 
endanger our advanced frigates. In fact, had not Cap¬ 
tain Wooldridge, and some of the other officers, wholly 
disregarding the explosion, taken their fire-ships in a 
proper direction for the enemy, it is more than probable 
that none of them would have produced any effect what¬ 
ever on the enemy’s fleet. 


• 125 

But although not one of the enemy’s ships wasactu- 
■ally destroyed by means of fire-ships, yet the terror ex- 
r'ited by their approach induced the enemy to cut their 
cables, and exposed them, by their running aground, to 
the attack which ensued. 

I now come to the proceedings of the 12th of April, 
which commence with the signal, that the enemy could 
be destroyed ; and which destruction it is imputed to 
me, I delayed or neglected. 

At 5. 48. A.M. the Imperieuse, then about three 
miles from, the enemy, and about the same distance 
hom the Caledonia, made the signal tome by telegraph, 
that “ seven ot the enemy’s ships were on shore, and that 
halt the fleet could destroy them.” 

The actual situation of the French fleet, at that time, 
was this: Seven of their ships were on shore on the 
Palles, two had escaped towards the Charente, and two 
lay either at their original anchorage, or a very little re¬ 
moved from it, with their broadsides bearing upon any 
thing that might approach, to attack the ships on 
shore. 

1 ordered the fleet to he unmoored immediately; the 
wind was at NAV. and the tide was then nearly at the 
last last quarter ebb, and much too far spent, to admit 
ot a force being sent in, so as to effect any thing, with 
the possibility of returning, in case of disaster, before 
the making of the flood, which would effectually have 
locked up our ships within the enemy’s confined anchor¬ 
age, during the whole of that tide. Here they would 
have been exposed, not only to the point blank shot 
of the batteries, but also to the broadsides of the above- 
mentioned two line of battle ships, then lying in AixRoad, 
and which, even without assistance from the batteries, 
must have entirely crippled every one of our ships in 
their approach, through so narrow a channel ; besides 
which, some of the grounded ships were sufficiently up¬ 
right, and so situated as to enable them to bring their 
guns to bear upon the entrance. 

I would here submit to the Court, whether the idea 
which appears to have been entertained by Lord Coch¬ 
rane, that a force could have been sent in so as to have 
arrived before low water in the morning, was not in itself 
preposterous and impracticable. 

Upon the fullest consideration that no possible attempt 
could be made until the tide had flowed for some time, 


1 26 • 

unless a previous change of wind should take place; all 
I had to do, was to make every preparation for the at¬ 
tack on the enemy’s grounded ships ; accordingly 1 made 
the signal for the fleet to weigh, and the Rear Admiral 
and Captains being assembled on board the Caledonia, I 
gave orders to the Commander of the Etna, the only 
bomb present, to proceed as soon as the tide would per¬ 
mit that vessel to approach near enough to bombard the 
enemy’s ships. I at the same time ordered the Insolent, 
Conflict, and Growler gun-bngs, to accompany her, and 
directed the Captains of the Valiant, Bellona, and Re¬ 
venge, with the frigates, to take air advanced anchorage, 
as near as possible to the Boy art Shoal, to be in readiness 
to proceed to the attack, as soon as the water had suffi¬ 
ciently flowed to enable them to do so. At between 
nine and ten A.M. which was much before the flood was 
sufficiently made to commence effective operations, the 
fleet ran in, and came to an anchor within about three 
miles distant from the enemy’s fortress of Aix ; the three 
ships before mentioned, with the frigates, anchored about 
a mile nearer to the Boyart, but the bomb and brigs did 
not come to. 

As the flood-tide made, three of the seven ships, 
which had grounded on the Palles Shoal, and were the 
farthest from us, being lightened, succeeded in warping 
off, and made for the Churente. 

The two line-off battle ships still at their anchorage, in 
the situation before described, took, at the same time, 
advantage of the flood, and proceeded likewise towards 
that river. 

Most, if not all these five ships, now ran aground at 
the mouth of the Charente, and were never assailable. 

1 hese movements of the enemy’s ships were not, as I 
submit to the Court, to be prevented b} r any means that 
l could adopt, with the smallest chance of success, and 
without his Majesty’s ships being put to tiie most un¬ 
warrantable peril, and when, as Rear Admiral Stopford 
lias, in his evidence on the part of the prosecution, most 
emphatically described, “ Ours would have been all the 
loss, and the enemy’s all the advantage.” 

1 he wind blew directly in, so that in the event of our 
ships being crippled, while the flood tide was running, 
which appeared inevitable, it would have been impossible 
for them to have worked out, or to have retreated to an 
anchoiage, out of the reach of the enemy’s shot and shells. 


127 

the consequence of which could scarcely have been less 
than their utter destruction. 

1 hese serious impediments induced me to delay the 
attack until the latter part of the flood, in order to give 
any ships, which might be disabled on their approach, 
a chance of returning by means of the receding tide. 

Had the wind been favourable for sailing both in and 
out, or even the latter only, there could have been no 
doubt that tlie sooner the enemy’s ships were attacked 
the better. 

A nd i think the Court will allow that I am completely 
borne out in what I have stated, by the sentiments 
which it will be proved were expressed to me by Lord 
Cochrane, when he came oil board the Caledonia after 
the action ; that had I acted upon his signal, and sent 
in at that time, half the fleet, he calculated upon the loss 
of three or four of his Majesty’s line-of- battle ships. And 
I have moreover to observe, that if. in defiance of the 
obstruction of the other ships of the enemy, I had sent in 
a force, before the three ships bad warped off the Palles 
Shoal, it is a positive fact, that it could not have ad¬ 
vanced to the attack of those three ships, on account of 
the shoal water. 

It appears by the log-hook of the Imperieuse, that 
at 11. 30. she weighed, and run in in company with the 
Etna bomb and a gun brig. The fact is, that the Etna 
passed the Imperieuse whilst at anchor, about one, and 
that she began the attack some time before the Impe- 
pieusearrived up; half an hour afterwards the Impe- 
tieuse and Beagle followed the Etna and gun-brigs in to 
the attack, and between ten minutes before, and seven 
minutes after two, as will be seen by a reference to the 
log-books upon the table, I ordered the Indefatigable, 
Unicorn, Aigie, and Emerald frigates, with the Valiant 
and Revenge (and the Pallas a few minutes later), to 
weigh, Captain Bligh, the senior officer, having some 
hours before received my directions for his proceeding 
against the enemy. 

The Imperieuse opened her fire at about 20 minutes 
after two, the Aigie at three, and the other ships as 
soon after as the flowing tide permitted. 

In consequence of strong north-westerly winds, the 
flood tide continued running until past three in the 
afternoon, which Lord Cochrane has not noticed in his 
evidence. 


' 12$ 

Tn my letter of the 10th May to the Admiralty, I could 
not state these circumstances so minutely as I am now 
’enabled to do, bv a reference since made to the log books. 

At 4. 10. P.iVI. the enemy’s ship Calcutta, and the 
Ville de Varsovie, and Aquilon, about an hour after, 
were taken possession ol by the boats of the advanced 
squadron> and set on lire, as soon as the prisoners 
Were removed; a short time after, La Tormerc was 
burnt by the enemy. This ship is admitted, by the evi¬ 
dence of Lord Cochrane, to have been out of the reach of 
our fire, and it is a notorious fact, that the three-decker 
•and the other two ships that got afloat, had been 
aground at some distance beyond theTonnere. 

In this manner the Court will find that the four ships 
capable of being attacked at the time the signal was 
made (if the Tonnere may be so considered, of which 
I doubt) were completely destroyed, the other three of 
the seven first on shore, never having, as I have already 
stated, been in a situation to he assailed. 

And I venture most positively to assert, that the 
destruction of these ships would not have been effected, 
if I had not delayed the attack until the time I did. 

At the close of the afternoon I judged it adviseable to 
attempt to follow up our success by an attack upon 
the five ships tiiat had escaped to the mouth of the 
Cbarente, which I thought it might be possible to ef¬ 
fect during the night, 1 therefore sent Rear Admiral 
Stopford, in the Caesar, with the Theseus and the fire¬ 
ships* and boats of the fleet, with Mr. Congreve’s rock¬ 
ets, and gave the Rear Admiral discretional orders, to 
proceed as far as he should judge proper, and for his 
applying that force as he should think fit, and ac¬ 
cording as circumstances should render it expedient. 

Scarcely had the Caesar reached Aix Road, before 
she grounded, and lay in a very perilous situation (as 
lias been deposed by the Rear Admiral) exposed also 
to the point-blank shot from the batteries. 

The Rear Admiral perceiving that nothing could he 
effected by the line of battle ships, all of which had 
grounded (as had also some of the frigates), and that 
they lay in imminent danger; and satisfied that if any 
thing further could be effected towards the destruction 
of these ships, it could only be by smaller vessels, he 
therefore, very judiciously, before day-light on the 
13th, availed himself of a providential shift of wind, 

* three vessels had been prepared as such in the course of the day. 


m 

which enabled him, when the line of battle ships 
floated, to extricate them from that danger, and to 
return to Basque Roads. 

Captain Bligh, of the Valiant, also on his return, re¬ 
ported to me, that it was found impracticable to destroy 
the three-decked ship, and others which were lying 
at the entrance of the Charente, as the former, (which 
was the outer one) waS protected by three lines of 
boats placed in advance from her. 

In addition to the incontestible proofs already ad¬ 
duced, of the impracticability of effecting any farther 
destruction of the enemy’s fleet, I will advert to the 
high professional character of Rear Admiral Stopford, 
and Captains Beresford, Bligh, and Kerr, who cannot 
for an instant be supposed likely to omit any cir¬ 
cumstance that could effect the object for which they 
were sent by me into Aix Roads, and I am morally 
certain, that they did not withdraw their ships, until 
it was wholly impracticable to annoy the enemy 
farther, or, until it appeared to those officers that the 
destruction of their own ships would be the certain 
consequence of their longer continuance in Aix Roads. 

Lord Cochrane remained in the Road of Aix, during 
the 13th and 14th, accompanied by the Pallas frigate, 
the sloops, and gun brigs, and Etna bomb, but nothing 
was attempted by the frigates. 

During the 13th, the Etna was employed in throwing 
shells, the Whiting schooner in firing rockets, and 
the other small vessels firing upon the enemy’s ships 
on shore, when the tide permitted them to approach. 

On the 14th, having, by signal, directed the Im~ 
perieuse to join me, I ordered Captain Wolfe, of the 
Aiffie, to take the command of the small vessels ad¬ 
vanced ; these, with the Etna, continued firing on the 
enemy’s ships at the entrance of the Charente, as 
opportunity offered, during the remainder of the day, 
but without effect. 

On the 15th, I dispatched Sir Harry Neale to their 
Lordships, in the Imperieuse, with my public letter 
of the 14th April, giving an account of the service 
which had been performed. 

From the 15th to the 24th, the attack on the enemy’s 
ships on shore, at the mouth of the Charente, was 
continued by the bombs, (the Thunder having arrived 
on the 19th) assisted by the small vessels, as wind and 

* S 


130 

weather permitted; but the enemy had, by throwing 
overboard their guns and stores, got so high up, that 
even the gun brigs, and other vessels of light draught, 
frequently grounded, in their endeavor to approach, 
and never could get sufficiently near, to produce any 
effect. 

The orders of the Lords Commissioners of the Ad¬ 
miralty to me of the 14th April, to detacli two squa¬ 
drons of four ships of the line each, to cruise for the 
purpose of intercepting the French ships which had es¬ 
caped from L’Orient in February, having, with the 
other orders which i received from their Lordships, 
between the 17th March and 29th April, been read 
upon opening the Court, 1 take occasion to observe, that 
I had anticipated the orders of their Lordships in this 
respect, and the success in the operations of the 12th, 
without the loss of any of the king’s ships, having en¬ 
abled me to do so, I had previously appointed two 
squadrons for that service, one of which had actually 
sailed before I received the orders of their Lordships 
thereupon. 

From the 24th to the 29th April, nothing material 
occurred; and having received the Admiralty letter of 
tlie 22d April, signifying, “ that their Lordships con¬ 
sidering the state of the enemy’s force, in consequence 
of the brilliant success of the fleet under my command, 
so much reduced as to render my further presence un¬ 
necessary, directed me to repair to Spithead in the Ca¬ 
ledonia.” I accordingly completed the arrangements of 
the fleet, and proceeded in the Caledonia to England, 
on the 29th April. 

Previous to my leaving Basque Roads, one of the 
enemy’s frigates was set on fire by themselves at the 
entrance of the Charente, another was observed to be 
wrecked further up that river. The number of ships 
that escaped without injury did not, from the best in¬ 
formation, exceed one or two line of battle ships, and 
two frigates; what may have been the fate of the re¬ 
mainder I leave to be considered by the members of 
this honourable Court, who are well qualified to judge 
of the condition of ships which had been so long and so 
repeatedly aground. 

By the foregoing narrative, as well as by the log and 
signal-books of the Caledonia (to which, as also to every 
correct log of the fleet, I am as desirous to refer as 


131 

Lord Cochrane may be), it will, I conceive, be seen 
that I tully meet the charge which has been preferred 
against me, and if the impression arising out of this 
enquiry should prove less favourable to Lord Cochrane 
than that which may have been produced by my letter 
to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, of the 
14th April, his Lordship must be sensible, that, as the 
instigator of this Court-Martial, he will himself have 
been the cause of this change of sentiment. I have 
been willing to grant to his Lordship the fullest credit 
for his personal bravery, and for his judicious manner 
of approaching the enemy in the Imperieuse, to which 
points the commendation expressed in my letter of the 
14th April, related ; for, in fact, the success of the 
first part of the enterprise, as I have before observed, 
arose from the terror excited by the appearance of the 
fire ships, as they failed in the principal effect they 
were intended to produce, and the blast of the explosion 
vessels under his Lordship’s immediate direction, did 
not take place by any means so near to the enemy’s 
ships as his Lordship had projected ; the general result, 
however, of the attack, was so successful, that, under 
that impression, I did not hesitate to express, in my pub¬ 
lic letter, the degree of approbation which is therein 
marked, passing over circumstances not altogether sa¬ 
tisfactory to me, and not at that time necessary to be 
brought into public notice. 

The Court is now in possession of all the facts and 
circumstances on which I rest my justification, and it 
remains to be considered how far they are affected by the 
evidence produced on the part of the prosecution. 

I have, first, to refer to the evidence of the second 
in command, and to that of the Captains of two of 
the frigates engaged in the attack, viz. the Rear 
Admiral Stopford, and Captains Rodd and W olfe. 

These officers, far from supporting any part of the 
charge made against me, have distinctly denied there 
having been any neglect, delay, or deficiency, in any 
part of my conduct in Basque Roads ; and, I am per¬ 
suaded, that had the prosecutor called all the other 
witnesses summoned upon the trial, a corresponding- 
testimony would have been given by each of them. 

I have next to refer to the evidence of the log and 
signal-books of the fleet, on which the charge purports 
to be founded, and, I must here beg to call your 

S 2 


132 

i 

attention io the very unusual circumstance of there 
being already on your table, two log-books of the same 
ship, (namely the Imperieuse) and materially differing 
from each other; one of them produced by the Master 
of the Imperieuse, as the authentic public document 
of that ship, to the accuracy of which he has deposed; 
and the other presented by Lord Cochrane, and ad¬ 
mitted by his Lordship to be a compilation by himself 
in London, from materials which are not produced to 
the Court. 

In addition to these circumstances, I have to lay upon 
your table a third paper, purporting to be also a log¬ 
book of the Imperieuse, but differing from the two al¬ 
ready before you : this paper was delivered to me by 
Lord Cochrane, in obedience to my order of 12th May 
last, to furnish me “ with a copy of the books of logs 
and signals of his Majesty’s ship Imperieuse, under his 
command, from 11th to 15th April inclusive;” and to 
this log the Court will find affixed his Lordship’s signa¬ 
ture. 

The Court itself having so attentively inspected the' 
master’s log, I need not point out the alterations evi¬ 
dently made therein; and it cannot fail to observe the 
variations in the other two logs. 

I must, however, remark, that among the deviations in 
these papers from the ship’s original log, the signal im¬ 
mediately in question, which is recorded in the latter, to 
have been for “ half the fleet,” stands in both these com¬ 
pilations as having been made for “ part of the fleet” 
only*; and of the two logs received from Lord Cochrane, 
that only produced in Court by himself, records the cir¬ 
cumstance of his having hailed the Indefatigable, and 
proposed to her a joint attack upon the enemy’s ship the 
Ocean ; and I cannot help here reminding the Court of 
the application made by the Master of the imperieuse 
for access to the Indefatigable’s log. 

I beg leave to submit, whether documents, formed some 
time after the events they record took place, and so con¬ 
trary to the practice of the Navy, can be deemed authen¬ 
tic, or ought to be referred to as, or in support of, evi¬ 
dence before this Court. 

I have no doubt the signal made by Lord Cochrane 
on the morning of the 12th April, which forms a part 

* Lord Cochrane, in his evidence, admits that the signal actually made 
was for half the fleet. 


4 


133 

of the charge against me, will, combined with other sub¬ 
sequent signals, appear to the Court unprecedented and 
improper; of this his lordship now seems aware, from 
the manner in which he has expressed himself in his 
evidence ; and that there may be no doubt of the accu¬ 
racy of the signal log-book of the Caledonia, I must 
again call before you the signal officer, to shew that the 
signal of recal on the 13th April, said to have been ob¬ 
served by the Imperieuse, was never made by the Cale¬ 
donia ; and also, that the signal of the 14th, recorded in 
the Caledonia’s log as made by the Imperieuse, that “ if 
permitted to remain can destroy the enemy,” is denied 
by Lord Cochrane, ever to have been made. 

I have yet to call the attention of the Court to the 
plan drawn by Lord Cochrane, of the position of the 
enemy’s ships as they lay aground on the morning of the 
12th April, and to that position marked upon the chart 
verified by Mr. Stokes; the former laid down from un¬ 
certain data, the latter from angles measured, and other 
observations made upon the spot; the difference between 
the two is too apparent to escape the notice of the 
Court, and the respective merits of these charts will not, 
1 think, admit of a comparison. 

The accuracy attributed by Lord Cochrane to the 
French charts will, I doubt not, seem very extraordinary, 
after it shall be shewn in evidence that his Lordship has 
expressed a very opposite opinion. 

It now only remains for me to examine in what man¬ 
ner Lord Cochrane has attempted, by his unsupported 
opinion, to maintain the charge. This is to be collected 
from the long narrative evidence given by his lordship. 
It cannot, I am sure, be deemed necessary for me to fol¬ 
low him throught be whole of this evidence. There are, 
however, some parts of it that require particular animad¬ 
version. 

In the course of his evidence, Lord Cochrane, in allu¬ 
sion to the danger which would attend his going with¬ 
out encouragement to the attack of the ships at the 
mouth of the Charente, says, speaking of himself, “ a 
heavy,very heavy responsibility would lie upon my shoul¬ 
ders In case of disasters, which in military operations are 
sometimes unavoidable ; if I had my cable shot away, 
for instance, I might have been sunk.” Yet, whilst on 
the one hand his lordship seems to have been so sensible 
of the weight of responsibility imposed upon himself, by 
the command of a frigate and a few small vessels, he ap_ 


134 

pears, on the other, to have been unmindful of the far 
heavier degree of responsibility attached to my command 
during so complicated an undertaking; in alluding to 
the dangers of which, I must take this opportunity to 
mention five furnaces for heating shot which Lord Coch¬ 
rane reported to me to have himself discovered, when he 
went in to reconnoitre previous to the attack. 

Lord Cochrane states, that 74 gun ships may go into 
an inner anchorage between the Boyart Shoal and the 
Palles, at any time of tide. He asserts also, that the 
tide rises only from ten to twelve feet. By the French 
chart, which he produced to conlirm his deposition, it 
appears that there is a bank to pass over before ships can 
get into that anchorage, with from 18 to 20 feet at low 
water. But by the charts of the Master of the Fleet, 
and Master of the Caledonia, who sounded upon the 
bank, it appears that there is only from 14 to H) feet, 
and the bank full of knowlls. Under these circum¬ 
stances, if Lord Cochrane’s opinion be correct relative to 
the rise and fall of the tide, no man in his senses would 
venture a 74 over it, even in the smoothest water, at less 
than i flood, and therefore as to the refuge that this in¬ 
ner anchorage would afford a crippled ship, how little 
would the probability be that the opportunity of both 
tide and wind should offer for a crippled ship, at the 
moment it was most wanted, to pass over the bank, and 
get out of the reach of the batteries; hut if I had even 
previously known as much of this inner anchorage as I 
now do, 1 would not, as the wind was at the time, have 
done otherwise than I did; and if Lord Cochrane really 
knew what he has now professed to have known when 
he was in Aix Road, it was a duty imperiously incum¬ 
bent upon him to have communicated that information 
on the afternoon of the 12th, to the captains of the line- 
of-battle ships which he saw in so perilous a situation, 
aground, within point blank range of the batteries. 

Lord Cochrane has expressed an opinion, that two or 
three sail of the line sent in on the morning of the 12th, 
might, by running up on the verge of the Boyart Shoal, 
have passed to leeward of the two French ships remain¬ 
ing at anchor. This I declare to have been absolutely 
impracticable, as well from the raking fire of the two 
ships afloat, of the upright ones on shore, in our ap¬ 
proach, and the fire of the batteries, as from the shoal 
water close under their lee. The testimony of Captain 
Rodd, the only witness examined on this point, on the 


1 35 

part of the prosecution, corroborates my opinion, which, 
I have no doubt, will be further supported by the evi¬ 
dence of other competent witnesses, whom I propose 
calling. 

With respect to the force of the Aix batteries, I ap¬ 
prehend what appeared to Lord Cochrane, and to the 
master of his ship, as ruins of the Fort, were, in fact, 
materials tor improving or encreasing the works; in¬ 
deed, can it be natural to suppose, that the enemy, 
who are so active in forming batteries wherever they 
can be useful, and whose engineers are considered to 
he equal to any, would, of all moments, choose that 
for dismantling or biowing up works, when they ex¬ 
pected those works would be most required , tor it is 
very certain the enemy was as fully apprized of our 
intentions of attacking their fleet as myself; and it 
will, pei haps, be considered less likely that the enemy 
should weaken their defences on the Isle D’Aix, raised 
evidently for the protection of their fleet, when at the 
same time they were endeavouring to form- others on 
the Boyart shoal, as a further protection for it. 

Relative to the service that had been performed, and 
what might possibly lui be further attempted to. 'irdsthe 
destruction.of the enemy’s ships. Lord Cochrane suites 
a conversation to have passed between his Lordship 
and myself, on his return from Aix Roads, in which he 
represents me to have said, “ that if he threw blame, 
it would appear like arrogantly claiming all the merit to 
himself.” 

I, however, trust the Court will not conceive that 
the expression of casting blame has any allusion to my 
conduct, for, as I have before said, Lord Cochrane 
never expressed one syllable, from which I could form 
the most faint idea, that he felt disappointed at any 
thing resting with me; his Lordship’s allusion had re¬ 
ference only to the several officers who acted with him 
in Aix Roads, upon whom generally he cast blame, 
without giving the smallest intimation, either by word 
or manner, that, in his expressions of dissatisfaction, he 
1 included his Commander in Chief. 

By the manner in which Lord Cochrane has ex¬ 
pressed himself, it might perhaps be concluded, that 
1 had been desirous he should bear my dispatches to 
England, and after the caution he represents me to 
have given him, it might, if I allowed this statement 


136 

to pass uncontradicted, be supposed by some, that 1 
proposed this as an inducement to secure Lord Coch¬ 
rane’s silence, whereas, when his Lordship recalls the 
circumstances to his mind, it will, I am sure, lead him 
to acknowledge, that so far from pressing this service 
upon him, 1, in the first, instance, gave him to understand, 
that Sir Harry Neale, the Captain of the fleet, was to 
bear my dispatches, and at which, Lord Cochrane, I 
positively declare, expressed evident marks of dissatis¬ 
faction ; and it certainly will appear to every reflecting 
mind, that my sending his Lordship to England, with 
orders to go to the Admiralty, betrayed no desire of 
concealment, nor apprehension of any representation 
Lord Cochrane might make of my conduct. 

Upon a general review of the evidence of Lord Coch¬ 
rane, it will appear that his Lordship has founded his 
statement on the narrative log compiled since his return 
to England, on the French chart, and on the position in 
which is placed, in his own chart, the enemy’s several 
ships aground, and the two ships which remained at 
the anchorage on the morning of the 12th. 

When it is considered how essentially this log differs 
from the ship’s log, and both of them from the docu¬ 
ment Lord Cochrane has furnished me with, I con¬ 
ceive not much credit can be given to either. 

With regard to the reliance to be placed on the French 
chart, I have already observed, that Lord Cochrane 
declared, before the attack, that it was incorrect. 

With respect to the position of the enemy’s ships in 
the morning of the 12th April, after their dispersion, 
it is so widely different from that in which they are 
placed in the chart which has been delivered in by the 
Master of the Caledonia, and will be verified by the 
Master of the fleet, that it is hardly to be supposed they 
relate to the same transaction, and it is very fair here to 
remark the fact acknowledged by Lord Cochrane, in his 
evidence, that he erred no less than five points of the 
compass in the report he made to me before the at¬ 
tack, of the direction in which the French fleet was 
moored in two lines, from the fort of Isle D’Aix. 

Lord Cochrane has thought fit to represent that the 
enemy’s three grounded ships, which escaped from off 
the shoal of the Palles, were lying so near together, as 
to give two of them, which he states to be heeling in¬ 
wards. the appearance of their masts and yards locking: 


\ 


I 


i 37 

this description of them is certainly well calculated to 
make a strong impression of their defenceless state: but 
whatever may have been their appearance to his Lord- 
ship, such is not the fact; for, in reality, they were lying 
perfectly separate and clear of each other, as is shewn 
by the afore-mentioned chart, produced by the Master 
of the Caledonia, as will also be proved by evidence. 
But whatever their situation might have been with 
respect to proximity, I must here repeat that they could 
never have been approached by our ships within the 
reach of our shot, as Lord Cochrane has allowed in 
regard of the Tonne re, which was nearer to our attack¬ 
ing force than either of the three ships in question. 

It now only remains for me to request the attention 
of the Court to some conclusions, which I think may be 
drawn from the whole of the statements I have sub¬ 
mitted to the consideration of you, Sir, and the rest of 
the members of this honourable Court; and by which, 
with the additional evidence 1 have to adduce, it will, 
I Hatter myself, distinctly appear, 

1st. That during the whole of this service, the most 
unwearied attention was applied by me to its main 
object:, the destruction of the enemy’s fleet. 

2dly. That in no part of the service was more zeal 
and exertion shewn, than during the whole of the 12th 
April; when 1 had necessarily in view two objects, the 
destruction of the enemy’s fleet, and also the preserva¬ 
tion of that under my command : for the extreme difti- 
cultie's m approaching an enemy closely surrounded by 
shoals, and strongly defended by batteries, rendered 
caution in my proceedings peculiarly necessary. 

3dly. That three out of the seven of the enemy’s ships 
aground on the Palles, were from their first being on 
shore, totally out of the reach of the guns of any ships 
of the fleet that might have been sent in ; and that at 
no time whatever, either sooner or later, could they have 
been attacked. 

4tilly That the other four of the eleven ships of 
which the enemy’s fleet consisted, were never in a situa¬ 
tion to be assailed after the fire-ships had failed in their 
main object. 

These are the points on which I rest my justification, 
trusting that it will appear to the Court upon their 
review of my whole case, that 1 did take the most effec¬ 
tual measures for destroying the enemy’s fleet: that 

T ' 


1 SB 

neither neglect nor unnecessary delay did take place in 
the execution of this service, and on the contrary that it 
was owing to the time chosen by me for sending a force 
in, to make the attack, that the service was accomplished 
with so very inconsiderable a loss. 

Had I pursued any of the measures deemed practi¬ 
cable and proper in the judgment of Lord Cochrane, I 
am firmly persuaded the success attending t his achieve¬ 
ment would have proved more dearly bought than any 
yet recorded in our naval annals: and far from accom¬ 
plishing the hopes of my country, or the expectations of 
the Admiralty, must have disappointed both. If such 
too were the foundation of his Lordship’s prospects, it 
is just they should vanish before the superior considera¬ 
tions attendant on a service involving the naval character 
and most important interests of the nation. 

I conclude by observing, that the service actually 
performed has been of great importance, as well in its 
immediate effects, as in its ultimate consequences; for 
the Brest fleet is so reduced as to be no longer effective • 
it was upon this fleet the enemy relied for the succour 
and protection of their West India colonies, and the de¬ 
struction of their ships was effected in their own harbour, 
in sight of thousands of the French: and I congratulate 
myself and my country, that this important service has 
been effected, under Providence, with the loss only of 10 
men killed, 35 wounded, and 1 missing, and not even 
one of the smallest of our vessels employed has been 
disabled from proceeding on any service that might have 
become necessary. The extent of difficulties, and pro¬ 
spect of danger in this enterprize, were extreme, and the 
gallantry and determined spirit of those engaged most 
conspicuous. These merits, and those difficulties, ought 
not to be depreciated, on account of the inconsiderable 
loss sustained on the occasio.n ; 1 by no means seek to 
arrogate to myself any merit by these observations, hut 
I make them, as a tribute of praise due to the zealous 
services of the brave officers and men under my com¬ 
mand, and with a view of pointing out, how justly they 
are entitled to the gratitude of their country. 

GAMBIER. 


Portsmouth, 

31 st July, 180.0. 




139 


I he Log delivered by Lord Cochrane to Lord Gambler being 

produced , 

Judge Advocate—I suppose it will not be necessary to 
read this log. 

President—I presume not. 

Judge Advocate —The Court may compare it. 

{The French General Order referred to in the defence was given in.) 

JOHN DYER, Esq. sworn. 

Examined by Lord Gambler . 

The Letter from Lord Mulgrave to Lord Gambler being shewn to 

the witness , 

Q. Do you believe that to be the hand writing of Lord 

Mulgrave } 

O 

A. Yes, it is. 

Q. And that his Lordship’s indorsement on the letter from 
Lord Gambler of the time of the receipt thereof? 

A. Yes. 

Judge Advocate —These letters have already been read 
in the defence; they are the originals of a letter from Lord 
Mulgrave and another from Lord Gambier. 

Mr. JOHN SPUR LING called again. 

Examined by Lord Gambier . 

Q. Is this signature “ Cochrane,” to the copy of the log, 
his lordship’s hand writing? v 

A. It is, to the best oi my knowledge. 

Q. You have seen him write? 

A. I have. 


JAMES WILKINSON, Esq. Secretary to Lord Gambier, 

sworn. 

Examined bn Lord Gambier. 

•/ 

Q. In what way did this paper come into my posses¬ 
sion ? (the French Order being shewn to the witness.) 

A. How it came into his lordship’s possession I do not 
know. I first saw it on board the Caledonia, on the 13th or 
14 th of April, a day or two after the attack. It was found in 
one of the French captured ships.f 

* See the log here produced in the Appendix, No. 2. 

+ See this Order in the Appendix, No. 4. 

1 X s 




140 


Mr. ElTWARD FAIRFAX, Master of the Fleet, sw-orn. 

Examined by Lord Gambler. 

Q. Were you employed sounding and surveying in Basque 
Road and towards Aix Road previous to the 1 1th of April ? 

A. Yes, and reconnoitering the position of the enemy. 

Q. State the general knowledge you obtained while so em¬ 
ployed by my orders, and whether it agrees with the charts in 
the Neptune Francoise ? 

A. 1 was mostly employed on the Long Sand, (the Boyart 
is the southern part of it) and found that it extended full three 
quarters of a mile to the eastward and northward of where laid 
down. 1 will state to the Court where it varies. If you lay 
a ruler from Fouras Castle to Isle D'Aix, you will see that it 
carries you much clear of the sand, as expressed by the chart. 
The mark for tl;c spit is Chasseron light house, W. N. W. 
and Fouras Castle, between the citadel and the barracks upon 
Isle D’Aix. (The witness pointed it out upon the chart.) .Here 
are twenty-four feet in this part, where there are forty-five feet 
laid down in the chart. This is the only chart we had as 4 
guide. The variation is pourtrayed in the chart produced. by- 
Mr. Stpkes. I gave Mr. Stokes the marks, and I have all the 
different angles in my pocket, with the different soundings. 

Q. Is the space for the anchorage of large ships in Aix 
Roads much confined, and the water round it shoal ? 

A. The space is much confined. I have not sounded my¬ 
self there ; but I will state to the Court bow I ascertained that 
the space was small, and likewise the position. In the first 
place I went to the N.N.E. of the Isle D’Aix, till 1 brought 
the enemy’s line touching the citadel. I then took the direc¬ 
tion that they bore from that point, and afterwards the direc¬ 
tion of their line, which was nearly S. by W. by compass.— 
After ascertaining that I went towards the Boyart, in such a 
situation as to bring the northern part of Isle D’Aix to 
bear E. and the citadel E.S.E. by compass. Having the 
distance from the citadel, it then becomes a question in tri¬ 
gonometry to ascertain the distance from the ships and the 
space which they occupied, which was three quarters of a mile, 
the length, of the line. This report was given to Sir Harry 
Neale and to Lord Gambier. The enemy’s fleet, the last time 
they were reconnoitred, was about south and by west by the 
compass from the citadel. 

Q. This reconnoitring took place before they left their an¬ 
chorage? 

A. Yes. Perhaps it will be sufficient to say they were 
south and by west by the compass. This chart shews the 


t 


141 

state of the enemy at daylight, f Mr. Fairfax produced a chart 
of the position of the French jlcet in Aix Hoads on the 11 th and 
\2th of April ; likewise some of the fire-ships be fore they were on 
fire , the explosion vessel conducted by Lord Cochrane and Lieut.. 
Bisscl.J This chart is correct, except that the head of the 
Calcutta is placed by the engraver too far to the southward. 
It should have been about N. W. by the compass : and the 
head of this ship, which is the three decker, the Ocean, is to 
the eastward, but not sufficiently far to the northward by 
compass. 

Q. That is a chart printed from your original manuscript ? 

A. Yes, it is. 1 believe they never shifted their births in 
Aix Roads, by what 1 saw and heard, without having a haw¬ 
ser fast: they never set a sail but the stay-sails and mizeiv top¬ 
sail. Nor was it ever known, I believe, that a ship of the line 
worked out from thence without first having got her head to 
the westward. 

Q. Is the navigation of Aix Road difficult for large ships, as 
far as you know ? 

A. Very much so. 

Q. What is the rise and fall of the tide in Aix Roads, as far 
as you know ? 

A. 1 should suppose from eighteen to twenty feet. 

President—I should think you should express from what 
datum you speak? 

A. The log-book of the Caledonia was constantly kept and 
marked, and it will be seen there: what I speak particularly 
from, is the night 1 was in D’Aix Roads in the Lyra. 

Lord Gam bier —Do you know of Lord Cochrane making 
a report to me of the position of the enemy’s fleet at their an¬ 
chorage ? 

A. Certainly. 

Q. Previous to the 11th of April, in consequence of his 
having reconnoitred? 

A. Certainly. 

Q. Shew upon the chart the position in which Lord Coch¬ 
rane placed them ? 

A. Nearly E.N.E. and W.S.W. by compass, to the best of 
my recollection. If they had been attacked in that way, it is 
impossible that above two of the ships could have been driven 
on shore by the fire vessels. 

President—I apprehend that merely what might have been 
the case, if they had been so and so situated does not apply : 
your Lordship would not wish that taken down. 


/ 


Lord Gambier —No; that is not what I asked. How 
many points do you differ from Lord Cochrane ? 

A. [ think it was five points. 

Q. My reason for asking that is, that Lord Cochrane re¬ 
ported his reconnoitre to me after he had been in the Impe- 
rieuse some few days before the attack. What I mean to infer 
is, that if Lord Cochrane could be so much mistaken in that 
part of his evidence as to the position of the French fleet, he 
might be as much so in respect to the works on the Isle of Aix. 
—Had you any conversation with Lord Cochrane upon the 
subject of the charts, previous to the 12th of April, as to how 
far they might be depended upon for their soundings, &c. ? 

A. Not a word; nothing but about the positions of the 
ships, not the soundings. Lord Gambier, when I was intro¬ 
duced to Lord Cochrane, pointed out the difference of the re¬ 
connoitring, and said that the attack must be very different, if 
J was right in my positions, from the lines being so very much 
at variance. Lord Cochrane acquiesced, and Sir Harry Neale 
advised Lord Cochrane to go to the situation that I had, or to 
that purport, to convince himself that he had been wrong, 
which 1 believe he did. 

President~H; d you any conversation afterwards, from 
which you perceived that he had found out his mistake? 

A. No, only from the report of his Lordship’s evidence, 
which I have seen in the newspapers. 

Lord Gambier —Did you know, previous to the 12th of 
April, of any anchorage above the Boyart Shoal and near the 
Palles Shoal for line of battle ships out of range of the enemy’s 
shells ? 

A. I knew of no anchorage. 

President —Have you acquired a knowledge of any such 
since ? 

A. I have not. 

Lord Gambier —-At what distance was the British fleet 
from that of the enemy when it took its first anchorage in 
Basque Roads? 

A. The Caledonia from the citadel of Isle D’Aix was dis¬ 
tant 11,900 yards, nearly six nautical miles. I reported this to 
Lord Gambier and Sir Harry Neale. I ascertained this by the 
admeasurement of angles I took for the purpose. 

Q. Where were you on the forenoon of the 12th of April ? 

A. The first part of it on board the Lyra, and the latter part 
of it on board the Caledonia. 

Q. Where was the Lyra at that time? 

A. We were working out from Isle D’Aix towards the 
fleet. 


143 

Q. State how the wind was on that day, and the time of 
high water in Aix Hoad ? 

A. The fore part the wind was NF.N.W. or N. and by W. 
At noon I believe about north, but I cannot exactly charge my 
memory : at three o’clock in the afternoon it was about 
hs .N.W. 1 he time ot high water, by calculation, would be 

about five minutes past two, but strong northerly winds vary 
that very much. 

Admiral St aniiope —You mean to say that it blew strong 
at the time ? 

A. Yes, for two or three days. It rvas high water on that 
day about hall-past three o’clock, or twenty minutes past 
th ree o’clock. the Calcutta did.not float : she was touching 
till near three o’clock; I cannot charge my memory to a few 
minutes. 

Lord Gambier —State the situation of the enemy’s fleet on 
the morning of-the 12th of April ? 

A. 1 have described them on the chart produced by me. 
There is one occurrence which, I believe, no one did know 
but myself, and which I reported; which is, that two ships, 
I believe, the Hear Admiral and the Commodore, had been on 
shore at a little before 3 A.M. on the 12th. Before day-light 
they loosed their sails, and caused me to get the private signals 
on board the Lyra ready for sinking. Shortly afterwards they 
got their heads to the eastward, and seemed to recede from 
me; seemed to increase their distance : their sails were taken 
in immediately. The sails they had set were mizen-top-sail, 
main-top-mast stay-sail, spanker, and fore-top-mast stay-sail. 
1 account for the alteration of these two ships by what 1 have 
stated. 

Q. Can you state their situation at noon ? 

A. At eleven A.M. (for I went down below after that, being 
in a good deal of pain from a contusion I had received, and did 
not come up till near two o’clock) they were then nearly the 
same as the chart expresses. At day-light one of them, the 
Rear Admiral, the sternmost ship, had his top-sail-yards hoisted 
up ; the other had one of his top-masts up, either the main or 
foretop mast and yard hoisted. There was one of the top¬ 
masts down ; I had no glass, and was working out in the 
brig. 

Q. Were any of the enemy’s ships that were aground lying 
so close together, as to have the yards of two ot them locked 
in together ? 

A. By perspective, those near the Tonne re seemed to be 
very close. If you draw a line they appear to be in cue ; but 
by the observation by lights, they were separate, as I have Lid 


144 

them down ; every half mile as we got out they appeared to 
be otherwise. 

President —The question is, whether these two ships were 
lying so close together, that their masts and yards might be 
locked in, or whether they were distinct ? 

A. They were distinct at night. I think their yards were 
not locked. 

Lord Gambier —Had any ships of the line been sent into 
Aix Road, towards the entrance of the Charente, at any time 
in the morning of the 12 th of April, to attack the enemy’s ships 
that were aground ; at what time was it possible for them 
to return, under the circumstances of wind and tide, as they 
were the whole day ? 

A. They could not even have shifted their situation till four 
o’clock P.iVI. As for returning 1 should think it impossible. 

Q. Would they have been within range of shells and shot 
also from the enemy’s batteries while those ships remained 
there ? 

A. From every chart I have seen they certainly would. 

Q. With the wind, as it blew the whole of the day of the 
12 th of April, could those ships have sailed out large. (It 
may appear extraordinary that 1 should put this question, but 
I have particular reasons for it.) Could they have sailed out 
large, or must they have worked with the tide ? in fact, it is 
answered before, by his saying they could not shift their posi¬ 
tion. 

A. They must have taken advantage of the ebb tide to have 
worked out if they had got out at all, 

Q. As the wind did continue the whole of that day, if those 
ships had been crippled or had lost a mast, must they have 
remained under the fire of the enemy’s batteries until the 
wind should shift? 

A. I do not know how they could have helped themselves. 

Q. What then would have been the probable fate of those 
ships ? 

A. Destruction. 

Q. Could any of the enemy’s ships, before they ran up the 
Charente, on the 12th of April, have annoyed and raked anv* 
of the king’s ships that might have been sent in to attack them"? 

A. They certainly lay in a favourable place for it. 

Q. After these ships ran to the entrance of the Charente, 
could they have been approached by the British ships ? 

A. I should think by nothing but a frigate. 

Q, Could any line-of-battle ships have run to leeward of 


V 


145 

the two ships of the enemy that lay at their anchorage to attack 
them on the morning of the 12th without taking the ground ? 

A. Most certainly not. I have laid them down accurately 
on the chart, and it will be there seen they could not. 

Lord Gam bier — I beg leave to say 1 asked that question, 
because Lord Cochrane said he would first have attacked those 
two ships, and then run to the leeward. Mr. Fairfax says 
they couldmot have run to leeward. 

Mr. Fairfax —I beg leave to observe, that no ship or ships 
could have hove-to upon the larboard tack with the wind as it 
was but what they must have fallen off, so much as to bring 
themselves into a position to be raked by those two ships of the 
enemy. There was not room to go under their steins. 

Q. Had even two or three ships of the line been sent in to 
attack those two ships, were any of the enemy’s ships aground 
then lying in a position to annoy our ships either in that an-, 
chorage or in their approach to it ? 

A. Some of them certainly were. 

Admiral Young —Did you see the Imperieuse make any 
signal on the morning of the J2th ? 

A, 1 did. 

Q. At what time was the first signal made, and what was 
that signal ? 

A. 1 think it was about five, but I do not know the exact 
time. 

Q. Was it day-light at five o’clock? 

A. I cannot say to the time; I was working out with the 
brig, and picked up some men under the batteries. 

Q. If a part of the fleet had got under weigh immediately after 
the making of that signal, at what time of the tide would they 
have arrived in Aix Roads in a situation to attack the enemy? 

A. Upon the last quarter ebb. They could not have at¬ 
tacked the enemy without endeavouring to go into the anchor¬ 
age the enemy had left. They could not have got within reach 
of them without pursuing that deep water line which was pro¬ 
tected by the batteries of the enemy and by the enemy’s ships 
on shore. 

Q. By following that deep water line, how near must they 
of necessity have passed by or anchored under the batteries on 
the Isle D’Aix ? 

A. Three-quarters’of a mile ; they would have been close to 
the shoal at the mile ; they must necessarily have passed within 
that distance. 

Q. Had you an opportunity of observing the strength of the 
current of the tide in the harbour of Aix? 

A. No. 


t 


U 


Q. Was it such, as far as you did observe it, as would admit 
of a fast-sailing ship working over it, and beating out against 
the flood, as the wind was on the 12 th of April ? 

A. By report, 1 should imagine that no ship could. 

Q. By what report? 

A. By what 1 have heard from pilots of the narrowness of 
the channel. 

Q. If, then, a part of the fleet had gone into the Road of 
Aix when the Imperieuse made the first signal in the morning, 
must it have remained within three-quarters of a mile of those 
batteries till the ebb made in the afternoon ? 

A. They might have shifted by the flood; but then they 
would have been in a worse situation. 

Q. Were you in the Road of Aix after the British ships were 
placed for the purpose of attacking the enemy? 

A. No. 

Q. You have said that by perspective, by which I suppose 
you mean by the eye, three of the enemy’s ships appeared to 
be near each other—Were you afterwards in any situation 
which enabled you to determine that they were not near 
each other ? 

A. No ; it was prior that I distinguished them separate. 

Q. Can you at all determine how far they were asunder ? 

A. I should think not a ship’s length from each other—. 
those three. 

Admir a l Duckworth —Were you on board the Caledonia 
when the fleet were at single anchor on the afternoon of the 
11 th ? 

A. I was away in the Lyra from the afternoon of the 11th 
till the morning of the 12th, about eight o’clock. 

Q. Had the fleet been unmoored at the moment Lord 
Cochrane made the signal at five o’clock on the morning of 
the 12th, could it have tended to promote the destruction of 
those two ships that were left at anchor near the Isle of Aix ? 

A. It could not. 

Q. You, of your own knowledge, do not know at what 
hour of the forenoon or of the morning of the 12th the fleet 
was unmoored ? 

A. The fleet was unmoored when I came on board. 

Q. Were you dn board tbe Caledonia when they weighed 
to proceed nearer to the Isle of Aix ? 

A. Yes; I think between nine and ten o’clock the Cale¬ 
donia got under weigh.—We came to an anchor again in about 
tw enty minutes or half an hour. 


147 

Q. After anchoring again, what was the distance from the 
Caledonia to the citadel at the fsle of Aix? 

A. The cross hearings gave it about three miles and a half; 
from that to three miles. 

President —Mr. Bicknell, do you propose any questions to 
Mr. Fairfax? 

Mr. Bicknell— None. 


Mr. 1 HOMAS SIOKES, Master of the Caledonia, called 

in again. 

O v 

Eramincd hj Lord Gambler . 

Q. Where were you on the forenoon of the 12th of April 
last. 

A. On board the Caledonia. 

Q. State how the wind was on that day at the time of high 
water in Aix Roads ? 

A. From day-light in the morning till ten o’clock about 
N. N. W. the wind fresh ;—from ten to twelve, from N. N. W. 
to N. N. E. ;—from twelve to three in the afternoon, from 
N. N- E. to N. N. W. rather varying ;—from three to five, 
the wind varying from N . N. W. to N. VV. it was high water 
in Aix Roads about three o’clock. 

Q. State the situation of the enemy’s fleet on the morning 
of the 12th of April ? 

A. At day-light, I observed the whole of the enemy’s ships, 
excepting two of the line, on shore ; four of them lay in group, 
or lay together on the western part of the Palles Shoal, the 
others on the eastern side of that shoal; some off the Eoras and 
within Madame. The frigates had entered the Charente, ex¬ 
cept the Indianne, which was on shore near Ennette Isle. The 
three-decker was on the north-west edge of the Palles Shoal, 
with her broadside flanking the passage, the north-west part 
nearest the deep water. 

President —I observe, in the chart I had from you, the 
situation of the Ocean, particularly, is not marked on the 12th ; 
she is marked on the 1 3th as advanced up the Charente ? 

A. The only ship marked in the chart on the 12th are those 
that are destroyed : the reason 1 marked her on the 13th is, 
that a particular attack was made on her by the bombs. I ob¬ 
served her from the mizen-tops of the Caledonia, and I also 
had an observation from an officer; so that I have no doubt 
her position is put down within a cable’s length. 

Lord Gambier —Had any ships of the line been sent into 
Aix Roads and towards the entrance of the Charente at any time 

us 


i 



148 

on the morning of the 12th of April to attack the enemy’s ships 
that were aground, at what time would it have been possible 
lor them to return ? 

A. It would not have been possible for them to return 
that day. 

Q. Would they have been within range of shells and shot 
from the enemy’s batteries while they remained there ? 

A. At half range of shell and point blank shot. 

Q. As the wind continued as it did the whole of that day, 
and if those ships had been crippled or had lost a mast, must 
thev not have remained under the fire of the enemy’s batteries 
till the wind should shift? 

A. They must have remained under the fire of the enemy’s 
batteries until the tide flowed sufficiently to have floated them 
to the southward of the Palles Shoal, where there was a place 
in five fathoms at low water ; but this retreat, in my opinion, 
the ships would wot have been able to have gained, as they had 
not room to wear clear of the Palles Shoal ; and had they been 
disabled in their masts or yards, they would not have been able 
to have tacked ; nor even if they were not crippled, they had 
not room to stand on to have got sufficient way to bring the 
ships about. 

Q. Had you any certain knowledge of that anchorage you 
now mention before the 12th of April? 

A. None whatever. 

Q. Is there not a bank between the Boyart Shoal and the. 
Palles Shoal? 

A. Yes. 

Q. W hat depth of water is there generally upon that bank 
at low water ? 

A. From twelve to sixteen feet in the deepest part; but 
that part is narrow. 

Q. If there was only sixteen feet, line-of-battle ships could 
not pass over it at all times ? 

A. No, not until near two-thirds flood. You must reckon 
on going over that part at twelve feet. 

Q. To get to the above anchorage, is it necessary to pass 
over the bank just mentioned ? 

A. It is. 

Admiral Young —Is there a channel of sixteen feet all 
across ? 

A. There is a channel of sixteen feet all across, but that is 
narrow : there are, about the middle of it, patches of twelve 
feet. 

t 

I resident— T here is no going into the channel of sixteen 


feet, without, in some instances, passing over that of twelve 
feet ? 

A. You may go over that channel of sixteen feet; but it is 
so narrow, that I should calculate on going over that part 
which is only twelve feet. 

Q. It is so intricate you must count on passing over some 
part which is only twelve feet ? . 

A. I should calculate on going over part of the twelve feet, 
because it is so narrow it is difficult to hit the passage of six¬ 
teen feet. 

Lord Gambier—C ould any of the enemy’s ships, on the 
12th of April, before they ran up the Charente, have annoyed 
and raked any ot the king’s ships that might have been sent in 
to attack them ? 

A. The Fourdroyant and Cassard both lay afloat: the Cas- 
sard about one-third of a mile distant from Isle of Aix, and 
close on the edge of the bank which extends from the Isle of 
Aix to the north-west point of the Palles Shoal ; the Four¬ 
droyant lay also near the edge of that bank, and I suppose about 
three cables distant from the Cassard. The three-decker lay 
with her broadside flanking the passage. They all three would 
have fired with complete effect on any ships that might ap¬ 
proach. 

Q. After the enemy’s ships had run to the entrance of the 
Charente, on that day, could they have been approached by 
the British ships ? 

A. No. 

Q. Is the navigation of Aix Roads difficult for large ships, 
and much limited in space ? 

A. It is very difficult for large ships; the deep water very 
much limited. 

Q. Then the space for the anchorage of large ships must 
be very much confined, and the water round it shoal? 

A. Yes. 

Q. Were you employed in sounding and surveying within 
the Isle of Aix ? 

A. I was; from the 17th to the 24th of April. 

f 

Q. Did the general knowledge you obtained while so em¬ 
ployed by my orders agree with the chart of that part in the 
Neptune Francoise ? 

A. In some part it agreed with the Neptune Francoise, but 
in other parts 1 found a wide difference: the Neptune Fran¬ 
coise giving more water than 1 found in many parts. 

President —Did you sound between the Boyart Shoal and 
the Palles Shoal ? 


15 0 

A. I passed between them at three or four different times 
in the Nimrod cutter : I took soundings at those times. 

Q. Is the account which you give of sixteen and twelve feet 
water, at low water, between these shoals, derived from the 
information of your own soundings which you have just 
mentioned ? 

A. Not entirely from my own soundings, but from the 
soundings taken by the Master of the Dotterel, whom I sent 
for that purpose, and who reported to me in writing to have 
found those soundings. 

Q. You ordered him to make soundings ? 

A. I did. I also sent the master of the Foxhound on that 
service. 

Q. Had you any opportunity of ascertaining what the rise 
of the tide is in Aix Road, or the vicinity of it, in spring 
tides ? 

A. The lead was hove and the depth of water carefully 
ascertained every half hour on board the Caledonia, from the 
time she anchored off Chasseron till she anchored in Basque 
Roads, and from that time until, I believe, the day she quitted 
the station, whereby we ascertained beyond all manner of 
doubt the actual rise of water in Basque Roads. It is nine¬ 
teen feet in spring tides and eight feet dead neap. 

Q. If the rise of the tide was nineteen feet in what is termed 
Basque Roads, could it be less, or would it not be more in the 
more confined situation towards the Roads of Aix ? 

A. The rise of tides is found in Aix Roads to be twenty-one 
feet at high spring tides, which is more than we ever found the 
rise in Basque Roads. 

Lord.Gambier— Could the three French ships that were 
aground on the Palles and afterwards warped off and run up 
the Charente, ever have been attacked by line-of-battle ships? 

A. They could not; they never could have come near 
enough to have fired upon them with effect, for the shot to 
reach. 

Q. Could any more of the enemy’s ships than the four 
that were destroyed have been destroyed, had any of the kind's 
ships been sent to attack them at day-light on the 12th of 
April? 

A. If we had attacked the enemy’s ships on the morning 
of the i2th, from the position of the Fourdroyant, Cassard* 
and the three-decked ship, I think we should have sacrificed 
our own ships without making any impression on the enemy, 
or destroying any of their ships. The only time that they 
could have been attacked, with any prospect of success, was 
at the time the attack was made; the tide had then ebbed* 


✓ 151 

and the ships were fast on tile ground with their sterns to the 
westward, and they could not bring any guns to bear on the 
ships that attacked them. To that circumstance, in my opi¬ 
nion, we owed our whole success; for had the French ships 
grounded with their broadsides flanking the passage, they 
would have been enabled to have defended themselves ; and 
they could not have been attacked with the least prospect of 
success. 

Admiral Young —As you were employed some time in 
the Road of Aix, you had an opportunity of observing the 
strength of the current of the tide—had you not ? 

A. I had. 

Q. Was it so strong as to prevent fast-sailing ships from 
working over it, and beating out against the flood ? 

A. The flood tide, in the springs, ran at least three knots 
an hour ; therefore it was impossible for any ship to work 
out against that tide. 

Q. Then any ships going in at the end of the ebb must 
necessarily remain during the whole of the flood ? 

A. They must. 

Q. You have said, I think, that if any of the ships of the 
line had gone into Aix Roads on the morning of the 12th of 
April, they could not possibly have got out again that day ? 

A. They could not. 

Q. Is that an opinion you have formed since you left Basque 
Roads, or was it your opinion on the 12th of April ? 

A. It was my opinion on the morning of the 12th ; and I 
have never had any reason to alter it. 

Q. Were you consulted by any person on the practicability 
of going into and coming out of the Road of Aix on the 12th 
of April ? 

A. I was not particularly consulted ; but Sir Harry Neale, 
on the morning of the 12th, seeing the enemy’s fleet on shore, 
asked me what I thought (or words to that effect) could be 
done as to taking the line-of-battle ships in to attack the ene¬ 
my ? I told him perhaps we might destroy some of their ships, 
but that we should sacrifice our own ; there could be no idea 
whatever of the ships being able to return. 

Q. Are you quite clear you gave that opinion to Sir H. 
Neale on the morning of the 12th of April ? 

A. Yes. 

Q. I think you have said that you had no knowledge what¬ 
ever of the anchorage within the Isle of Aix, where ships of the 
line might ride in five fathom water till after the 12th of 
April ? [ 


162 

A. Yes; 1 had no knowledge of that anchorage till after 
the 12th of April, nor had 1 any knowledge of the anchorage 
of the Isle of Aix. 

Q. If you had known of that anchorage before the 12th of 
April, would the tide have admitted ships of the line to have 
gone to it on the morning of that day ? 

A. The tide would not have admitted ships of the line to 
have gone to that anchorage until twelve or one o’clock on 
that day. 

Admiral Duckworth —Were you on board the Caledonia 
on the afternoon of the 11th, when the fleet were at single an¬ 
chor in Basque Roads ? 

A. Yes ; I was. 

S 

Q. Do you know the cause of the fleet’s being moored 
that afternoon ? 

A. I mentioned to Captain Bedford, of the Caledonia, at 
about seven in the evening, the necessity of mooring the fleet, 
as they might swing on board of each other during the weather 
tide : he mentioned it to the Commander in Chief, and the 
fleet was moored. The fleet could not act in the night, and 
to unmoor was only the business of about half an hour. 

Q. Had three or four line-of-battle ships been advanced to¬ 
wards the Isle of Aix, and lain during the night at single an¬ 
chor, could they, by weighing when Lord Cochrane made 
the signal about five in the morning, at that time of tide have 
gone into the Road of Aix to have attacked the enemy without 
the greatest danger ? 

A. Had four sail of the line run into Aix Roads when Lord 
Cochrane made the signal, they would there have met a force 
equal to themselves; they would have made the attack under 
every disadvantage. The whole of the fire of Isle D’Aix, 
as well as the fire of the Fourdroyant, Cassard, and Ocean (the 
three-decker) would have been directed on them. They would 
have had no place to retreat to, and their only safety would 
have remained in the destruction of the French ships and 
silencing the batteries of Isle D’Aix ; which I am sure it would 
have been impossible for them to have accomplished. 

President — Do you wish to put any question, Mr. 
Bicknell ? 

Mr. Bicknell —No. 

■ . ' ' 

President —Does your Lordship wish to put any further 
question ? 

Lord Gambier —Do you know any thing about the Cal¬ 
cutta striking her colours to our ships? 

A. She had not struck when I was on board the Jmpeneuse r 
the Aigle, Unicorn, and Emerald had anchored and fired upon 


153 

her, and one of her shot struck a boat astern of the Imperieuse 
after they had anchored and fired upon her. The Indefatigable 
had not anchored when 1 left the Imperieuse. 

Lord Gambier —I have felt it necessary to put this question, 
because, in my public dispatch, I stated that the Calcutta 
struck to the Imperieuse, which I inserted on the authority of 
Lord Cochrane, who so informed me when he came on board 
the Caledonia. Lord Cochrane having made that statement, 
I did justice to his merits and services in inserting it; but a 
doubt having been suggested on the subject, I wish to have 
that point cleared up, in justice to the other officers of the 
fleet. 

President —Were the ships and vessels sent in to attack 
the enemy as soon as it could be done with propriety, con¬ 
sidering the state of the wind and tide ? 

A. They were, to the best of my opinion. 

Q. From the first attack made upon the enemy’s ships, to 
the final cessation of hostilities against them, was every thing 
done that could be done to effect their destruction ? 

A. Every thing was done, that was possible to be done, for 
the destruction of the enemy’s ships. 


Captain JOHN BLIGH; of His Majesty’s Ship the 

Valiant, sworn. 

Examined by Lord Gambier. 

Q. Do you recollect the situation of the enemy’s fleet on 
the morning of the 12th of April at day-light ? 

A. I do ; I think they were as here represented.— (In the 
chart made by Mr. Stokes.) 

Q. Do you remember the telegraph signal being made from 
the Imperieuse on the morning of that day ? 

A. Yes, I do. 

f 

Q. What was that signal ? 

A. That a part of the fleet could destroy the enemy’s ships ; 
a part, or half, I do not recollect which : half I believe. 

Q. About what distance was the Imperieuse from the 
enemy, and from the Caledonia, when she made that signal ? 

A. The Caledonia was about six miles from the Isle D’Aix, 
and the Imperieuse about half way—about three miles. 

Admiral Stanhope —Will you permit me to ask whe¬ 
ther you think, upon the whole, upon recollection, the signal 
was a part of the fleet, or half the fleet ? 

A. I believe it was half; but I will not swear positively. 

X 



Lord Gambier —Had I sent in line-of-battle ships to Aix 
Roads early in the morning of the 12th of April, or soon after, 
weTe any ships of the enemy’s fleet in a situation to enable 
them to rake or annoy our ships as they advanced ? 

A. Two of them were lying with their broadsides towards 
the entrance, and would have considerably annoyed any ships 
sent against them, certainly. 

Q. Were there any of the enemy’s ships which were aground 
capable of acting against our ships ? 

A. Early in the morning they lay with their broadsides to¬ 
wards the entrance, and I think they were capable of annoying 
the British ships. 

Q. What number of guns appeared to command the an¬ 
chorage of Aix Roads from the batteries of the island ? 

A. When at anchor in the Road of Aix I counted fifty 
guns: there may have been more, but I am certain there were 
not less. 

Q. Did the enemy throw shells from the island ? 

A. They did. 

Q. Can you speak at all as to the number of mortars they 
had ? 

A. No, I cannot. 

I 

Q. If an} 7, of our line-of-battle ships, advancing under the 
circumstances just stated, had become crippled, could they have 
returned before night, or what would have been the con¬ 
sequence ? 

A. 1 do not think, under all the circumstances, that if the 
line-of-battle ships had been sent in, they ever would have got 
out again. I think it would have been sending them to in¬ 
evitable destruction. 

Q. When I sent you into Aix Road, on the afternoon of 
the 12th of April, what were the directions I gave you ; were 
they discretional or otherwise? 

A. To use my utmost endeavours to destroy the enemy’s 
ships. I considered the order to be in some measure dis¬ 
cretional, as the sole responsibility rested on the Captain, the 
Pilot having refused to take-the ship in. 

Q. Do you recollect at what time I gave you those orders? 

A. d he first order I received from the Cotpmander in Chief 
was at eight o’clock in the morning, to anchor near the Boyart 
Shoal within range of shell of the Isle D’Aix. The second 
order I received to proceed in, was a little after two P. M. 

Q. Relate to the Court your proceedings generally in Aix 
Roads, until you returned to Basque Roads ? 

A. At half-past two 1 weighed in company with the Re- 


155 

venge, and went in to the attack of the enemy’s ship?. Our 
frigates were lying in close line, about north and by west to 
south and by east, rather in a curved line. I anchored to the 
southward of them close to the Indefatigable ; and a little after 
three we commenced our fire on the Calcutta, and shortly 
after I observed her crew abandon her, leaving her colours 
flying. We then directed our fire at the Aquilon and Ville 
de Varsovie and Tonnere, as we could get our broadsides to 
bear upon them. The Ville de Varsovie’s crew partly left 
her, and I think she was taken possession of by the Unicorn’s 
boat. The Aquilon was the only ship which struck after that, 
and the Tonnere, about five o’clock, was quitted by her crew, 
and set on fire by them. As the tide fell, the Revenge ground¬ 
ed ; but, by the exertions of Captain Kerr, she was soon got 
off’, and went between the Boyart and the Palles. The frigates 
all followed her, except the Imperieuse, who grounded about 
six o’clock that evening. In moving the Valiant, she grounded 
on a knowl, and remained until eleven o’clock that night, 
when the tide rose and she got off’; at low water there was 
seventeen feet alongside her. Four fire-vessels were all pre¬ 
pared by the Commander in Chief, and were sent in after¬ 
wards : two to have gone against the Fourdroyant, under the 
direction of Captain Seymour, and two against the Ocean, a 
three-decked ship. It was eleven o’clock, or half-past eleven, 
before they were completely ready, when the wind being 
baffling, and at times blowing directly out, 1 applied to Admiral 
Stopford for some gun-brigs to cover the retreat of our boats, 
the enemy’s boats being moored in two lines across the stern 
of the Ocean with boats in advance. As the wind continued 
to blow directly out, until four o’clock in the morning, I 
judged the ^attempt to be impracticable, and therefore ordered 
thefire-vessels to move where the Imperieuse was laid, to fol¬ 
low the directions of Lord Cochrane. At half-past three, the 
prisoners being moved from the Aquilon and the Ville de 
Varsovie, and "the water at that time up to their orlop decks, 
I ordered them to be set on fire ; and at day-light I weighed 
in obedience to a signal from Admiral Stoptord, and proceeded 
to Basque Roads. 

Q. Was not the Valiant, and were not some of the other 
ships that were aground, in a perilous situation ? 

A. Yes; I think the Valiant was in a very perilous situ¬ 
ation : nothing but the wind shifting and blowing directly out 
could have saved her from being wrecked. 

Q. State the loss of the enemy’s ships, as well those de¬ 
stroyed as those rendered unserviceable, as far as you know, in 
consequence of the attack ? 

A. There were four of the enemy’s ships destroyed ; the 
Aquilon, Ville de Varsovie, Tonnere ships of the line, and 

X 2 


156 

the Calcutta : the Indienne frigate was burnt two days after. 
I think the others must have received considerable damage 
from being on shore, all but two. 

Q. What is your opinion of the position taken by Captain 
Kerr of the Revenge ; was it judicious ? 

A. I think it impossible a ship could be better placed than 
the Revenue ; and indeed the general conduct of the Revenge 
on that day reflects the highest credit on the real and bravery 
of her Captain. 

Q. Did the Revenge go within the Imperieuse and the other 
frigates, and relieve them from the fire of the batteries, and 
the guns of the enemy’s ships? 

A. She anchored the northernmost and easternmost ship 
about three cables length within the Imperieuse, and appeared 
to me to draw the fire of the batteries of Isle D’Aix from the 
frigates to her. The fire from the enemy’s ships was so trifling 
throughout, from their helpless situation, that I never thought 
it was an object to be protected from it. 

President —You have stated that the Revenge was very 
judiciously placed, and you have described the conduct of that 
ship as having been highly meritorious on the occasion ; were 
not the other ships and vessels engaged with the enerpy placed 
as advantageously as they could have been, according to the 
peculiar circumstances that existed, and did it not appear to 
you that the Captains and Commanders of them conducted 
themselves with equal zeal in the public service ? 

Lord Gambier —Sir, before Captain Bligh answers that 
question, I beg to state (which I am sure will be perfectly 
satisfactory to you) that the very next question I was about to 
put to Captain Bligh was that question. 

President —I beg of the Court to permit me to have it 
expunged, that it may appear to be put by yourself. I had 
rather the question was proposed in your own language. I 
thought it a momentary omission, and,I was desirous rhat the 
Court should not adjourn even for to-day without that question 
being asked. I beg it may be expunged. 

Lord Gambier —If the Court will permit it to stand under 
my name if it is wished. 

President —Perhaps you would wish to change the words. 

Lord Gambier— No, not in the least. 

A. The utmost zeal was manifested by every ship en^a^ed ; 
and I think it impossible they could be better placed for the 
destruction of the enemy’s ships than they were. 

‘ * * .1 v 7rIfV 

Adjourned to to-morrow. 


I 


157 


v 




SIXTH DAY, 

Tuesday", August 1 , 1809 . 

. 'Jii 



« 


Captain JOHN BLIGH called in again. 

Examined by Lord Gam bier. 

Q. When was it that the two line-of-battle ships of the 
enemy, which continued afloat on the morning of the 12th of 
April, moved towards the Charente ; and when did the three 
grounded ships get off the Palles. I mean the three that went 
up the Charente ? 

A. About half-past twelve o’clock the two ships that were 
afloat moved up the Charente, and very shortly after the three 
ships that had been aground also moved. 

Q. It has been stated that- 

President —Your lordship is aware that you cannot allude 
to the evidence of any other person. If it is any thing stated 
in the evidence of Captain Bligh, the.question is correct. 

Lord Gambier — I will not put the question: it is not 
material.—You mentioned yesterday the strength of the ene¬ 
my’s batteries on the isle of Aix; did you observe that any of 
the fortifications had been blown up and destroyed? 

A. 1 did not observe that any of the fortifications had been 
blown up or destroyed. I think, if they had, 1 was so close, 
I must have seen it. 

Q. Did you hear Lord Cochrane express to Captain Beres- 
ford, when in Aix Road, the probability of three or four of 
our line-of-battle ships being lost in attacking the enemy and 
what passed on that subject? 

A. When Captain Beresford asked Lord Cochrane his rea¬ 
son for making the telegraphic signal he made in the morning, 
that half the fleet could destroy the enemy, he said he calculated 
on our losing three or four of the ships, if the Commander in 
Chief had sent the squadron in. 

Q. If the two line-of-battle ships of the enemy, which had 
remained at their anchorage in the morning, had moved to¬ 
wards the Charente at half-past eleven o’clock, could the fri¬ 
gates alone, assisted by the smaller vessels, have succeeded in 
their attempt to destroy the whole of the seven ships of the 
enemy that were on shore on the Palles ? 


I 




158 

A. No. I am confident that they would not have made any 
impression on the ships ; but, on the contrary, I think it would 
have been attended with the loss of some of our own ships. 

Admiral Young —Do you mean that they would not have 
made any impression upon any of the ships, or on the whole 
of them. 

A. J do not think they would have made any impression 
upon any of the ships, situated as they were. 

Admiral Young —That question is on the supposition 
that two ships of the line did go up ? 

A. That two ships of the line were in a situation to attack 
those that were on shore. 

Lord Gambier —It was after those two ships had run up ? 

Judge Advocate —Your Supposition is that they had 
moved towards the Charente ? 

A. Yes : my answer is on the ground that the two ships 
had moved towards the Charente, but were still in a situation 
to have assisted the enemy. 

Q. W ere those two ships, in your mind, after they had 
moved up, so far removed, that they could not have given any 
assistance or have opposed our frigates? 

A. The impression on my mind- 

Admiral Young —I think, as far as possible, Captain 
Bligh should speak to what he felt and thought at the time. 

A. The impression on my mind at the time was, that they 
had moved so far up as not to be able to assist their own ships, 
or to oppose our frigates. 

Lord Gambier —Had the three enemy’s ships that were 
aground upon the Palles, and afterwards floated, moved up 
from that situation before or after those two ships ? 

A. To the best of my recollection they floated and moved 
up after those two ships ; very shortly after, twenty minutes, or 
half an hour. 

Q. Did it appear to you, that on the morning of the 12th of 
April, or at any time when the enemy’s ships were on shore, 
and the signal had been made that they could be destroyed, 
there was, on my part, any neglect or unnecessary delay in 
taking effectual measures for destroying them ? 

A. I have already stated, that if our ships had gone in on 
the morning of the 12th, it would, in my opinion, have been 
sending them to inevitable destruction. 1 do not think the 
ships could have been sent in sooner than they were, and there 
did not appear to me to be the smallest neglect or unnecessary 
delay on the part of the Commander in Chief. 

President— From the first attack upon the ships of the 



159 

enemy to the final cessation of hostilities against them, was 
every thing done that could be done to effect their destruction ? 

A. I think that every thing was done that could be done, 
and even more than I at first expected. 

Q. You have stated that you observed no part of the forti¬ 
fications on the Isle D’Aix that had the appearance of being 
blown up and destroyed ; did you take notice of any heaps of 
stones or rubbish which gave an appearance that any part of 
the batteries were in a disordered state ? 

A. I looked very attentively with a very good glass, at about 
a mile distance from the fort, the fortifications of which ap¬ 
peared to me to be perfect. If there had been any heaps of 
stones or rubbish I must have seen them. 

Admiral Young —Was there any part of the works of the 
island that appeared to be in a state of repair ? 

A. No part that 1 saw. Towards the sea they appeared 
to me to be throwing up or erecting another battery under a 
very long tier of guns, and close to the water’s edge. I mean 
by that, that the works of the Isle D’Aix were perfect, but 
that they were erecting another battery towards the sea, close 
to the water’s edge. 

Q. You have said that the responsibility of taking the 
Valiant into the Road of Aix rested entirely on the Captain, the 
Pilot having refused to take her in : what reasons did the Pilot 
give for not taking her in ? 

A. That the water was too shoal, and as the wind and tide 
then were, he thought the ship would be lost. 

Q. Were all the enemy’s ships, which were on shore on 
the Palles Shoal, near enough to the British ships to be de¬ 
stroyed by them ? 

A. No. The three ships that moved up the Cbarente were 
lying to the southward and eastward of the Ocean, and she 
was never within gun-shot of either the Valiant or Revenge. 

Q. Do you mean that those ships were not within reach of 
the guns of the British squadron before they moved up the 
Charente ? 

A. In my opinion they were not within reach. 

Q. If the Ocean was not within reach of the guns of the 
Revenge or Valiant, was she within reach of the guns ol any 
other ship ? 

A. Not where they anchored, but the frigates might have 
been moved near enough to have reached her. 

Q. Could they have done that without being aground ? 

A. Yes, at about half tide, I think they might. 

Admiral Stanhope —To what ship did the Calcutta 
strike ? 


/ 


160 

A. I have already stated that the 'autta never struck her 
coh.' s j ice >-f the Bea ,.e le^nied to ice that he had 

r. ... .tie Calcutta, and that there was nobody on 

b i -.. rlv r >ew had abandoned her. I think it was the 

off'a v' f t .e Beagle. 1 know it was the Beagle’s boat that 
made the report to me, 

Q. Did you give him any orders in consequence of such 
report ? 

A. 1 did not. It was my intention to have sent a party of 
marines immediately to her, as she lay considerably without 
the reach of the enemy’s batteries. I think she might have 
been brought out without the loss of a man. She ’as upright. 
I do not think she was afloat. I saw somebody let her anchor 
go. I do not know who it w T as. She was set on fire a very 
few minutes after, but 1 do not know by whose order. 

Lord Gambier —I should be glad to ask a question of Mr. 
Stokes, who is on board. 

Mr. THOMAS STOKES called again. 

Examined by Lord Gambier . 

Q, At what time did the enemy’s two ships of the line, 
which remained at their anchors on the 12th of April in the 
morning, cut or slip their cables and run towards the Charente ? 

A. The Cassard, bearing a Commodore’s broad pendant, 
slipt or cut and made sail for the Charente at ten minutes past 
one P.M. The Fourdroyant, bearing a Rear Admiral’s flag, 
made sail for the Charente at twenty minutes past one. I 
noted the time by my watch. I am positive as to the fact, 
because 1 made a memorandum of it, which I have now on 
board the Caledonia. 

Q. Do you know when and where the explosion vessel was 
set on fire, which served to be the signal for the commanders 
of ships to enlight their ships ? 

A. I cannot speak as to my own knowledge. 

President —The Court can receive nothing but what 
comes within your own knowledge? 

A. I can speak only from the report of Mr. Fairfax to me. 

Lord Gambier —Do you remember at what time the three 
enemy’s ships that were on shore upon the Palles and warped 
off removed from thence ? 

A. To the best of my recollection about one o’clock, or a 
little after. 

Admiral Young —Did they remove from thence before 
the ships that were at anchor ran towards the Charente ? 

A . They did. 



161 

Q. ou were on board some of the British ships at their 
anchorage in Aix Roads; were any of the enemy’s ships at too 
great a distance to be destroyed by them ? 

A. 1 was on board ot the Imperieuse during part of the time 
of the action. All the enemy’s ships were at too great a dis¬ 
tance to be destroyed by our ships, except those that were 
destroyed ; the Calcutta, Aquilon, and Varsovie. It is father 
doubtlul to me, whether the Revenge’s shot could have been 
fired with effect Upon the Tonnere. 

Admiral Douglas —Do you allude to the Revenge from 
her being the nearest ship to the enemy ? 

-A • Yes; the Revenge was the nearest ship to the enemy. 
Perhaps the ionncre was nearer than she appeared to me to 
be. 

Admiral \oung —Was there any other situation in the 
Road ot Aix in which the British squadron could have been 
placed, from which they could have destroyed the other 
ships ? 

A. No, there was not. 

» — ■ — 

Captain JOHN POO BERESFORD, of his Majesty’s ship 

the Theseus, sworn. 

Examined by Lord Gambler. 

Q. Were you sent into Aix Road with the Theseus in the 
afternoon of the 12th of April ? 

A. The Theseus's-signal was made about five o’clock to 
proceed into Aix Road and assist ships in distress, on which 
we instantly made sail. 

Q. Had I sent in line-of-battle ships to Aix Road early in 
the morning of the 12th of April, were any ships of the ene¬ 
my in a position to rake and injure our ships as they ad¬ 
vanced ? 

A. Two of the enemy’s ships were afloat, one bearing a 
flag and the other a broad pendant, which, in my opinion, 
would have entirely crippled any ships sent in to act. • Indeed, 
if two of our ships had been placed as they were, I think we 
could have defied an enemy’s approach, for the approach must 
have been joiner end on. 

fc> D 

Q, If any of our ships advancing, under such circum¬ 
stances, had become crippled, either by the ships of the enemy 
raking them, or by the fire of the batteries, could they have 
returned, or what wmuld have been the consequence? 

A. Under the circumstances of the wind and tide, I do not 
think thev could have returned : if they could, it must have 

Y 



162 

been by the greatest good fortune. I He consequence must 
have been, in my mind, very serious, if they could not have 
returned. 

(Mr. Stokes's chart was shewn to Captain Bercsford.) 

President— Captain Beresford must say whether the ships 
are marked upon that chart as they appeared to him. 

A. Those two ships seemed to me, from the position in 
which I saw them, to be at the mouth of the Charente guarded 
by the battery. 

Q. Is the description of them upon that paper similar to 
what you observed when you saw them there ? 

A. That strikes me to be as nearly the position as I can 
speak to. I did not go into the Inner Road till they moved 
up. But I should, if I looked at the chart, put my finger 
and sav, they were about there, a hey seemed to me to be 
in a situation to defend themselves ; and it they had stood and 
acted properly, I think they might have defended the whole 
roadsted. 

LordGambier —Could two or three line-of-battle ships, 
on the morning of the 12th of April, when twm of the enemy’s 
ships remained afloat at their anchorage, have advanced to 
attack them by passing near to the Boyart, and putting their 
helms a-lee, bearing in mind how the wind was that morning, 
their fore and main-top-sails being to the mast. Having thus 
brought their beads to the N.E. would they, by these means, 
have been enabled to bring their guns to bear with effect upon 
the enemy’s ships, and be themselves out of the reach of shot 
from the isle D’Aix? 

A. Certainly not. 

Q. Could any line-of-battle ships have run to leeward of 
' those two ships of the enemy that lay at their anchorage on 
the morning of the 12th of April, have had space enough to 
have anchored, and by these means to have attacked those 
ships ? 

A. I should not like to have risked it myself; and it ap¬ 
peared to me, that there was scarcely room for a friend to 
have passed between them and the shoal, setting aside all idea 
of an enemy firing in passing ; for the smoke alone, besides 
the ship being crippled, must have caused you to be entangled, 
and the ship must have gore ashore and been lost. In short, 
if I had been ordered to attempt it, I should have thought the 
enterprise most hazardous. The flood tide and the wind were 
both in. 

Q. Did you ever understand by whose orders the Calcutta 
was set on fire ? 


( 


V 


163 

% 

A. The only thing I know, with respect to the Calcutta 
being fired, was by a conversation between Lord Cochrane 
and myself, in the presence of Captain Bligh, Captain Mait¬ 
land, and others. 

4 t \ 

President —Is this strictly evidence, Mr. Judge Advocate? 

Judge Advocate —Yes, I should think it is; because I 
conceive it is to affect the evidence of Lord Cochrane. In 
that point of view J think it is legal evidence. 

A. He said he thought it was a thousand pities the Calcutta 
was not brought off*, but that he sent a young cur on board to 
use his own discretion, and that the boy set fire to her. 

Lord Gambier —Do you think she might have been 
brought off' 

A. I was not on the spot when she was fired: but Lord 
Cochrane told me she might have been brought of easily, also 
in the presence of his brother and others, on board his own 
ship. 

Q. Did you go on board the Imperieuse on the afternoon of 
the 12th of April ? 

A. I did. 

Q. What was her situation, and what passed between Lord 
Cochrane and yourself? 

Judge Advocate — I take it this is to effect the same pur¬ 
pose 1 mentioned just now, otherwise it is not evidence. I 
would beg to ask whether it is to produce a contradiction to 
Lord Cochrane ? 

Lord Gambier —Completely so. 

Judge Advocate— Because in that way alone will it be 
evidence. 

A. She was on shore. I told him I had just come from 
the Caesar, which was also on shore in a critical situation, 
within the range of shot and shell; that, in my opinion, ships 
of the line had no business there : that Lord Gambier seemed 
to me to be most anxious to act with his fleet, but that, it 
he had sent them in there, it clearly appeared that few would 
have returned, if any, I think, were my expressions, and that 
it would have been madness to have done it. His Lordship 
said that three sail of the line might have been lost, which, in 
his opinion, did not signify. My reply was, that even one 
sail of the line being lost would, in my opinion, have been a 
disgrace to the enterprise and to Lngland. f his passed in the 
presence of Captains Biigh, Woolridge, and Maitland, Colonel 
Cochrane, his brother, and there were several others round 

Y 2 


164 

Lord Cochrane at the time, whose names I do not re¬ 
member. 

Q. Under the circumstances of the wind and the tide of 
flood making at eight o’clock, did it appear to you, that on 
the morning of the 12th of April, or at any time when the 
enemy’s ships were on shore, and the signal had been made 
that they could 
liect or unnecess 
stroying them ? 

A. None whatever. It was my opinion on board the Ca¬ 
ledonia, as well as the opinion of many other officers, that the 
proper time of tide for sending ships in was at the time of tide 
that would insure their coming out in case of accidents. 

Q. -Do you remember the signal from the Imperieuse, on 
the morning of the 12th of April, that the enemy’s ships were 
on shore, and that half the fleet could destroy them ? 

A, It was reported to me at the time the signal ygas made. 
I was in the cabin getting ready to go on board the Caledonia, 
and I ran upon deck directly. 

<2. It was reported to you officially ? 

A. Yes; by the First Lieutenant or by the Signal Lieute¬ 
nant ? 

Q. \v hat impression did it make upon your mind at the 
time as to the propriety of such signal being made? 

A. 1 thought the signal a very improper one. 

Lord Gambier— '{will not ask any further questions upon 
this subject. I could enter further into it, but [ will not de¬ 
tain the Court longer, nor press upon Lord Cochrane further 
than is necessary for my own defence. 

Captain Beresford—I should wish to state the reasons 
why I thought that signal a very improper one. As it was 
impossible for the fleet to have acted against them at that 
moment. 

President —From the first attack upon the ships of the 
enemy to the final cessation of hostilities against them, was 
every thing done that could be done to effect their destruc¬ 
tion ? 

A. I think every thing was done that could be done, and 
much more than I ever expected. 

Admiral It oung —Are you clear in your recollection that 
the report made to you of the signal was that half the fleet 
would be sufficient to destroy the enemy? 

A. 1 am certain of it : but 1 think previous to that the signal 
was, that the fleet could destroy the enemy. 


e destroyed, there was on my part any neg- 
ry delay in taking effectual measures for de- 


165 

Admiral Y oung —You are looking at some minutes*— 
were those made at the time ? 

A. They were made from a letter I received from the First 
Lieutenant at the time; but I can recollect the circumstances 
perfectly without them. 

Q. When an Admiral is informed, by signal, that a specific 
force is sufficient to execute any service, is it generally under¬ 
stood that the force pointed out is the greatest that can be em¬ 
ployed, or the smallest that will be required : if you were to 
tell the Admiral, by signal, that ten ships would be sufficient 
to perform a service, should you mean to tell the Admiral that 
he need not send more than ten, or that he must not send less 
than that number ? 

A. I should expect the Admiral to send the number I made 
the signal for: that the service required the force pointed 
out. 

Q. Then, if you had been Commander in Chief of the fleet, 
and that signal had been made to you, what would you have 
considered as the smallest force you could have sent in to de¬ 
stroy the enemy in consequence of that signal ? 

A. At the time that signal was made 1 would not have sent 
in one ship. 

Q. If you had had the command of a fleet, and a Captain 
under you had informed you half your fleet could destroy 
your enemy, what proportion of your fleet should you send 
in ? 

A. I think, to make sure of it, 1 should have been inclined 
to send in more than half; for 1 would not let it take the 
chance. 

Q. Do you think, that, on the morning of the 12th of April, 
it would have been prudent or proper to have sent in more 
than half the fleet to the Road of the Isle of Aix to destroy the 
enemy 7 ? 

A. It would have been very improper, as I have said in 
the former part of my evidefice. I do not think ships of the 
line had any business there. There is one thing I omitted in 
my statement of what passed on board the fmpeneuse. When 
1 said that I thought ships of the line had no right there, Lord 
Cochrane said that there should have been more bomb-vessels 
sent from England ; that they would have annoyed the enemy 
if they had not destroyed them. 1 wish to add that to my 
evidence. 

President —Is that relevant evidence?—The question is, 
whether the force there was in the best manner applied. I 
do not think that what might have been with propriety sent 
from England at all applies to the question before us. 

Lord Gambier—I have no wish at all upon the subject* 


r 


V. 


166 

Capt. Beresford — I only state It as that which in part 
fixes the strong impression on my mind as to the impropriety 
of line-of-battle ships going in there ; but I have no wish that 
it should be inserted if it is not thought relevant. 


Captain ALEXANDER ROBERT KERR, of His Majesty's 

Ship the Revenge, sworn. 

Examined by Lord Gambler . 

Q. Do you remember the state of the enemy’s fleet on the 
morning of the 12th of April last at day-light? 

fMr. Stokes's chart was shewn to Captain Kerr.) 

A. I think the situation is as nearly marked here as can be. 
I recollect the situation of the enemy’s fleet perfectly : seven 
sail on shore, and two sail of the line afloat; one line-of-battle 
ship advanced some distance up the river, and the frigates all 
'shut in with the Isle D’Aix. 

Q. Do you remember a telegraphic signal being made by 
the Imperieuse, in the morning of that day, that seven of the 
enemy’s ships were ; on shore, and that half the fleet could de¬ 
stroy them ? 

A. Perfectly well; I read the telegraph off myself. 

Q. Are you certain as to the word half? 

A. Yes, I am. Whether it was may be destroyed by half, 
or half the fleet can destroy’- them, i am not certain ; but 
I am quite positive that the word half was used. This 
was as nearly about six o’clock as could be. 

Q. Had I sent in line-of-battle ships to Aix Road at the 
time that signal was made, or soon afterwards, were any ships 
of the enemy’s fleet in a position to enable them to rake and 
injure our ships as they advanced ? 

A. The two ships that were lying afloat were certainly in 
positions to have raked and crippled any ships advancing : 
the three-decker was likewise in a situation that a part of her 
guns would have borne upon the ships going down. 

Q. If any of our line-of-battle ships, advancing under such 
circumstances, had become crippled, either by the fire from the 
enemy’s ships or their batteries, could they have returned from 
thence, or what would have been the consequence ? 

A. No ship could have returned, as the wind was directly 
in, blowing fresh ; and, from the depth of water I found in 
the Revenue at an earlier time of the ebb in the afternoon, it 
is my firm belief that the ships advancing could not have got 
sufficiently near to have brought those two ships to close action, 
and would have grounded themselves within range both of the 



J 67 

✓ * . 1 

batteries and the line-of-battle ships. The consequence must 
have been the inevitable loss of the ships. 

Q. At what time, in the afternoon of that day, did I order 
you to proceed with the Revenge to the attack of the enemy; 
and state whether the orders I gave you were discretional or 
otherwise ? 

A. At two o’clock. I certainly considered the orders in 
some degree discretional, from the Pilots, both of my own ship 
and the Caledonia, not being sufficiently acquainted whether 
there was water enough for the line-of-battle ships to act in, 
in Aix Roads. 


Q. When you stood out from under the batteries in the 
Revenge, it appears that you ran to the southward or west¬ 
ward ; were you confident of finding there sufficient water 
for the Revenge ; or what were your motives for going in that 
direction ? 

A. No; I had no idea that I should be able to keep the 
Revenge afloat. To the southward was the only position 1 
could take ; and I conceived it my duty to let her ground out 
of range if possible, rather than within. 

Q. From the situation in which you placed the Revenge 
when opposed to the enemy, and the depth of water you 
found round you, would it have been possible for line-of-battle 
ships or large frigates to have gone a-head of you to attack the 
enemy’s three-decked ship, and others, towards the entrance 
of the Charente with effect? 

A. Certainly not. When the Revenge quitted her situation, 
her keel was in the mud, and I was forced, from the ebb tide 
making down the Charente and the wind on the larboard beamy 
to make sail in shore. We found so very little water as wc 
advanced, that any ship, however short a distance a-head, 
could not possibly have got out again, and must have grounded 
and been lost, as she was immediately under the fire of the 
enemy’s batteries. 

Q. Was every exertion used, according to your judgment, 
from your observation, by every ship or vessel sent in to'attack 
the enemy ? 

A. Every thing appeared to me to have been conducted by 
the different ships with the greatest zeal and gallantry. 

Q. Were the three ships of the enemy that were on shore 
upon the Palles, and which afterwards got off, at any time 
in a position to be attacked by us? 

A. Certainly not: they were advanced farther than the 
Tonnere, and the Revenge’s shot just reached the lonnere. 


Q. Could any more of the enemy’s ships have been 
destroyed than were destroyed, had any of the King’s ships 
been sent to attack them sooner than they were ordered in for 
that purpose ? 


I6S 

A. No ; it is my firm belief that had ships gone in 'sooner 
they would have been crippled, by which means the French 
ships (I mean the two that remained afloat) would have dis¬ 
covered the strength of their position, of course remained in¬ 
stead of going up the river, and prevented the four ships that 
were afterwards destroyed from being so. 

Q. Under the circumstances of the wind and tide,' did it 
appear to you that on the morning of the 12th of April, or at 
any time when the enemy’s ships were on shore when the sig¬ 
nal had been made that half the fleet could destroy them, 
there was on my part any neglect or unnecessary delay in 
taking effectual measures for destroying them ? 

A. As far as so very junior an officer as myself could pre¬ 
sume to judge of the conduct of the Commander in Chief, 
I thought that every thing was done that could possibly be 
done ; and had the ships gone in sooner, 1 am confident a 
number must have been lost. 

■ \ % 

President —From the first attack upon the ships of the 
enemy, to the final cessation of hostilities against them, was 
every thing done that could be done to effect their de¬ 
struction ? 

A. Every thing. 

Admiral Young —Did you, on the morning of the 12th 
of April, see the three ships that were on shore which you 
have represented as being too far from the British squadron to 
be destroyed by them ? 

A. Yes. 

Q. Were they in the same situation in the afternoon as you 
saw them in the morning ? 

A. No; they had got off, and advanced some distance up 
the river. 

Q. Were they, when you saw them in the morning, in a 
situation to be destroyed if they had been attacked } 

A. N o ; certainly not. 

Q. What would have prevented their being destroyed ? 

A. I he two line-of-battle ships that were lying afloat, and 
the depth of water, preventing our ships advancing sufficiently 
near. 

Q. How long were you at anchor in the Road of Aix ? 

A. An hour and a half, or rather more. 

Q. Did you observe the state of the fortifications on the 

Isle of Aix ? 

A. No, 1 did not; the situation of the Revenge was so 
critical, that I was otherwise taken up. 


169 

Mr* SAMUEL RAVEN, Master of His Majesty’s Ship 

the Caesar, called again. 

Examined by Lord Gambler . 

\s 

Q. Had any ships ot the line been sent into Aix Road by 
me on the morning of the 12th of April last, to attack the 
enemy’s ships that were aground, at what time was it possible 
for them to return ? 

A. Not during the day—they could not have returned. 

Q. W ould they have been within the range of the shot from 
the enemy’s batteries while they remained there ? 

A. 1’he greatest part, 1 conceive, must have been ; particu¬ 
larly the Caesar. 

Q. If the wind had continued as it did the whole of that 
day, and il those ships had been crippled in their masts, must 
they not have remained under the fire of the enemy’s batteries 
until the wind should shilt, and what would have been their 
fate ? 

A. The greatest part must have remained under the batte¬ 
ries, and, without a favourable wind, I think the greatest part 
of them must have been lost. 

(Mr. Stokes's Chart was shewn to the Witness.) 

Q. Are the situations of the ships marked upon that chart, 
the same as they appeared to you ? 

A. They are. 

Q. Do you think that any might have escaped ? 

A. Not with the wind as it was. 

"President —Do you mean that they could not have got off 
Sven with the ebb tide ? 

A. Not as the wind was. 

Q. Could line of battle ships, not having met with any ac¬ 
cident, work out from Aix Roads to the Road of Basque, 
against a northerly or north-west wind, with an ebb tide? 

A. They may, from the anchorage where the French ships 
lay, but not without being exposed to the fire both from Isle 
D’Aix and Oleron, as they worked out. 

Lord Gambier—W hen the enemy’s ships that were a- 
ground upon the Palles Shoal, and the two that were afloat, 
ran to the entrance of the Charente, could they have been ap¬ 
proached by British line of battle ships, or large frigates? 

A. From the knowledge I have of the place, Ido not con¬ 
ceive they could have been approached by large ships ; for, 
during the time they were running in, they were observed 
from the Caesar to heave their shot overboard, and other 
things, to lighten the ship, and they frequently hung aground 

Z i 


far several minutes, and then went on again. I am not posi¬ 
tive as to the large frigates, as I do not know the depth of 
water. 

Q. State what part of Aix and Basque Roads you have 
sounded, and how far the information you obtained agreed 
' with the French chart in general ? 

A. I have surveyed every part of great and little Basque 
Roads, and find the depth of water to differ materially from the 
French chart, nor could 1 at any time get three proper angles 
together when the ship was at anchor. I have little or no 
knowledge of the Isle D’Aix Roads, being only in there in 
the Caesar that night after the ship was a-ground. I sounded 
round the ship nearly a cable each way, and found very little 
difference in the depth of water, except to the north-west, 
which was four fathoms and a half. 

Q. You have been there in the Caesar, under the flag of Sir 
Richard Strachan, have you not? 

A. Yes ; I was there nearly two years. 

Q. Did you make any observations upon the anchorage of 
the enemy’s squadron that were there before, and upon the 
rise and fall of the tide ? 

A. The enemy were always moored very close to each 
other, and close to the Isle D’Aix. On the 1st August, 1807, 
the enemy’s ships came out for the purpose of manoeuvring, 
and were pursued by the British squadron under the com¬ 
mand of Sir Richard Strachan ; they got into the Isle D’Aix 
Roads before we could come up with them. It appeared from 
the manner in which they went in, that the anchorage was 
very much confined, only going one ship at a time, and they 
anchored so close, that it was impossible to have gone through 
their line otherwise. 1 conceive it was the intention of Sir 
Richard Strachan to have attacked them, but from the strength, 
of the batteries, and the manner in which the ships were laid, 
we worked out again. The enemy’s ships were six sail of the 
line, two frigates, and four brigs; they anchored nearly north 
and south, as well as 1 can recollect, in one line. The rise 
and fall of the tide is generally eighteen feet; I have known it 
rise nineteen feet, with a strong north-west wind at spring 
tides. 

Q. Did the)' appear ever to take the ground at low water, 
at that anchorage ? 

A. It appeared frequently from the Caesar, that they did at 
low water, at spring tides, touch the ground, i speak more 
particularly to the Majestien, for, after the other ships had 
swung, she appeared to hang aground abaft, and did not 
swing for a quarter of an hour afterwards, and whenever it 
came to blow from the north-west, they always struck their 


171 

topmasts before the British squadron did in Basque Roads, 
which we supposed was to ease the ships from pitching, and 
from striking ground abaft in the last quarter ebb, or at low 
water. 

^ Admiral A oung —At what time on the 12 th of April did 
the Caesar go into the Road of Aix ? 

A. Between five and six o’clock we weighed, and the ship 
took the ground a little after seven. 

Q. How was the wind when you went in ? 

A. brom N.W. to N.W. and by W. 

Q. At what time did the Caesar return to Basque Roads ? 

A. A little alter four the next morning-. 

Q. How was the wind when she went out? 

A. South-west. 

Q. Vvas S.W . a fair wind for her to go out of Aix Roads ? 
A. Yes ; the course is north and by west out. 


Captain STAIR DOUGLAS, of His Majesty’s Ship the 

Bellona, sworn. 

Examined by Eord Gamhier. 

Q. Do you remember the state of the enemy’s fleet in 
Aix Road, on the morning of the 12th of April at day¬ 
light ? 

(Mr. Stokes's Chari was shewn to Captain Douglas ). 

A. To the best of my recollection, two sail of the line were 
afloat—the three-decker, and three sail, appeared to be a- 
ground. 

Q . Were you ordered by me to advance towards the Boyart 
Shoal on that morn in £ ? € 

A. Yes, in the cabin of the Caledonia—Sir Harry Neale’s 
cabin—Admiral Stopford was present. 

Q. Had 1 sent in any ships to Aix Road at day-light, or 
soon afterwards on that morning, to attack the enemy ; were 
any of the enemy’s ships in a situation to enable them to rake 
and injure our ships as they advanced ? 

A. Certainly ; I think they were. 

Q. At what time could our ships have returned during that 
day?- - 

A. The wind blowing very strong into the harbour of Aix, 
the}' - coukl not have returned until the ebb, and then they must 
have worked out, and probably been disabled by the batteries 

or the ships they must have engaged. 

7 9 



172 

Q. If any of the English ships, advancing under such cir¬ 
cumstances, had become crippled, what would have been the 
consequence ? 

A. The impression made on my mind at that time was, 
that they would have been burnt by red hot shot, which the 
enemy had sufficient time to prepare. 

Q. Under the circumstances of the wind and tide, did it 
appear to you, that, on the morning of the 12th of April, or 
at any time when the enemy’s ships were on shore, when the 
signal had been made that half the fleet could destroy them, 
there was, on my part, any neglect or unnecessary delay in 
taking effectual measures for destroying them ? 

A. On the contrary ; 1 think the happy time for effecting 
it was chosen by the Commander in Chief. 

President —From the first attack made upon the ships of 
the enemy, to the final cessation of hostilities against them, 
was every thing done that could be done to effect their de¬ 
struction ? 

A. In my opinion every thing was done that could be done 
under the circumstances. 

Admiral Young. Was the Bellona in Basque Roads 
when the Commander in Chief arrived there ? 

A. We arrived there with the Commander in Chief; we 
sailed with him from Plymouth. 

Q. Can you state, from the time of his arrival in Basque 
Road to the time of his leaving it, any instance of neglect in 
his conduct and proceedings, as Commander in Chief of the 
Channel Fleet? 

A. As far as I can judge of the merits of the Commander 
in Chief, he evinced the greatest zeal to promote the public 
service on all occasions, and I do not know of any neglect 
whatever. 


Captain WILLIAM GODh RE.Y, of His Majesty's Bomb 

Vessel the Etna, sworn. 

, • i • 

, • .• ' i • . 

Examined by Lord Gambler. 

:i,. y,• ;tt i: , 

Q. Were you ordered into Aix Roads by me on the 12th of 
April, to bombard the enemy’s ships that were aground, and 
at what time of the day ? 

A. I was; my signal was made about half past ten o’clock 
in the morning, for myself to come on board the Caledonia* 
and the Etna to weigh at the same time. 

Q,. Did you get into Aix Road before the Imperieuse ha$ 



173 

commenced firing upon the enemy—before she went into ac¬ 
tion—and how long ? 

-A. Yes, nearly half an hour. 

Q* At what time did you pass the Imperieuse ? 

A. About one o’clock. 

Q* ^ hat gun-brigs had you with you ? 

A. i hree, which went in with me—the Conflict, the In~ 
solent, and, I think, the Encounter. 

Q. Were you employed on the 13th, in throwing shells at 
the enemy’s ships aground, at the mouth of the Charente ? 

A. Yes. 

Q. Did it produce any effect upon the enemy ? 

A. That is really matter of opinion ; I thought it did. 

Q. When was the 13-inch mortar of the Etna split ? 

A. On the 13th, at night. 

Q. When were the 10-inch shells expended ? 

A. The 14th, at night. 

Q. Did you keep up firing occasionally as the tide and wind 
served, until that time ? 

A. Yes. 

President —Were the ships and vessels sent in on the 12th 
of April, to attack the ships of the enemy as soon as it could 
be done with prppriety, considering the state of the wind and 
tide ? 

A- Yes. 

Q. From the first attack upon the ships of the enemy until 
the final cessation of hostilities against them, was every thing 
done that could be done to effect their destruction ? 

A. Yes, most certainly. 

Admiral Young —Was the Etna anchored in a situation 
out of the reach of the guns on the batteries of Aix, on the 
12th ? 

A. No ; I think some of their shot went over us. 

Q. Did any shells annoy you ? 

A. The shells went far beyond us. 

Q. Was that a situation from which any of the enemy *5 
ships on shore would have been destroyed by guns ? 

A. No. 

Q. When were you ordered to leave the Road of Aix? 

A, On the 29 th, 1 think. 


174 

Q. How was the wind when you left it ? 

A. A light air from the southward. 

Q. That was then a fair wind to sail out ? 

A. Right out. 

Q. While you were at anchor in the Road of Aix, did you 
observe the fortifications on the Island ? 

A. Yes. 

Q. Did you perceive that they were blown up and de¬ 
stroyed ? 

A. No. 

Q. Did you perceive that any part of them were under re¬ 
pair ? 

A. I did see people at work, which I conceived to be mak¬ 
ing a platform or battery of new work ; they were making 
new ground. 

C 

Q. Did you count the number of guns in the works of 
Aix ? 

A. I did. 

Q. How many can you distinctly speak to ? 

A. I can speak distinctly to there being on the first day 
forty at least, that commanded the entrance to the Charente 
on the south-side of the island. 

Q. Do you mean, by commanding the entrance of the 
Charente, that they would bear on any ships that might be 
sent in to destroy the French squadron ? 

A. Certainly. I should suppose thirty of them would bear 
on the anchorage of Aix Roads ; the new work was con¬ 
structing on the south-west angle, lower towards the water. 

President —Did you observe any heaps of earth, rubbish, 
or stones, by the fortifications on the Isle D’Aix, which indi¬ 
cated that any part of those works were in a ruinous state > 

A. No. 

Admiral Young —During the time the Etna was in 
Rasque Roads, can you state any instance of neglect or mis¬ 
conduct in the proceedings of the Commander in Chief of the 
Channel Fleet ? 

A. No, most certainly not. 

President —You continued in Aix Roads from the 12th to 
the 2yth of April ? 

A. Yes. 

Q. Do you mean literally in Aix Roads? 

A. Yes, I do. 


1 75 

Lo rd Gambier— -It may be as well for Captain Godfrey 
to define what lie describes as Aix Roads, because it was up 
towards the Maumusson passage, where it has been stated 
there was anchorage for line of battle ships. 

President —We are not to understand, that the whole of 
that seventeen days you were lying within range of shot and 
shells? • r ( 

A. No, certainly not. 

(The chart was shewn to Captain Godfrey , and he pointed out 
his position to the inembers of the Court . 

Judge Advocate —When did you enter the Road of Aix— 
where did you anchor—and when did you leave it ? 

A. I entered the 12th. We shifted our anchorage eight 
times for the purpose of bombarding the enemy, and we 
continued to the 29 th, when we left it. 

President —You did not continue in what is there de¬ 
scribed as Aix Roads, any longer than the 12th ? 

A. No, I had to go through Aix Roads to the mouth of 
the Charente. 


Lieutenant 1IOCKINGS, of His Majesty’s Ship the Cale- 

donifa, called again. 

Examined by Lord Gambler . 

> 4.' 

Q. Was the signal of recall made to the Imperieuse on the 
13th of April ? 

A. No, not that I recollect. 

Q. Must you not have known it if there had been a signal 
to that effect ? 

A. Certainly. 

I 

Q. Did you observe a telegraphic signal made by the Im¬ 
perieuse, on the 14th of April—“ If permitted to remain, 
can destroy enemy,’’—and at what time of day r 
- A. Yes, I recollect that signal; I believe it was just after 
the recall was made on the 14th of April, about forty minutes 
after nine A.M. It is on the signal log. 

Admtral Young.— -Yon are Signal Lieutenant of the Ca¬ 
ledonia ? 

A. Yes, I am. 


1 


/ 



Q. You will then be able to speak to all signals that were 
made by the Imperieuse on the morning of the 12th April > 

A. Yes, I can. 

Q. Can you say positively that the telegraph communica¬ 
tion mentioned, was 44 half the fleet,” is sufficient to destroy 
the enemy ? I particularly mean to press the word half,” 
upon your mind. 

A. I cannot answer as to that signal, because I was coming 
on board the Caledonia from the Imperieuse, and was not 
there till seven o’clock, and that signal was made at five : I 
had been in one of the fire-ships. 

Q. By whom was that signal marked ? 

A. By the signal mate, Mr. Sparshott. 

Q. Did the Imperieuse, at any time after you returned on 
board the Caledonia, inform the Commander in Chief, by 
signal, that any smaller part of the fleet than one half could 
destroy the enemy ? 

A. Not that I recollect. 

Lord Gambier —With the permission of the Court, I will 
call the Signal Mate, that they may propose the question to 
him as to the signal/* 

o 


Mr. SAMUEL SPARSHOTT, Signal Mate of His Ma¬ 
jesty’s Ship the Caledonia, sworn. 

President —Were you on board the Caledonia on the 
morning of the 12th of April, and were you employed in tak¬ 
ing down the signals made to and from the Caledonia ? 

A. Yes. 

Q. What was the first signal made to the flag ship, from 
the Imperieuse, on that morning ? 

A. The first signal made by the Imperieuse I could not 
understand—I reported it to Sir Harry Neale, and he desired 
the signal to be made to make that message over a^ain ; the 
Imperieuse then made that half the fleet could destroy the 
enemy—seven on shore. 

Q. Did you observe the communication by the telegraph 
yourself, and are you certain that half the fleet was the com¬ 
munication made ? 

A. ] did observe it myself, and am quite certain the si°- aa ) t 
” half the fleet,” was made. ° 

Q. During the whole course of that day (the 12th of April), 
was any signal made by telegraph, or otherwise, from the 



177 

Irhpeirieuse, to the Caledonia, that two ships could destroy the 
enemy ? 

A. There was no such signal made. 

* • • r - > « 

President —As Mr. Sparshott is before the Court, does 
your Lordship wish to ask him any questions ? 

Lord Gam bier —No. 

_ 


Mr. FI) WARD FAIRFAX, Master of the Fleet, called 

a^ain. 

o 

Examined by Lord Gatnbicr, 

Q. Do you recollect when and where the explosion vessel 
blew up on the night of the 11th April ? 

A: She was about two cables lengths from the Lyra. The 
Lyra is marked in the chart produced by me, as well as the 
explosion vessel, when she blew up—the fire-vessels all seemed 
to steer for that point—1 hailed four of them, and the Mediator, 
and desired the Mediator to steer south-east, or else she would 
miss the French fleet—from the other vessels 1 received no an¬ 
swer. 

President —To the best of your judgment, what was the 
distance of the explosion-vessel from the enemy, when she 
blew up ? 

A. About a mile. 

Admiral Young —What sort of a night was it ? 

A. Very dirty, and blowing strong—the Lyra was pitch¬ 
ing nearly bows under, with a cable out, the topgallant-mast 
struck. 

Q. Was the night light or dark? 

A. Very dark at intervals. 

Q. I think you are Master of the Caledonia, or Master of 
the Fleet ? 

A. I am. 

, . • * * 

Q. How then did you, in a very dark night, ascertain that 
the explosion-vessel blew up within a mile of the enemy ? 

A. By her comparative distance from us in the Lyra, judg¬ 
ing the distance she was from the enemy. I hailed the boats 
from the explosion-vessel immediately, and demanded the 
counter-sign—this was immediately after the explosion—they 
did not know it, but answered they were from the Imperieuse, 
I having said I would fire into them if they did not answer. 

Q. Where were you when the explosion took place ? 

A. In the Lyra. 



173 

President _Had you ascertained the distance that the Lyra 

herself was from the enemy, before it was dark, on the 1 ltll 

A! 1 just anchored at dusk—it was dark twilight, and by 
the bearings and computed distance she was a mile and a 
quarter from the enemy's line-of-battle ships. 

Q. You think the explosion-vessel was a quarter of a mile 

nearer than you ? 

A. Yes. 


Q. Who set fire to the explosion-vessel ? 

A. The boats from the Impericuse. 

President —What I am desirous of knowing is, by whose 
directions she was set fire to in that situation ? 

A. I can answer that only, by mentioning a conversation 
with Lieutenant Bissel, when he came on board the next day. 
Lieutenant Bissel and Lord Cochrane were together ; and 1 
asked, “ what was the reason you set fire to the explosion- 
vessel so close ?”—he said the fuzees burnt only six minutes and 
a half, instead of twenty. Lord Cochrane himself lighted the 
fuzees. 


Q. By being so close, you meant so close to the Lyra, not 
the enemy r 

A. Yes; I said, you had like to have blown me up, and not 
the enemy. 


Captain JOHN TREMAIN ROOD, of His Majesty’s Ship 
the Indefatigable, called in again. 

Loud Gambier —The. question I was about to propose is 
not considered by the Judge Advocate strictly applicable, there¬ 
fore l shall not have occasion for Captain Rodd. The ques¬ 
tion related to the application made by the Master of the ln\- 
perieuse, for access to the Indefatigable’s log. 

Admiral Young —How long were you in Basque Roads 
with the Commander in Chief? 

A. From the 3d of April to the time the Commander in 
Chief sailed—I sailed with him. 

Q. Can you state any instance of neglect or misconduct in 
the Commander in Chief, during that period ? 

A. None whatever. 


i 



179 

JAMES Y\ ILKINSON, Esq. called again* 

Examined In/ Lord Gambler. 

w 

Q. Do you know of tlic issuing of the General Orders 
ot the 15th of March, the 25th of March, and the 11th of 
-April, which are stated in my defence ? 

A. Yes. 

Judge Advocate —They are similar to those stated in the 
Defence X 

A. Yes, they are. 

Lord Gamuier—D id you hear Lord Cochrane, on his 
coming on board the Caledonia on the 14th of April last, say 
any thing to me respecting the loss he calculated upon of any 
of the King’s ships, if 1 had sent them in to the attack of the 
enemy, agreeably to his signal ? 

A. ^ es, 1 did. Lord Cochrane, in conversation, told the 
Admiral, that il he had sent in the ships agreeably to his sig¬ 
nal, he calculated or reckoned upon three or four of them be¬ 
ing lost, or words to that effect. This alludes to the signal of 
the 12th—“ Seven of the enemy’s ships on shore—-half the 
fleet can destroy them.” 

Q. Did he say any thing respecting my own conduct or 
misconduct, or that of any of the officers of the ships ? 

A. Me said nothing of your Lordship’s conduct in my pre¬ 
sence—he spoke generally of misconduct of the sloops and 
small vessels, anti of a great many of the fire-ships, and he 
particularly noticed the gun-brigs—small vessels was the ex¬ 
pression—I am confident the men of war sloops were intended 
to be referred to, from the circumstance of the Beagle being 
mentioned. Lord Gambier expressed his regret that his Lord- 
ship entertained so bad an opinion of the conduct of the small 
vessels, and particularly asked Lord Cochrane as to the con¬ 
duct of the Heajrlc ; he observed to Lord Cochrane, that the 
.conduct of the Beagle had gained her the admiration of liiin- 
self and the officers of the fleet who hud observed her, an.d 
said surely she behaved well, or words to that effect. Lord 
Cochrane, in reply, said, I have a great regard and esteem 
for Captain Newcomb : and from his having been an old 
messmate of mine— 

President —Mr. Judge Advocate, there appear to be 
some doubts entertained as to the strict propriety of this ; it is 
commenting on the conduct of officers whose conduct is not 
called into question, and I think it might be attended with very 
unpleasant consequences. I am not singular in my opinion ; 
some other members round me have also doubts of the strict 
propriety of it. 


2 A 2 


180 

r / 

Mr. Wilkinson —I be" to submit to tbe Court- 

President. —You have no apology to make—you have 
done very properly in answering the question. 

Judge Advocate —I understand the bearing of it to be to 
shew some contradiction to Lord Cochrane ; certainly this, 
as to the conduct of other officers, does not appear to be re¬ 
levant, unless it is in that point of view. 

President —If it were any thing respecting the conduct 
of the Commander in Chief, there could not be the shadow of 
a doubt as to the propriety of it; but it may be a question, 
whether it should be so extensive as it becomes when it re¬ 
spects the conduct of other persons. 

Judge Advocate—I understand it is intended to point at 
the expression as to casting blame, to shew whether that ex¬ 
pression alluded to blame ^cast on Lord Gainbier, or upon 
other persons. 

Lord Gambier —Certainly it is. If the Court have any 
doubt as to the propriety of the evidence—if Mr. Wilkinson 
will state whether he heard Lord Cochrane express any dis¬ 
satisfaction with my conduct, that will be quite sufficient. 

President. —I should think it will be better to confine 
Mr. Wilkinson to specific questions. 

Admiral Stanhope —The difficulty now is, as Admiral 
Campbell observes, that we have gone a good way into the 
conduct of another officer, and it may not be pleasant to leave 
it as it stands at present. 

Judge Advocate —We have certainly dipped very far into 
the conduct of another officer ; but it does not at present ap¬ 
pear what is intended to be said of his conduct—Lord Gam¬ 
bier considers it as perfectly good. 

Lord Gambier —Perfectly so—all I wish, is to prove the 
assertion I have made in my defence, that there was no blame 
imputed to me, by Lord Cochrane, at that time. 

Judge Advocate —Mr. Wilkinson was perfectly correct 
in giving his answer, because the question required it. 

President —I have already said to Mr. Wilkinson, you 
have no need to make an apology—you have conducted 
yourself with great propriety in giving the answer; the only 
doubt that existed in my mind, was whether it was that sort 
of evidence which it was proper for the Court to receive, 
though very proper for the witness to give, when the question 
was put to him. 


k 



lsl 

Judge Advocate —I should think the proper question will 
be, whether Lord Cochrane found fault with Lord Gambler’s 
conduct. 

Lord Gam bier —That will be all I desire. I declare upon 
my honour that he never did. 

President —The question appears to be, whether Mr. Wil¬ 
kinson, having now gone so far, he shall proceed with his nar¬ 
ration. 

Judge Advocate—I should think it would be better he 
should proeeed now to the close of whatever passed as to Cap¬ 
tain Newcomb, for it will be published, and it is very unpleasant 
that it should stand as it does at present; there are several re¬ 
porters for the papers present, and it will be published imperfect 
if it stands as it does. 

Mr. W illdmon proceeded: 

And from his having been an old messmate of mine it may be 
supposed I should say everything in his favour; but, my Lord, 
I cannot make an exception respecting the conduct of the 
-officers commanding gun-brigs. 

He made comments on the conduct of other officers, which 
I shall not relate unless the Court require it. 

President —My Lord Gambier, there will be time for an¬ 
other witness. 

Lord Gambier —Having taken up so much of the time of 
the Court, I really am averse to intruding myself any further 
upon it. I will not call any more witnesses, but will now 
leave my case to the Court. 

President —The time of the Court is of no sort of conse¬ 
quence; we wish you to exercise the full judgment of your 
own mind, to stop when you please, and proceed as long as 
you please. You will consider whether you would not wish to 
call any of the distinguished officers who have not been ex¬ 
amined. 

Lord Gambier —No, Sir, I do not feel it necessary to cull 
any other. 

President —If you have the least wish T hope you will 
avail yourself of the opportunity. Perhaps you will take till 
to-morrow morning to consider of it. 

Lord Gambier —Then if the Court please, I will defer till 
to-morrow morning my decision upon that point. 

President —It will be only adjourning a quarter of an hour 
sooner than usual, and then you will have an opportunity ot 
considering whether there is any point on which you should 
wish to give further evidence. 

Adjourned till to-morrow. 


1 S3 


ilPT!. . > L • ■ . ' 

SEVENTH DAY, 

Wednesday, August 2, 1809. 


Rear Admiral STOFFORD called in again. 

President —Admiral Stopford has desired to be called in to 
correct a little inaccuracy in his evidence. 

I 4 

Judge Advocate —I will read the evidence, with the alter¬ 
ations I had made with respect to the hazardous undertaking of 
the fire-ships : it was too much exemplified in what happened 
to the fire-ship fitted out by the Caesar. She went in before 
the explosion-vessel, and before the Mediator; getting near the 
French fleet she brought to, seeing no other vessel near her un¬ 
til the explosion-vessel blew up close to her, killed two men on 
board of her, and damaged one of the boats in which the men 
were to come away from her; the men were therefore much 
crowded in the other boat, a few only being able to come away 
in the damaged boat. The acting lieutenant and one man died 
from fatigue in the bottom of that boat, and the boats were both 
picked up by the Lyra. 

Admiral Stopford —That is the alteration I wished to 
make. 

Admiral Young —From the time of the arrival of the 
Commander in Chief in Basque Roads, to the time of his leav¬ 
ing it, can you state any instance of his neglect, misconduct, or 
inattention, to the public service ? 

A. So far from it, that it always appeared to me that the Com¬ 
mander in Chief was actuated by a warm zeal for the service, 
and a desire to discharge the duties intrusted to him with punc¬ 
tuality and effect. 


Lieutenant HOCKINGS called in again. 

Admiral Young—Y ou have said that on the 14th the sig¬ 
nal was made by the Imperieuse, to say that enemy’s ships 
might be destroyed ? 

A. The signal made by the Imperieuse was, if permitted to 
remain, can destroy the enemy. 

Q. To whom did you report the making of that signal ? 

A. lo Sir Harry Neale, the Captain of the Fleet. 





I S3 

Q. Do you know whether any thing was done in conse¬ 
quence of it ? 

A. I believe there were some launches ordered in by the 
Admiral, but I am not confident of it. Vessels were passing to 
and fro from the Admiral, and these launches were sent in to 
the Imperieuse. 1 do not know what they were passing about. 
The Aigle had been ordered to go in some time before, but in 
consequence of her having made a signal that her prisoners on 
board were suspicious, she was detained to send the prisoners on 
board the 1 heseus, and she then went in to relieve the Imperi- 
euse as soon as she had put her prisoners on board the Theseus, 
but what orders she took in I can not say. 

Lord Gambier —Was not there a signal made to the Im- 
perieuse to communicate with L’ Aigle in consequence of that 
signal ? 

A. There was a telegraph signal. 

Q. Did L’ Aigle go to the anchorage where the Imperieuse 
was, and relieve her, and how soon ? 

A. I cannot exactly say the time she anchored, but she went 
in immediately after she had removed the prisoners. 

President —Were any operations undertaken against the 
enemy upon the junction of L’Aigle with the Imperieuse? 

A. Not in conjunction with the Imperieuse, but the next day 
bombs were sent in, and the gun brigs. 

Lord Gambier —I think it was stated in my defence, or in 
my letter to the Admiralty, that the Thunder bomb arrived 
after that time. 

President — I think it was, but perhaps your Lordship wiil 
ask the question. 

A. The bomb I spoke of was the Etna. She was the only 
one then with the fleet. 

Lord Gambier —Was the other bomb, the Thunder bomb, 
sent in as soon as she arrived ? 

A. Immediately she anchored and got her orders, and went 
in the same morning. I see by the log it was the 19 th she 
arrived. 

President —Did the Vesuvius bomb arrive before your 
operations against the enemy had ceased ? 

A. No other bomb arrived until after the operations had 
ceased. Here are the Devastation and the Hound put down on 
the log as arriving on the 27th, after the operations had ceased. 
I have not got the name of the Vesuvius as arriving at all while 
we were there. 

Lord Gambier —Were any of the enemy’s ships within the 
range of bombs after the Devastation and the Hound arrived? 

A. I do not think they were. 


IS 4- 

Admiral Young —Did you form that opinion on board of 
the Caledonia, or were you at any time in Aix Road to form it 
there > 

A. On board the Caledonia. I never was in Aix Road. 

Lord Gambier —Do you know on what day the Regulus, 
which was on shore under the town of Fouras, got off, and went 
up the Charente? 

A. 1 think it was at day-light in the morning of the 29th. 

Q. Are you sure as to that ? 

A. I can only speak from the log—it was noted on the log¬ 
it appears on the log, that at day-light on the 29 th, an enemy’s 
two-decked ship got off, and moved to the westward ; it ought 
to have been eastward, and I believe that was the ship. 

Lord Gambier — I only beg to remark to the Court, that, 
it appears by the evidence of Captain Wolfe, who commanded 
the squadron upon that service, that he received from me all the 
assistance he required for carrying it on. 

President —That is in the perfect recollection of the Court. 
It was not upon that ground that the Court wished to see Lieu¬ 
tenant Hockings. 

Lord Gambier —Mr. President, previous to my withdraw¬ 
ing yesterday from this place, 1 intimated an intention of closing 
my evidence and my defence, and this I did from respect to the 
Court, being averse to engage more of their time than I con¬ 
ceived to be necessary, satisfied that every material point of the 
charge had been fully refuted ; but as all the captains of the in¬ 
shore squadron have been before the Court, with the exception 
only of three, I would claim your indulgence so much farther 
as to call in those officers, intending to put to them a very few 
questions; one of those is Captain Ncwcombe. As his name ap¬ 
peared yesterday in evidence, and it may lead to an inference 
prejudicial to that meritorious officer, if I did not notice his con¬ 
duct, I beg leave to assure this Court, that he acquitted himself 
in the command of the Beagle in Aix Roads, in a manner highly 
honourable to himself, and certainly satisfactory to me. 


Sir HARRY NEALE, Captain of the Fleet, called* 

Sir Harry Neale — I would beg to address a few words 
to the Court before 1 am sworn. Upon taking this oath which 
I have read, and of which I understand the extensive nature, am 
1 to state to the Court every thing which may occur to me, as 
to proposals and private communications with the Commander 
in Chief, or solely to answer the question put to me? 1 take 
the liberty of asking that, because 1 stand in a peculiar situation 
with the Commander in Chief. 

President — I apprehend myself—if the Court differ 'with 



185 

me they vvili state it—that you are not called upon to relate pri¬ 
vate conversations you had with the Commander in Chief in 
your intimate and particular situation. 

Sir Harry Neale —There were continual conversations 
between the Commander in Chief and me. 1 have given him 
m> opinion on different services; some of those he may have 
approved, and some he may not have approved. 

President —Certainly. I apprehend those are not to be 
stated. 

Admiral Young —Tf you are directed to detail any circum¬ 
stances, you then are to say all you know of the circumstances 
or the events you are directed to detail ; but if you are asked a 
specific question, your oath, I should imagine, will only oblige 
you to answer specifically and directty, and as fully as you can 
the question which is proposed to you. 

(Sir Harry Neale took the Oath.) 

Admiral \oung —Did the Signal Lieutenant of the Cale¬ 
donia, on the 14th of April, report to you that the Imperieuse 
had informed the Commander in Chief, by signal, that if allow¬ 
ed to remain she could destroy the enemy’s ships ? 

A. 1 was walking the poop when 1 directed, by the Com¬ 
mander in Chief’s order, the signal of recall to be made to the 
Imperieuse. The Imperieuse replied, if permitted to wait can 
destroy enemy. It was reported to me. 

Q. W as any thing done in consequence of that signal ? 

A. Yes. 

Q. What was done ? 

A. Captain Wolfe of L’Aigle was directed to proceed and 
take the command of the in-shore squadron, and the Imperieuse 
was directed by telegraph to communicate with L’Aigle, but 
whether he did communicate the information, or any plan, in 
consequence of that direction, or to the Commander in Chief 
upon his return to the Fleet, J am ignorant of. 

Q. Did L’Aigle go into Aix Roads in consequence of that 
signal ? 

A. Yes. 

A. Is L’Aigle a ship of equal force, or nearly equal force, 
to the Imperieuse, so as to be as well calculated to destroy the 
enemy as the Imperieuse would have been ? 

A. Yes, she is. 

Q. Were any other ships or vessels sent in with L’Aigle, or 
in consequence of that signal ? 

A. To the best of my recollection all the small vessels, or 
nearly so, had been sent in the day before, no other was sent ia 
on that occasion ; if there was any other it was only the Lyra. 

2B 


186 

President —As Sir Harry Neale is here, would your Lord¬ 
ship ask him any questions. 

Lord Gambier —Had you any conversation with Lord 
Cochrane at any time, respecting the accuracy of the French 
charts ? 

A* Yes. 

Q. What did he state as to their accuracy or inaccuracy ? 

A. I was conversing with Lord Cochrane about the 6th of 
April, respecting the distance that the British fleet was anchored 
from the French fleet: his Lordship stated that the fleets were 
nine miles from each other ; I replied that they were only six. It 
had been ascertained by angles as well as by cross-bearings upon 
the chart; his Lordship replied, the chart was not to be de¬ 
pended upon. I was speaking of a French chart. I had 
marked the situation of the fleet upon the French chart. 

Admiral Sutton —Did it happen to be what is called the 
Neptune Francoise? 

A. That was what 1 was speaking of. I had that in my cabin, 
and concluded from what followed that that was what he allud¬ 
ed to. His Lordship said, that the French were in the habit of 
giving a smaller space upon their charts than was true*; that he 
had an instance of it upon some former occasion; when standing 
in to the Pertius Breton, he expected to have found, by the 
chart, that the space was small, and he found it near five or six 
miles broad. 

Q. What number of furnaces for heating shot did Lord Coch¬ 
rane report -to me that he had observed in the fort of the Isle 
D’Aix, in reconnoitring previous to the 11th of April ? 

A. I did not hear him report to you, but he reported to me 
on his return from reconnoitring, I think on the 5th of April, 
that he had seen eighteen hundred men, and five furnaces burn¬ 
ing at that time. 

Q* Was not the firing of the explosion-vessel committed to 
the direction of Lord Cochrane ? 

A. Entirely. 

.Lord Gambier —Under the peculiar circumstances in which 
Sir Harry Neale stands, as my confidential friend and first cap¬ 
tain of the Caledonia, 1 do not think it proper to ask him any 
further questions. 

President— You have stated the observations Lord Coch¬ 
rane reported to you, as to the number of men and the furnaces; 
did he state to you how many guns he saw mounted on the bat- 
terics^cf the Isle D’Aix ? 

A. No, he did not; he reported the west end of the battery 
to be in a state of rubbish ; it was visible from the fleet that it 
was newly forming; the west end pointed towards the Boyart, 


187 

President —Your Lordship intimated an intention of call¬ 
ing other witnesses—the Court is now ready to hear any other 
you have to produce. 

Lord Gambier— It is material for me here to observe that 
Lord Cochrane had on the 13th made the signal to me—Can 
destroy enemy; on which account I did not then recal the 
Imperieuse; but as nothing had been effected by his Lordship, 
when, on the following day, he made the signal to me, when 
recalled, “ If permitted to remain can destroy enemy,” I 
thought it unnecessary to pay more attention to this signal than 
to direct his Lordship by signal to communicate with L’Aigle, 
which ship Lord Cochrane knew I had ordered to relieve him. 
I concluded, therefore, Lord Cochrane would communicate to 
Captain Wolfe any measures he had in contemplation for de¬ 
stroying the enemy, and wished to have his Lordship’s report 
of the proceedings, that I might transmit my report to the Ad¬ 
miralty without delay. I will now, with the permission of the 
Court, call Captain Hardyman. 


Captain LUCIUS HARDYMAN, of His Majesty’s Ship the 

Unicorn, sworn. 

Examined by Lord Gambier . 

Q. At what time in the afternoon of the 12th of April were 
you directed to proceed with the Unicorn to the attack of the 
enemy ? 

A. As near as I can recollect, it was at about half past two 
o’clock. 

Q. Were the three ships of the enemy, that were on shore 
upon the Palles Shoal that day, and which afterwards got off, at 
any time in a position to be attacked; 1 mean from the depth of 
water round them, and other circumstances ? 

A. There were two ships afloat prior to the frigates going in, 
and the enemy’s three-decker ashore and upright, with her 
broadside to the entrance to the anchorage-ground of the Isle 
D’Aix ; the three enemy’s ships on shore appeared to me not to 
be in a position to admit of an attack on them by any of the 
British ships. 

Q. Was every exertion used according to your judgment 
and observation, by every ship and vessel sent in to the attack of 

the enemy ? ‘ , 

A. To the best of my judgment every exertion was used by 

the British ships and vessels. 

Q. Under all the circumstances of the wind and tide, did 
it appear to you, that on the morning of the 12th of April, 
when the enemy’s ships were on shore, and the signal had been 
made, that half the fleet could destroy them, there was, on my 

2 B 2 



IBS 

• 

part, any neglect or unnecessary delay in taking effectual mea¬ 
sures to destroy them ? 

A. I do not know of any neglect or unnecessary delay. 

President —From the first attack on the enemy’s ships, to 
the time of your leaving Basque Roads, was there, to the best oi 
your judgment, every thing done that could be done, to effect 
their destruction ? 

A. I think there was. To the best of my recollection I leit 
Basque Roads the 2Gth or 27th of April. 

Admiral Young —-Was the Unicorn anchored with the 
rest of the squadron on the 12th of April, on the edge ol the 
Palles Shoal ? 

A. Yes, she was. 

Q. Were the brig, sloops, and the gun-bftgs advanced nearer 
to the enemy than the attacking squadron was ? 

A. To the best of my knowledge none of the brigs, except¬ 
ing the Beagle, was in the advance of the British ships during 
the attack on the 12th. The Beagle was the only brig, and 
was undei weigh during: the time of the attack between the 
British frigates and the enemy. The Beagle continued under 
weigh between the enemy and the attacking frigates. 

Q. Did the Beagle appear to you to be as far advanced to¬ 
wards the enemy as the depth of water would admit of her 
being ? 

A. Not having sounded any distance between the Unicorn 
and the enemy, 1 cannot say whether the depth o 1 water would 

• have admitted the Beagle to have closed more with the enemy. 

% 

Q. How much nearer to the enemy than the frigates do you 
suppose she was? 

A. To the best of my judgment, three or four ships lengths. 

Q. Did she anchor? 

A. I did not observe her anchor at all on the afternoon of 
the 12th. 

Q. Did she engage the enemy under weigh ? 

A. Yes, she did, and I believe continued so engaging until 
the general firing of the British squadron ceased. 

President —Was the Beagle placed between the British 
ships and the ships of the enemy aground, being under sail, 
subject, at any time, in your apprehension, to receive any da¬ 
mage by the shot of the English ships? 

A. Yes, I think she was; but I do not know that she receiv¬ 
ed any damage from them. 

A dmi ra Young —Were you in Basque Roads at the time 
the Commander in Chief arrived there ? 


189 

A. Yes. I was *here from the day the Commander in Chief 
arrived, till the 26th or 27th of April. 

Q. From the time of the Commander in Chief arriving in 
Basque Roads till the time of your leaving it, can you state any 
instance of neglect, misconduct, or inattention, to the public 
service in his proceedings ? 

A. I cannot. The Unicorn was the advanced frigate from 
the day of anchoring in Basque Roads until the afternoon of the 
12th of April. 

Abmiral Sutton —Were you at anchor on the lSthand 
14th? 

A. In Basque Roads, on the morning of the 13th, I came 
out, and I continued at the anchorage in Basque Roads. We 
all came out, and I reported myself to Lord Gambier, and con¬ 
tinued there till the 26‘th or 27th of April. 

Q. Did you observe whether the brigs and small vessels, 
that had been directed in-shore for the purpose of annoying the 
enemy’s ships that were aground, continued their exertions in 
the execution of these orders until the enemy’s ships had remov¬ 
ed entirely out of their reach ? 

A. For three or four successive days there was frequent firing 
upon the enemy’s ships, from the brigs and the smaller vessels 
that were there. It might have been, more days there was fre¬ 
quently firing. 

Lord Gambier— Did it not at times, during that period, 
blow so strong that the smaller vessels often times could not 
carry on any operations against the enemy ? 

A. In my opinion it did. 


Captain GEORGE FRANCIS SEYMOUR, of His Majesty’s 

Ship the Pallas, sworn. 

Examined by Lord Gambier. 

Q. What time in the afternoon of the 12th of April did you 
proceed in the Pallas to the attack of the enemy’s ships ? 

A. About a quarter after two. 1 am not quite positive as to 
the time, but thereabouts. 

Q. Do you remember seeing the position of the enemy’s fleet 
on that morning ; and whether there were any of them afloat at 
their anchorage? 

A. Two ships were afloat—those of the Rear Admiral and 
Commodore. 

Q. Do you recollect at what time (hose ships cut or slipped 
their cables, and ran up the Charente ? 



190 

\ 

A. Between twelve and one o’clock, under topsails, jib, and 
foresail. I am confident about one. I have some doubt about 
the other, having her main-top-mast up. 

Q. Do you recollect at what time the three enemy’s ships that 
were aground on the Palles Shoal, and which afterwards got off, 
removed from that situation ? 

A. I do not, but I think it was the last quarter of flood. 

Q. Was it after or before the two line-of-battle ships ran 
up ? 

A. I am not positive—I was occupied about my ship. 


Lord Gambier — I have no further questions to propose to 
Captain Seymour. 

Captain Seymour —Am I bound by the oath to relate 
every circumstance which comes within my knowledge, relating 
to the proceedings of the fleet ? 

President —If the questions that are asked you should not 
seem to embrace all the circumstances which you know respect¬ 
ing the matter to which it refers, you are bound still to relate 
them. 


Captain Seymour —I know no other circumstance on this 
subject. 

Admiral Young —When the ships of the line, and some 
of the frigates, left Aix Roads, did the Pallas go off with 
them ? 

A. She did not. 


Q. On the morning of the 13 th of April were there any of 
the enemy’s ships which remained within reach of shot from 
the Pallas ? 

A. No, not by a very considerable distance. 

Q. Was the Pallas then in a situation in which it was when 
she engaged the enemy on the l£th ? 

A. She was not. I had moved her the preceding evening 
into deeper water. 

Q. Were any of them within gun-shot of the situation from 
which she removed ? 

A . No. 


Q. V\ ere any of them in a situation which would have ad¬ 
mitted of their being destroyed by frigates and the smaller vessels 
that were then with the squadron ? 

A. Fhe smaller vessels attacked the Ocean on the 13 th, in 
the morning, i do not think the frigates could have accom¬ 
panied them to the attack. 


191 

Q. Was the Ocean the only ship that was within reach of 
their attack ? 

A. The Ocean was the nearest ship. Circumstances after- 
wauls proved that the Regulus, which was on shore under Fou- 
ias, could be approached by the smaller vessels. 


Q. Were all the smaller vessels sent to attack the Ocean ? 

A. All those that remained in Aix Roads on the morning of 
the 13 th. 5 


Q. How long did they continue their attack on the 13th ? 
To the best of my recollection, till about four o’clock in 
the afternoon, when they worked up to the anchorage of the 
imperieuse and Pallas. 


Q. Do you know why they did not continue their attack 
longer ? 

A. They came back with the ebb-tide, which had ebbed con¬ 
siderably before they weighed. 


Q. Did you understand that they returned on account of the 
shoalness of the water ? 

A. From the number of times the small vessels went in to 
the attack of the ships on shore, in the river, I may be mistaken 
about the Etna bomb having grounded on the 13th; but 
I think her having done so occasioned the return of the vessels 
to the anchorage where the Imperieuse and Pallas were lying ; 
the day closing in might bean additional reason for their return¬ 
ing. 


Q. Was the Ocean, on the 14th, in the situation in which 
she was attacked on the 13th ? 

A. She was till four o’clock in the afternoon. 


Q. Was she attacked again on the 14th ? 

A . No, she was not. 'The tide did not permit the vessels to 
go in before four o’clock. 

Q. Did you, on the 14th, see the Imperieuse inform the 
Commander in Chief, by signal, that if allowed to remain he 
could destroy the enemy ? , 

A. I did. 

Q, Was any additional force sent into Aix Roads in conse¬ 
quence of that signal ) 

A. Several brigs came in after the 13th, but I do not recollect 
at what time, or whether after or before that signal. 

Q. Had any plan been arranged or concerted between the 
Captains of the Imperieuse and yourselt, for destroying the 
enemy’s ships ? 


192 

A. Noi e. I beard Lord Cochrane express his opinion, that 
bv throwing sh ds at the ships t spring-tides, towards high wa¬ 
ter, there was every prospect of p eventing tne enemy’s getting 
off, as it would prevent their carrying out hawsers to heave 
oft' by. 

Q. You have said that the ship under Fouras could be attack¬ 
ed. Were vessels sent to attack her? 

A. There were. 

Q, Were any shells thrown at the ships that were on shore ? 

A. A considerable number. 

Q. Were all the bomb-vessels present employed on that 
service ? 

A. The Etna was employed whenever the weather permit¬ 
ted ; and on the Thunder’s arrival on the 18th, she also went 
in. For two or three days the Etna could not continue the 
bombardment, her ten-inch shells being all expended, and her 
thirteen-inch mortar having split. 

Q. Did you perceive that the throwing of shells produced 
the effect that was hoped for from it ? 

A. On several days the wind affected the flight of the shells 
so much, that the proper expectation of their doing mischief 
was much disappointed. 

Q. From the situation of the enemy’s ships on the 13th and 
14th, or any subsequent days, was it, at the time, your opinion, 
that they might be destroyed by frigates and smaller vessels? 

A. I hoped that bombarding them at high water would have 
prevented their getting off. I did not think the going in of the 
frigates would have been attended with any good effect. 

President —What are your reasons for believing that the 
going in of the frigates would have been attended with no good 
effect? 

A. My reason for first supposing so, was the Etna ground¬ 
ing as she went in, and that from the shoalness of the water 
frigates could not approach sufficiently near, or remain long 
enough, to do any good. 

Q. Upon the attack on the Ocean on the 13 th, what num¬ 
ber of vessels went in upon that occasion ? 

A. I think the Beagle, with three gun-brigs, and the Etna 
bomb. 

Q. Were the bomb and the several vessels that went in up¬ 
on the several attacks you have described, obliged, on going in 
and returning, to pass under the fire qf the batteries in the Isle 
D’Aix ? 

A. 1 hey were : each vessel passing at a greater or smaller dis¬ 
tance, in proportion to her size j the deep water lying near Isle 
D’Aix. 


193 

Q. It happening, from your situation on these occasions, that 
you could not fail to have observed the conduct of all the ves¬ 
sels of every description employed against the enemy*—did it 
appear to you that the whole of the vessels so employed were 
conducted with every becoming zeal and judgment for the be¬ 
nefit of the public service? 

Captain Seymour —From what period am I to give my 
answer ? 

President-—F rom the time of your being sent in to attack 
the enemy, and your having remained there. 

Captain Seymour —Without going back to the 11th? 

President —No. I take it from your going in on the 12th, 
because then you became an immediate spectator. I wish for 
your opinion, whether all the vessels were conducted with the 
greatest zeal and propriety of conduct for the public service? 

A. The whole of the commanding officers appeared to me to 
be actuated by the same spirit * and I saw nothing like failure of 
duty in any vessel whatever. 

Admiral Young —Can you state any instance of neglect, 
misconduct, or inattention to the public service, in the proceed¬ 
ings of the Commander in Chief from the time of his anchoring 
in Basque Roads till the time of his leaving it ? 

A. 1 think myself a very incompetent judge of the Com¬ 
mander in Chief’s conduct. 1 know no instance in which any 
of those terms can be applied. From what 1 afterwards saw, I 
think|the ships might have floated in sooner ; that they might 
have come in in the last half of the flood-tide. 

Lord Gambier — Was that impression upon your mind at 
the time ? 

A. No, it was not, certainly—From the knowledge I sub¬ 
sequently gained from the proceedings of the ships, 1 think the 
line-of-battle ships would have floated in in the last half of the 

flood-tide. 

President —How much sooner would that have been than 
the time they actually did go in ? 

A . At eleven o’clock. 

Q. What time did the line-of-battle ships go in ? 

A . Within a short time after two o’clock. 

Q. Is the Court to understand that you have formed this 
opinion from information you have obtained since the 12th of 
April, or that it was your opinion on that day ? 

'A. It was formed from the depth of water we found in go¬ 
ing in, and from seing the Revenge go out at a correspondent 
time of tide on the following day. 


i 


Q. From the time of the first attack upon the ships of the 
enemy until your departure from Basque Hoads, which was on 
the 27th or 28th of April, was there, to the best of your judg¬ 
ment, every thing done that was practicable to be done for 
effecting the destruction of the enemy’s ships ? 

A. Every thing. 

Admiral Young —When you say the ships of the line 
would have floated in at eleven o’clock, do you mean to say 
that it would have been proper for the Commander in Chief to 
have sent them in at that time? 

A. Two of the ships of the line of the enemy were anchored 
in a situation to annoy ships going in. At the time I possessed 
no information of the strength of the Isle D’Aix, or the depth 
of the water, to allow me to form a judgment. 

Q. If I understood the intention of that observation, it was 
advanced as an instance of either neglect, misconduct, or inat¬ 
tention in the Commander in Chief; how then is it that you now 
say you were not qualified to form an opinion ? 

A . I particularly said that 1 did not consider it either neglect, 
misconduct, or inattention. I mention it as a point on which a 
difference of opinion might be entertained; the question was so 
general that I could not reconcile it to my mind not to mention 
it, it being a point that might be disputed. 

Admiral Young —I think you must understand that it is 
your opinion the Court is asking, not the opinion of any other 
person with which the Court has nothing to do ? 

A. I myself doubt whether line-of-battle ships would have 
been successful or unsuccessful in doing good by eoinsr in. 

President —Do you mean, by your answer, to say that 
there was water sufficient for the line-of-battle ships to have gone 
in at eleven o’clock; but of the expediency of such a measure 
you do not form any judgment? 

A. 1 meant to say it is a point upon which the discretion of 
the Commander in Chief might be fairly used ; it is impossible 
for me to foretel the event of such an attack, it depending so 
much upon fortuitous circumstances. 

Q. Being upon the spot, and a spectator of the operations 
carrying on, and considering all the circumstances of the case, 
did you, at the time, think that the two line-of-battle ships 
should have been sent in at eleven o’clock ? 

A. There was an idea of fitting the Pallas as a fire-ship; my 
attention was entirely occupied with her. I have already stated 
that I formed my opinion that line-of-battle ships could go in 
Jiom two circumstances which happened subsequently. 

Presiden i —I wish Captain Seymour would be so good as 


195 

i-o saj, in a short answer, what was his impression at the mo¬ 
ment, being upon the spot, and seeing the proceedings and ope¬ 
rations of the fleet; and having stated before that the line-of- 
battle ships might have found water enough to go in at eleven 
q. clock, 1 wish to propose this question: Did you, at the time 
when you made these observations, think that the line-of-battfe 
ships should have gone in ? 

u ^ m I cannot give an opinion upon that. I was not in pos¬ 
session of the Commander in Chief's information, and had 
formed no judgment, not having information that would allow 
me to form any judgment as to the propriety of it. 

Admiral VouNtp—This general question is not meant to 
subject the general conduct of a Commander in Chief to the 
opinions of all tke^dfficers serving under his command, because 
it cannot be supposed that all officers serving under-his com¬ 
mand can be competent to form opinions of his general conduct, 
but it is quite within the capacity of any officer serving under his 
command, to state a particular instance of misconduct; and if 
you think this, of the two ships not going in so early as you 
think they might have floated, is an instance of neglect or delay 
in the Commander in Chief, it is your duty so to state it, that 
we may enquire into it, and hear any other evidence upon it ? 

A. I have already stated that I cannot say it was misconduct. 

I state the fact, and leave the Court to judge. 

Admiral Young —You state an opinion that the fleet 
would have floated in at eleven o’clock? 

A. Yes, that there was water enough. 

Q. Is that all you mean to say—that there would have been 
water enough for them to have floated in ? 

A. Yes; that is all I have said. 

Q. When you say that the ships of the line would have 
floated in at eleven o’clock, do you mean to speak to the depth 
of water alone, without taking into consideration any other 
circumstances which would have prevented or impeded their 
getting in ? 

D O 

A. I confine myself to the meaning of the words —that 
there would have been water enough for the line-of-battle 
ships to have floated in — that is all 1 mean to say. The op¬ 
position they would have met with the Court have as much 
before them as I have. There were two sail of the line lying 
in the passage ; and I was not acquainted with the state of the 
batteries on the Isle D’Aix. 

Admiral Sutton —You have stated that the Imperieuse 
made a signal oil the 14th—“ If allowed to remain, can destroy 
the enemy/’—Did it appear to you that the signal was pointed 

%C 2 


196 

to any particular operation which you observed at that moment 
practicable to be made upon the enemy’s ships. 

A. No ; more to their general annoyance. 

President —From what has occurred, does your Lordship 
wish to put any questions to Captain Seymour? 

Lord Gambier —No ; I do not think it at all necessary ; I 
do not consider it of the least consequence. 


Captain FRANCIS NEWCOMB, of His Majesty’s Sloop 

the Beagle, sworn. 

Examined by Lord Gambier. 

Q. Were you sent in, in the Beagle, to the attack of the 
enemy’s ships on the 12-th of April in Aix Roads? And state 
what passed. 

A. Being under weigh, on the 12th of April, and it being 
reported to me that a signal was made by the Commander in 
Chief—the frigates to go to the ship making signals of distress 
in such a quarter, I felt it my duty to proceed on after the 
Imperieuse to Aix Roads; the Aigle and other frigates, be¬ 
sides the Valiant and Revenge, following; conceiving it the 
intent of the Commander in Chief that I should so proceed, 
on having previously discovered the Etna bomb and other 
gun-brigs making sail for the anchorage, preceding the Im¬ 
perieuse, and which I judged was from the directions they 
received from the Commander in Chief. I judged it prudent 
to reserve in preparation my bower anchor and cable, for any 
of the ships that might require it, concluding that there was g. 
great probability that it might be required by either the line- 
of-battle ships or frigates. I caused my own stream cable 
and anchor to be ready with a spring to it, to make use of as 
a bower to bring up the sloop I command, the wind being 
then moderate enough to ride her by, and to facilitate rnv 
movements to wherever I should judge 1 should be required. 
I brought up in Aix Roads, with my stream anchor, on the 
larboard quarter of the Imperieuse, and without her, merely 
that I should not interrupt the anchorage of the line-oL 
battle ships and frigates that were close to me. The bomb 
and the gun-brigs were lying a little further to the westward 
of me. There were some shot fired in their direction, 
and towards me, from the Imperieuse. No signal whatever 
having been previously made for the direction of any of the 
vessels, 1 sent Lieutenant Price with a message,to Lord Coch¬ 
rane, to know if those shot fired were at the Isle of Oleron,or 
by mistake, or intentionally: if the latter, I felt very indig¬ 
nant atit. I brought up there, because 1 should not be in the way 



t 


197 

of the frigates and line-of-battle ships; and I should have 
thought it a most injudicious step,bad I placed my ship in such 
a situation so as to have prevented the services of a larger force: 
nor neither was there room between the Imperieuse and the 
Valles Shoal for any more than one, which situation the Inde¬ 
fatigable took up. Moreover, I explained that I had neither 
chart nor any person on board that had ever been there before; 
the tide then falling. And had I touched upon the Palles, the 
Beagle must inevitably have been lost.—When I sent the offi¬ 
cer away with this message, I was prepared to weigh my an- 
ciior, in the event of any situation being pointed out. A sig-r 
nal from the Imperieuse was made to close. The anchor was 
tipon my bowers. In about two or three minutes I shot the 
vessel in between the Indefatigable and the Jean Bart, who 
was previously cast away on the Palles Shoal, and brought up 
with my stream a second time, and commenced firing upon the 
enemy, the Ville de Varsoyie more particularly. This conti¬ 
nued for about a quarter of an hour, or twenty minutes, as 
near as I can recollect. Finding my rudder almost coming in 
contact with the wreck of the Jean Bart, and being too neat: 
the Indefatigable, so much so, that my mast and my rigging 
were in danger from her fire, 1 got a second time under weigh, 
and kept so until six o’clock that night with my top-sails, jib, 
and spanker, to annoy the enemy in such situations as I 
thought I could act best. My Second Lieutenant was away 
from the time I sent the message, to sound about the Palles 
and the entrance of the Charente ; and, observing that the 
Calcutta was abandoned, went ou board of her, at the same 
time that another boat, which I understood to be the Jmpe- 
rieuse’s boat, went on board to take possession of her. Seeing 
an opportunity to annoy the Aquilon, I made sail for her stem 
within pistol-shot, and commenced firing upon her, she re¬ 
turning it, carrying away many of my ropes and all my lar¬ 
board main-top-mast rigging: having fired upon her for about 
ten minutes from my starboard broadside, she struck her 
colours. I lowered a boat down, to send an officer on board 
to take possession of her, first tacking or wearing my head oft. 
She again opened her fire, and 1 was obliged to return it also. 
I kept my main-top-sail spilling, to preserve my situation close 
to her. Perceiving all her boats manned, and the ship’s com-* 
pany abandon her, I concluded that her firing, after she had 
struck, was from accident, and not by design. I then stood 
out, and back again, as occasion might require, being then in 
seventeen or eighteen feet water, and the tide fast tailing : and 
as no more annoyance could be given to any more of the 
enemy’s ships, namely, those upon the Palles Shoal, and which 
I afterwards learnt to be the Calcutta, Tonnere, Ville de Var- 
sovie, and Aquilon, 1 then recollect (seeing nothing more tq 
pe donej in my opinion) to have recommended to some of the 


\ 


193 

frigates to trip their anchors and shoot a little further out, to 
prevent their grounding at low water, telling them that I 
found more water a little further to the W. S.W. or the S.W. 
About six, or half-past, (I will not be certain which) I brought 
up my ship with the bower in about five fathoms ; and no¬ 
thing being required of the Beagle, I caused the ship’s com¬ 
pany to get their dinner. 1 went into the boats afterwards, 
and staid till twelve o’clock that night engaged in the service. 

President —Were you not subject to annoyance from the 
shot of the English ships while you lay so close to the Aquilon, 
as you have before described ? 

A. My situation was such, that I could stand in and annoy 
the Aquilon without the English ships giving her such annoy¬ 
ance. The Ville de Varsovie had previously yielded, and was 
directly in a line, or rather in the wake of the Aquilon, so as 
to prevent most of our ships from acting against the Aquilon 
without firing into the Ville de Varsovie. 

Admiral Young —Was the Beagle on the Palles Shoal at 
high water? 

A. I was not upon it at high water, but I dare say about 
an hour and an half after it. 

Q. At the time you were there, were any of the ships that 
afterwards escaped up the Charente within reach of being de¬ 
stroyed by your shot ? 

A. No. 

Q. Could you, as far as your information of the depth of 
water enabled you to judge, have got near enough to those 
ships to have destroyed them? 

A. No. 

Q. Were the gun-brigs as far advanced towards the-enemy’s 
ships on the 12th as the Beagle ? 

A. No. 

Q. Do you know of any reason which prevented them ? 

A. No, I do not, 

Q. What water does the Beagle draw ? 

A. Nearly about fifteen feet abaft, about twelve feet and a 
half forward, as nearly as I can recollect; sometimes more, 
sometimes less. 

Q. Do you know what water the gun-brigs draw ? 

A. To the best of my recollection, from the reports I have 
been accustomed to receive from them, about tea or eleven feet, 

Q. Could they have advanced towards the enemy’s ships 
nearer than you were, without being exposed to the fire of th$ 
British squadron ? 


199 

A. Had they so done they would have retarded the service, 
and subjected themselves to the fire of our own ships. 

Q. By what means would they have retarded the service ? 

A. Being subject to receive the fire of our ships instead of 
the enemy receiving it. 

Q. How long did the Beagle remain in Aix Roads? 

A. From the 12th of April to the day I was recalled by the 
Commander in Chief, which was the 17th. 

Q. Was there any time in which frigates and smaller vessels 
might have destroyed the enemy’s ships, which were not de¬ 
stroyed on the 12th ? 

A. On the morning of the 18th Lord Cochrane made ar¬ 
rangements to that effect, by sending the Beagle on the lar¬ 
board quarter of the Ocean ; the Etna bomb, with the gun- 
brigs, three or four in number, near the wrecks of the enemy’s 
ships the Aquilon and Ville de Varsovie. About ten o’clock, 

J proceeded in towards the enemy, the Vice-Admiral’s ship, 
another seventy-four, and a French frigate, situated at the 
mouth of the Charente. I brought up, when on the Ocean’s 
quarter, in sixteen feet water, and engaged her from the hour 
of eleven until four o’clock, she returning the fire from her 
stern and quarter, as well as the other line-of-battle ship, as 
also the frigate and shells occasionally from the Isle D’Aix, 
and many of the splinters fell upon deck. During these five 
hours my standing and running rigging were very much in¬ 
jured; my lower yard was ^hot through, and my main-top¬ 
mast, and several shot in m^'hull. Lord Cochrane, before l 
came into the anchorage, observed, he meant to bring in his 
frigate : this, however, 1 recommended him not to do, judg¬ 
ing there was not water enough, and the wind blowing strong 
directly to the Charente, with the tide running two and a hall 
knots or thereabouts. Why I gave this advice was, because L 
was then furnished with what I considered to be a tolerably 
good chart by Lord Cochrane, a French chart. During the 
time I was in action, finding the enemy bring so many guns 
to bear on all the vessels, I caused the signal to be made to the 
Imperieuse, the telegraph signal I think—my main-topmast 
gone. 

Admiral Young —Is it necessary to go into this detail ? 

A. It all leads to it : this will lead, 1 fancy, to the original 
question put, which is, I understand, whether any further ships 
could be destroyed. The next signal was—my main-yard 
gone : another signal—that the enemy’s ships were superior to 
those in action, and inferior to the fleet. Judging from lying 
in Basque Roads, when I had three fathoms and a half of 
water, I made the telegraph signal to the Imperieuse that fii- 
gatds might then act with advantage. I was induced to make 


200 

this signal, because Lord Cochrane had hilnself suggestod the 
idea of his coming in ; but at the same time fully convinced that 
had they so come in, they could not have remained in that 
situation more than two hours, without danger to themselves; 
this, however, might have been thought too hazardous to at¬ 
tempt, from the depth of water. I sent a message by the 
Second Lieutenant to Lord Cochrane, to signify that l should 
want powder, as I had then only three barrels left besides the 
cartridges that were filled, and also to observe that 1 should 
take the ground at low water, were I not to come out at about 
four o’clock. The answer was, I should come out at my own 
discretion. Abut half-past three, or near four, the enemy’s 
three-decker, as well as the two-decker, prepared to push far¬ 
ther up the Charente, it then being high water ; and 1 weighed 
at about four o’clock, the tide then falling, and turned up to 
my former anchorage, under a heavy fire from the batteries on 
the Isle of Aix. At about six o’clock, as near as I can recol¬ 
lect, 1 brought up with my bower at the anchorage I had 
left. 

Q. By the damage you observed the enemy’s ships to have 
sustained from the attack you have now detailed, was it your 
opinion that a repetition of such attack would have destroyed 
them, or would have prevented their getting up the Cha¬ 
rente r 

A. By no means; because vessels of the description that 
made the attack that I have now detailed could not, with any 
propriety, advance farther; but hpd there been a few bomb- 
vessels, with some gun-boats, it A,very probable that the ene¬ 
my might have been more annoyetl on the day after; but this 
class of vessels was not with us. 

Q. What do you mean by not with you ? 

A. With the squadron t they were not with the British 
fleet. 

Q. Were you in Basque Roads the whole of the time the 
Commander in Chief was there ? 

A. No ; I arrived on the 11th. 

Q. Did you remain till he left it ? 

A. No; 1 left it on the 18th. 

Q. Can you state any instance of neglect, misconduct, or 
inatte tion in the proceedings of the Commander in Chief 
during that period ? 

A. None; save and except had the Commander in Chief 
thought proi.er, from his situation, to have sent vessels in 
earlier than they were sent, although there mi^ht be a o-reat 
risk in so doing, there is a possibility of annoying the enemy 
mote than tney were annoyed ; but our ships must be sub- 


201 

jected nevertheless not only to the fire of the enemy’s ships 
that remained at anchor, but also to the fire from the batteries 
in Isle D’Aix. 1 cannot presume to place my judgment in 
competition with that of the Commander in Chief, how far 

it was ptoper to have sent ships in earlier than they were 
sent in. 3 

President —Under the circumstances of the annoyance 
which the ships earlier sent in would have been subject to 
from the two French ships remaining at anchor, and from the 
batteries upon IsLe D’Aix, and considering the state of the 
wind at the time, would you, had you been the Commander 
in-Chief, have sent the ships earlier in to attack those of the 
enemy on shore than they were sent in ? 

A. d he risk, I think, as the wind was, and the tide, rather 
too gteat, and the want of a perfect knowledge of the an¬ 
chorage further to the southward between the Palles and 
Oleron. 

Q. If the British ships had been sent earlier in, would they 
have been subject to annoyance from the French ship the 
Ocean, as well as the two b re rich ships still remaining at an¬ 
chor, and the batteries on the Isle D’Aix ? 

A. I think they would. 

Q. Suppose the English ships had been sent in at eleven 
o’clock in the forenoon of the 12th, or at noon on that day, 
and had received material damage from those annoyances you 
have described, how long must they have remained under the 
fire of the French ships and batteries, before they could have 
come ac^ain out of the Road of Aix ? 

A. b or a considerable time; for it was my opinion, from 
the short knowledge 1 had of the place, that large ships, as the 
wind then was, must have backed and filled out with a strong 
ebb ; and even then they would be still subject to the fire from 
the Isle D’Aix, as well as the shells from the Island of Oleron ; 
and if any unfortunate chance shot had crippled her masts and 
yards, there was every probability of her being destroyed alto¬ 
gether. I sucraested the idea to the Captain of one of the 
line-of-battle ships, I think Captain Bligh, that if this happen¬ 
ed, they must back and fall off. 

Q. From the first attack on the ships of the enemy, to the 
time of your leaving Basque Road, was there, in your judg¬ 
ment. every thing done that was practicable to be done to de¬ 
stroy the enemy’s ships ? 

A. 1 think there was, considering all the circumstances \ 

have stated. 



/ 


202 


Lieut. HOCKINGS, of His Majesty’s Ship the Caledonia, 

called in again. 

Examined by Lord Gambler . 

Q. At what time did the enemy’s two ships of the line, 
which remained at anchor on the 12th of April, slip or cut 
and run towards the Charente ? 

A. The Cassard and Fourdroyant were the two ships which 
slipped : the Cassard at ten minutes past one, and the hour- 
droyant at about twenty minutes past one. 

Q. Are you positive as to those ? 

A. I am positive as to those ships. I recollect the time 
perfectly well, because I had my watch in my hand at the 
time. 

Q. When did the three grounded ships warp off'the Palles 
Shoal ? 

A. About the same time the three-decker hauled off”, about 
two o’clock ; the others between one and two. 


Captain ALEXANDER ROBERT KERR, of His Majesty’s 
Ship the Revenge, called again. 

Examined bn Lord Gambler. 

Q. Did you, on the evening of the 12th of April, when the 
linc-of-battle ships were in a state of considerable danger, re¬ 
ceive from Lord Cochrane himself any information of a secure 
anchorage to the southward or westward of where the Revenge 
was for line-of-battlc ships; or did you receive such com¬ 
munication from his Lordship through any other of the Cap¬ 
tains of the line-of-battle ships or other persons? 

A. The only communication I had with Lord Cochrane 
was through the Master of the Revenge, who was sent to sound 
immediately on that ship’s anchoring ; in passing the Jmpe- 
rieuse he asked Lord Cochrane.., , 

Judge Advocate —You were not there ? 

A. No ; I was not. 

Judge Advocate— Then the evidence cannot be taken 
from Captain Kerr. If it is necessary to produce it the Master 
of the Revenge must be called. 

O > 

Lord Gambier —It was not in your hearing ; 

A. No ; he reported it officially'to me on his return. He 
was sent to sound on the ship’s anchoring. 

Admiral Stanhope— We can receive official reports. 



$<5S 

Judge Anvbc ate —1 really think official reports are not 
evidence. 

» Admiral Stanhope —When a Captain is below, official 
report is the only way in which any thing can come to his 
knowledge. 

D 

Judge Advocate -—Being of opinion that it is not evidence, 
I felt it necessary to object to its being taken. 

Lord Gameier —Perhaps Captain Kerr can answer with¬ 
out referring to this ? 

A. I felt the situation of the ship to be dangerous, and I sent 
him to sound round. On his return, he told me that Lord 
-Cochrane had informed him he did not know, but that he be¬ 
lieved there was water to windward. 

Q. To windward was to the northward ? 

A. Yes; under the batteries. 

President —From every opportunity you bad of noticing 
the bomb, the brig, sloops of war, and gun-brigs upon all the 
services on which they were employed against the enemy, did 
you see any instance of misconduct of any kind whatever in 
anv of those vessels ? 

j 

A. None whatever. The Beagle I had an opportunity par¬ 
ticularly of observing ; she received the fire of the Aquilon. 

Admiral Duckwottii —From the state in which you 
left the enemy’s ships on the morning of the 13th, when you 
came out of the Road of Aix, and your observation between 
that and the afternoon of the 14th, do you consider that by 
any other exertion than was used by the Commander in Chief 
more ships of the enemy could have been destroyed than were 
destroyed ? 

A. No, certainly not. 


Rear-Admiral the Honourable ROBERT STOPFORD 

called in again. 

j Examined by Lord Gambler, 

Q. What information did you receive, before you left 
Basque Roads, of the state of the enemy’s ships which escaped 
up the Charente after the attack on the 12th of April, and 
state it ? 

A. The information is contained in this paper, which is a 
letter 1 transmitted to the Commander in Chief at the time of 
receiving the intelligence. With the permission of the Court 
I will read that part which relates to this:—The Tounellc, 
i Regulus, and Patriot, each of 7 4 guns, so damaged as to be 
unfit for sea, reported to be cut down for mortar vessels. The 

2D 2 



20i 

Ocean, 120 guns, hove all her guns overboard, except tS or 
30 ; provisions and stores overboard ; anchors and cables cut 
away. The Fourdroyant, 80 guns, only 26 guns saved ; pro¬ 
visions and stores hove over board ; anchors and cables cut 
away. The Cassard, of 80 guns, damaged, but to be repaired, 
and is preparing for dock. The Jemappe, of 74 guns, received 
no damage, having hit the passage the first night and gone up 
to Rochefort. 

President —Is it material to insert how this information 
was obtained : I know no names ought to be mentioned ? 

A. The information was received by a seaman belonging 
to the French ship Fourdroyant, who called himself an Ame¬ 
rican, who deserted to the squadron in Basque Roads the 22d 
of May. 


Lord Gambier — Mr. President, Arrived at the 
termination of my defence, it remains for me to express 
my acknowledgements to this Honourable Court lor the 
patient attention with which it has honoured me.— 
The space of time comprehended in the charge, and 
more particularly the evidence of the principal (I might 
say the only) witness on the part of the prosecution, 
have led me into details more diffuse and extensive than 
I could have apprehended. 

When I first entered this Court, it was with a mind 
perfectly at rest as to the issue of my Trial; confident 
of having exerted myself to the utmost for the honour 
and advantage of my King and Country: the result of 
these Proceedings has confirmed me in this state of 
mind: I now retire, committing to your protection 
my professional reputation and my honour, in the full 
persuasion that I shall receive, at your hands, ample 
retribution for the aspersions on my character, which 
have led to this inquiry. 


Judge Advocate —This of course will be entered upon 
the minutes. 

President — I do not know that, in this stage, the insertion 
of this paper will be quite proper ; because the Court have an 
idea, for their own satisfaction, to call back one or two wit¬ 
nesses who have been called, and also some who have not 
been called. 

Judge Advocate —I should think, as Lord Gambier has 
finished his defence, it will come very properly now. 




205 

Admiral Young —Perhaps it will not come properly now, 
for this reason ; that Lord Gambier, having desired that the 
whole of his conduct, from the time of his arrival in Basque 
Loads till he left it, should be inquired into, it appears to be 
the opinion of the Court that every Captain should be called; 
that any Captain, who can state an instance of neglect or mis¬ 
conduct, should have an opportunity to do so : it may possibly 
happen that some Captain may state some instance of the 
kind, in that case Lord Gambier will still continue on his 
defence. 

Lord Gambier—I am very desirous that every inquiry 
should be made in the fullest manner. 

Admiral Young— We have no doubt of its being your 
wish : but it is our absolute duty*. 


Captain GEORGE WOLFE, of His Majesty’s Ship L’Aigle, 

called in again. 

President —When you joined the Imperieuse on the 14th 
of April, for the purpose of relieving that ship and conducting 
the further operations of the vessels against the enemy, wha*? 
communication had you with the Captain of the Imperieuse? 

A. Shortly after we anchored, Lord Cochrane came on 
board, and, after saying that I had come to relieve him,- 

President —The Court is not desirous of hearing any con¬ 
versation that passed which does not relate to the public 
service. 

A. I asked him what he would recommend with the vessels 
under my orders for the further destruction of the enemy’s 
ships ? He told me that the large mortar on board the Etna 
was burst, and the only thing we had to do was to bomb them 
as long as the shells of the other mortar lasted; that if an op¬ 
portunity offered of sending the fire-vessels it should be done 
by day-light, as many of the officers of the fire-vessels had 
made such a bad business of it on the night that the fire-vessels 
acted. I then went on board. Shortly afterwards, on liis 
leaving the ship, feeling the great responsibility I had in the 
command in that place, 1 asked him, as he was getting under 
weigh, whether there was any thing else he could suggest for 
the destruction of the enemy: i think, to the best of my re¬ 
collection, he said nothing more than to bomb them while 
the shells last; and I think they were ail expended that 
night. 

* The paper was the next day allowed to be continued cn the minutes, 
jp this place. v . 




206 

Q. Had 3 ?ou fire-ships with you ? 

A. There were four. 

Q. Was any attempt made to employ those fire-ships against 
the ships of the enemy? 

A. None; as I did not think it prudent so to do, from the 
impracticability of their getting at the French ships from want 
of water, as the tides would not serve only at day-light; next 
that they were so well protected by the batteries, numerous 
armed vessels, boats, and men, that were doing all that lay in 
their power to clear them and remove them when the tides 
made. 

Q. Lord Cochrane having remarked to you that some of 
the fire-ships, upon the first attack upon the enemy, had not 
been well managed, do you know of any particular fire-ship, 
or fire-ships, that were improperly conducted on the evening 
of the 11th of April ? 

A. I cannot particularize those that were badly managed ; 
the ship that passed between us and the island of Olcron, and 
got on shore there, was the only one I particularly noticed. 

Q. Do you know her name ? 

A. I do not; I hailed five that came very near us. Our 
own ship was very nearly burnt by two that were badly 
managed, and which were on fire as they passed us. 1 could 
only learn the names of the Officers of two of the fire-ships 
that behaved well : they did not fire their ships till after they 
had passed me. Five behaved very well : one of them was 
commanded by Captain Newcomb, who desired me to re¬ 
member he bad passed us. Lieutenant Cooksley of the Gibral¬ 
tar, was another who begged I would keep my eye on him, 
as he should not fire his vessel till he was amongst them, mean- 
ing among the enemy. I did, and saw him run on board of a 
two-decked ship of the enemy. From the fresh breeze of wind, 
I could not hear the names of the Officers commanding the 
others; but one, who had set fire to his \essel, came on board 
of me afterwards, and requested that I would bear testimony 
that he had acted properly : I do not recollect his name. 

Q. The two of which you entertained apprehensions that 
they would burn vou, were on fire at that time ? 

A. Yes; they were. 

Q. Did you see the explosion-vessel blow up ? 

A. Yes. 

Q. How was she situated in respect of L’Aigle ? 

A. We lay about two cables length from the Imperieuse; 
the explosion-vessel, I think, went from the Imperieuse to¬ 
wards the enemy’s anchorage : when she exploded I think 
she must be abreast of the isle D’Aix. 


. Q* ^ ere a ny of the fire-ships set fire to before the explo¬ 
sion vessel blew up ? 

A. None. 

Q. b rom every opportunity you had of observing the pro¬ 
ceedings of the bomb, the sloops of war, and the gun-brigs ; 
did it appear to you that any of these vessels were in any in¬ 
stance whatever improperly conducted ? 

A. 1 do not remember any such thing : I think if there had 
I should have seen it. 

Q. In short, you mean to say you saw no misconduct in 
any ol those vessels ? 

A. None. 


Captain PULTLNEA MALCOLM, of His Majesty’s Ship 

the Donegal, sworn. 

President — V\ ere you in Basque Roads with the Com¬ 
mander in Chief from the 11th of April to the 2qth ? 

A. I was in Basque Roads, but sailed on the 26th. 

Q. From the first attack on the ships of the enemy, on the 
evening of the 11th of April, to the time of your leaving 
Basque Roads, was every thing (according to the best of your 
judgment) done that could be done to effect their destruction ? 

Captain Malcolm —Shall I state the circumstances as 
they appeared to me ? 

Admiral Young —If any thing appears to you to have 
been improper, that of course you must state, otherwise a short 
answer to the question will be sufficient. 

Captain Malcolm — I should wish to state the circum¬ 
stances, whether favourable or unfavourable, as the oath re¬ 
quires. 

President —Certainly. Do so. 

• A. On the morning of the 12th of April, when a great part 
of' the enemy’s ships were seen on shore, the tide was ebbing. 
I think it was low water about eight o’clock. In my opinion 
it would have been highly imprudent to have ordered in any of 
the large ships to attack the enemy until, at least, hall flood, 
and because I had always understood that the anchorage in 
Aix Roads, in deep water for large ships, was very confined. 
Jt would also have been imprudent to have attacked them by 
frigates at that time, as two of the enemy’s ships of the line 
were anchored in a situation to have brought their broadsides 
upon them. When those ships quitted their stations, there 
then was no obstacle to present the small ships from going in, 



208 

by which I mean frigates, or even seventy-fours, if they had 
been light, but the tire from the Isle D’Aix, which they could 
nearly avoid by keeping near the Boyart. About the time 
that the two ships that were afloat quitted their anchorage the 
bomb went in, protected by the gun-brigs. I think that was 
about one, or a little after one. The ships’ companies had not 
dined. I should remark that our ships of the line w r ere very 
deep, each having above six months’ provisions, and having 
cleared the transports that were prepared for fire-ships oi their 
water and provisions. 

Adjourned to to~7norrou\ 


EIGHTH DAY, 

Thursday, August 3, 1S0Q. 


Captain ALEXANDER ROBERT KERR called in again. 

President —It is understood that you imagined the Court 
had stopped you when you had something material to add to 
your evidence ? 

A. I have only to say as to the Master’s communication 
with Lord Cochrane, that I sent him to sound. He applied 
to his Lordship to know whether he knew of a depth of w’ater 
to place the ship; and he said he did not know; he believed 
up to windward. 

Q. We understood that you had something to add respect¬ 
ing the damage to your ship ? 

A. That is known to the Commander in Chief. 

Q. In your way out from Aix Road to join the squadron in 
Basque Road, did your ship sustain any damage from the bat¬ 
teries of the enemy, whether from the batteries of Oleron. or 
those of the Isle D’Aix, or both of them ? 

A. She was struck from the batteries on Isle D’Aix on her 
passage out on the 13th, and the shells from Oleron were pass¬ 
ing over her at the same time. It was only one shot between 
wind and water under the main chains which struck her ; the 
loss was on the day before. 

Q. Were you coming off’ with a leading wind ? 

A. About a point free. We were going about six knots 
through the water. 


i 




209 

Q. What damage did you receive on the 12th ? 

A. I he bowsprit was severely wounded ; great part 6f the 
Tunning rigging and sails cut to pieces; five planks of the 
quaiter-deck cut through, and the quarter-deck beam entirely 
carried away, and a number of shots in different parts of the 
hull; three men killed and fifteen wounded, two of which 
afterwards died. 

Q* Oan y°u say whether your ship received those damages 
iioni the enemy s ships with which you were engaged, or 
from the enemy’s batteries on shore ? 

A. The damage in the hull and the killed and wounded 
were from the batteries in the Isle D’Aix entirely ; part of the 
running rigging from the Aquilon and Varsovie. 

Q. Will your Lordship ask any questions of Captain Kerr? 

Lord Oambier— I would just ask Captain Kerr whether, 
on his coming off from Isle D’Aix Roads, he kept in mid¬ 
channel, or as near as he could to the Boyart Shoal ? ' 

A. As close to the Boyart as possible. I bore up for the 
end of it. I came out on the larboard tack. 

Q. Did Lord Cochrane ever send to inform you that there 
was a safe anchorage to the southward ? 

A. No. 


Captain PUL FUNFi MALCOLM, of the Donegal, called 

in again. 

Pr ksident —Did you observe the enemy’s three decker on 
shore ? 

A. Yes. 

Q. Was she in a situation on the morning of the 12th to 
have done any mischief to any ships that had been sent in prior 
to the removal of the two French ships that remained at an¬ 
chor, as well as what might have occurred from the fire of 
those two ships? 

A. Till about noon she was heeling considerably, and ap¬ 
peared to me to be heaving her guns overboard: when she 
righted, she could have annoyed ships coming in. 

Q. At what time did this three-decker remove from the 
situation where you saw her on shore heeling ? 

A. 1 cannot speak exactly to the time, but I should suppose 
about two o’clock. I cannot say whether it was before or 
after two o’clock, as I took no note of time. I should sup¬ 
pose it was before, but I cannot say. I was absent from my 
ship at the time, on board the Pallas. 

Q. Did the other French ships, which were on shore upon 

2 E 



I 


210 

the Palles, and afterwards got off into the entrance of the Cha- 
rente, do so about the time that the three-decker did? 

A. Yes. 

Q. Did any of the enemy’s ships that got on shore upon 
the Palles, on the night of the 11th of April, get off and 
escape, except those that have already mentioned the three- 
decker and the others that got off afterwards ? 

A. All the ships got off. 

Q. You say the three-decker moved somewhere about two 
o’clock; there were others that were on shore on the night of 
the 11 th ? 

A. Yes. 

Q. Were those all that got off; did any get off after that, 
and get into the Charente ? 

A. No, none; they all got off, except those that were 
destroyed. 

Q. And that was about the time that the three-decker got 
off? 

A. Yes; within half an hour one of another. 

Q. You have stated that, if ships had been sent in to attack 
the enerrty before the two ships that w ere at anchor removed, 
they would have been subject to the fire of those two ships; 
and you have also said, that after the three-decker righted 
about noon, she also would have annoyed the ships so sent in : 
are you then of opinion that it would have been proper to have 
sent any ships in, while the two ships that were at anchor 
and the three-decker continued in those situations, considering 
also that the ships sent in would have been likewise subject to 
the fire from the batteries in the Isle D’Aix, and considering 
the state and direction of the wind at that time ? 

A. I think that ships on no account could, with propriety, 
have been sent in to attack the enemy till, at least, halt flood, 
which was about noon ; and that sending them in afterwards 
while the enemy remained upon the defensive would have been 
attended with very considerable risk, because, had they been 
disabled with the wind as it was, they could not have come out, 
but must have gone to the mouth of the Marmissour Passage 
for anchorage. 

Q. That is a passage between the Palles and the Boyart? 

A. Yes; which was ill understood, but where I had been 
led to believe there was anchorage for a few large ships. 

Q. You have stated it to be your opinion that half flood was 
about noon, and that the enemy’s ships got off at about two 
P.M. and you have, in the answer to the preceding question, 
stated that any ships sent in, previous to the removal of the 


2 11 

Frenca ships that got off, would be liable to considerable an¬ 
noyance from them as well as the Isle D’Aix; would you 
t en have sent ships in, before the two ships were removed 
and the three-decker got off? 

A. Had it appeared to me that there was no other chance 
ot destroying those ships but by such an attack, I certainly 
think it ought to have been made; but it was understood that 
they must all again ground in the mouth of the Charente, 
wheie it was the received opinion they could be attacked by 
bombs, gun-vessels, and fire-ships again, without risk ; bombs 
particularly : and had there been a reserve of fire-ships, I 
think some of them would have-been destroyed on the flood 
tide of the 12th. There'were fire-ships prepared with all ex¬ 
pedition, but they were too late. 

Q. Do you remember at what time of the day on the 12th 
ships were sent in to destroy them ? 

A. I cannot speak to the time. I was out of my ship ou 
duty, and took no notes. 

Q. Upon the whole, are you of opinion that, of all the 
French ships which got ashore upon the Palles on the night of 
the 11th of April, any more of them could have been destroyed 
than were destroyed, had the British ships been earlier sent in 
on the 12th of April to attack them ? 

A. Had they been attacked by the British ships, in my 
opinion they could not have been warped oft" from the shore, 
as it was necessary so to do, to lay out anchors to heave them 
oft". Those that were not aground had always the option of 
running further up the Charente : but it should be understood 
it must have been at the risk of our fleet, as I have already 
mentioned in a former answer. 

Q. It appears that the two ships of the enemy which re¬ 
mained afloat made sail towards the Charente about two 
o’clock in the afternoon,and that the three-decker and the other 
ships aground upon the Palles got off about the same time ? 

A. 1 think, upon recollection, it must have been nearer one 
o’clock than two when the first ship went away. The ships 
differed very much in their time that day. I should suppose 
it was considerably before two. -■? was on board the Pallas 
when the first ship went away. 

Q. Then I will alter the question.—It appears that the two 
ships of the enemy which remained afloat made sail towards 
the Charente considerably before two o’clock in the afternoon, 
and the three decker and the other ships aground upon the 
Palles got off about the same time, or soon afterwards; at 
what time, previous to that period, would you, had you com* 
manded the British fleet, have sent in ships to attack the 
enemy’s ships on shore ? 


2 E 2 


212 

A The moment that the two ships quitted their defensive 
position, the risk was then small ot sending: ships, and, of 
course, I would have sent them in instantly/ The only thing I 
'Mil in doubt about is the time. It was between the hours oi 
one and two o’clock. Nearly about that time the bombs and 
bri^s were sent in ; soon after that time. 

Q. Have you a recollection how soon after the bomb and 
brigs were sent in, the other ships were ready ? 

A. The Imperieuse and Beagle very soon followed. I 
should suppose in about a quarter of an hour or twenty minutes 
the other ships’ signals were made. 

Q. What other ships ? 

A. 1 believe all the frigates, and the Valiant and Revenge, 
perhaps in less than that. The reason those ships did not join 
the Imperieuse so soon as might be expected was, that the 
wind failed, and the tide was no longer in their favour. 

Q. As the bomb and brigs went in to attack the enemy soon 
after the time that you think was proper for the occasion, that 
the Imperieuse followed, and that in about twenty minutes 
after, or less, the Revenge, Valiant, and other vessels were sent 
in on the same service; what portion of time was there, in 
your judgment, which might be termed a delay in the Com¬ 
mander in Chief? 

A. I paid very little attention to it. Certainly, from the 
time that the two ships quitted the defensive position till ships 
were sent in by signal to attack the enemy, was the only time 
that can possibly be called delay. 

Q. What portion of time did there elapse, which could in 
any shape whatever be called delay in the Commander in 
Chief, in your judgment ? 

A. I should not suppose above half an hour; less than an 
hour certainly. But from the moment those ships quitted the 
defensive till they were sent in appeared to me lost time. It 
will be seen by the log; I cannot speak as to the time. 

Admiral Young —Do you mean by the Marmissour Pas¬ 
sage the anchorage that was taken up by the Imperieuse and 
the Pallas on the evening of the 12th of April ? 

A. Yes. 

Q. Did you know that anchorage so well as to risk the tak¬ 
ing a line-of-battle ship into it ? 

A. It would have been a risk to have taken a line-of-battle 
ship into it with the knowledge I possessed, or which any of 
us, to the best of my knowledge, possessed. That was the 
risk of the undertaking, particularly if the ships were disabled. 
I do not believe any of the Pilots ever had been there in large 
Snips. 


I 


213 

Q. Do you know at what time of the tide ships could be 
carried there ? 

A. That depends upon the draft of water; for our line-of- 
battle ships differed very much in their draft of water, 

Q. Take the lightest of the Iine-of-battle ships ? 

A. I considered it half flood. 

Q. It ships had been disabled in their masts and yards, after 
having advanced to the attack of the enemy in Aix Road, as the 
wind was on the 12th of April, with the flood tide running, 
would they have been able to have weathered the end of the 
Palles Shoal to have got into that anchorage ? 

A. At slack tide I should suppose they would, but not when 
the tide was running a strong flood. 

Q. If they had been disabled before slack tide, where could 
they then have gone ? 

A. They must have remained till slack tide, and continued 
the action. They must have risked that: that was the threat 
risk. a 

President —Was there, in your judgment, every practi¬ 
cable effort made to destroy the ships of the enemy that got 
into the entrance of the Charentc ? 

A. I was not in the Road of Aix, but I am certain that the 
Commander in Chief sent every vessel in that could tend to 
that purpose, and assist in their destruction. 

Admiral Stanhope— As you say you were not in Aix 
Road, how do you come by your information as to the depth 
of water there ? 

A. I have been in Aix Roads repeatedly since, after the 
ships were all gone up; and I have had information from 
. different pilots at different times, having been a considerable 
time upon that station. 

Q. Have you taken any survey yourself of the place, or do 
you judge from the French chart, meaning the Neptune Fran- 
coise ? 

A. I judged before the attack from the charts, and infor¬ 
mation I had received from pilots! 

Q. When did you consult the pilots to receive that infor¬ 
mation ? 

A. I had been upon that station on the blockade of Roche¬ 
fort for upwards of two years, under different commanding 
officers, and had endeavoured to make myself master of every 
part of the navigation of it, from pilots and people 1 had fallen 
in with. 

Q. Where were you when the attack was made on the 
night that the fire-ships were sent in? 


214 

A. On board my own ship, the Donegal, in Basque Roads. 

Q. Where were you on the 12th ? 

A. Mostly on board my own ship, but I was on board 
different ships, all in Basque Roads. I was on board the 
Commander in Chief’s in the course of the day, and on board 
the Pallas about one o’clock. 

Q. As you have stated in your evidence that, in your 
opinion, there was not any obstacle to prevent the small ships, 
frigates, and some ships of the line, had they been lightened 
from going in, had they kept close to the Boy art Shoal, do 
you speak of your knowledge at that time? 

A. Yes; my knowledge, as described before. I had no 
other means of acquiring knowledge : it was not certain know¬ 
ledge. 

Q. As you were on board the Caledonia, did you make 
this known to the Commander in Chief, that you were of opi¬ 
nion that, by keeping close to the Boyart Shoal, the ships 
might have gone, provided they had thrown all the stores and 
provisions overboard ? 

A. I do not know that I mentioned this to the Commander 
in Chief. The charts shewed it. The difficulty occurred in 
getting to the other anchorage under the battery. Every one 
knew there was an anchorage. The difficulty was in going 
out from the batteries. 

Q. To what draft of water do you think the line-of-battle 
ships ought to have been lightened to go in there, by getting 
rid of such portion of provisions and water as they might have 
dispensed with, leaving some small portion for the men ? 

A. If they had been lightened to twenty-two feet: every 
ship there was drawing more than tweniy-two feet; that is 
only in reference to their being caught in shoal water, where 
^ foot became of great consequence. 

Q. How did you propose to lighten them ? 

A. That must have rested with the Commander in Chief. 
I mentioned before that they were thus deep in consequence 
of having cleared the transports. 

Q. When you propose a thing, it must be supposed that 
you have some plan in your mind to remove the difficulty ? 

A. If it had been thought absolutely necessary," the provi¬ 
sions and water should have been thrown overboard, or taken 
into another ship. I only mean to say it was a greater risk 
sending in ships heavy than when light, where there might be 
shoal water. 

Q. What was the greatest depth of water you expected to 


215 

find at the distance the line-of-battle ships were to pass near 
the Boyart Shoal ? ^ 

wou ^ depend upon the distance at which they 
w< et. \y e always understood five or six r thorns were enough 
or the ship. „f you > ?nt two hundred yards, one way or 
ot ier, t ie difference .s very considerable. The large ships 
must ne essarily have passed within long shot of the batteries, 

and it would not have been prudent to have bordered too near 
upon the shoal. 

Q. is the Court do understand that your opinion relative to 
the depth of water in Aix Road, has been gained by the Nep¬ 
tune b ranco.se, communication with French pilots, and no 
other subsequent information than what you have already 
stated i / ' ■ 3 

A . I have stated exactly how I gained my information ; 
when I was in there, of course I consulted all the people who 
were there; I had no other means of gaining my infor¬ 
mation. 

Admiral Young— You were on board the Pallas? 

A. Yes; when the ships first went in. 

Q. Was that during the time of their being engaged with 
the enemy ? 

A. The Pallas did not go in with the other frigates; she 
went in very late ; I was on board, speaking to Captain Sey¬ 
mour, when the hist ship began to sail. 

President —Does your Lordship wish to propose any 
questions? 

Lord Gambier—I have no questions to put to Captain 
Malcolm. May I beg the favour to have the evidence of 
Captain Malcolm read over before any other witness is called j- 

Pr es i d e.n t—C ertainly. 

(Captain Malcolm's evidence was read over.) 

Admiral Y oung —In consequence of the reading of that 
evidence, I should wish Captain Malcolm to be called in again. 

(Captain Malcolm called in again.) 

Admiral Young —You have stated in your evidence that 
if the enemy’s ships had been attacked sooner, you think that 
they could not have warped off'their ships from the Shoal, be¬ 
cause it required the carrying out hawsers ? 

A. Yes. 

Q. Do you know whether any of the ships that did warp 
off* were at any tiitfe'within gun-shot of the ships which w r ent 
in to attack them ? 


216 

A. I can only speak from hearsay as to that—I do not know 
it—they had all shifted their births, and got further up, when 
our ships got in. 

Q. Do you mean that they had shifted their births between 
the time at which our ships were sent in, and the time at 
which you think they might have been sent in ? 

A. Yes : when I mention they might have been sent in, I 
mean with great risk to our ships, of which the Gommander in 
Chief was the best judge. 

Q. Do you recollect which of the enemy's ships were so 
moved ? 

A. Two got up the Charente ; all the rest grounded again 
on the bar at the mouth of the river : we had various reports 
of their names ; and I know we differed very much which was 
which ? 

\ l k — 4 ► - • 

Q. At what time did they move ? 

A. Between the hours of one and two—I am sure it was 
between the hours of one and two. 


Captain GEORGE BURLTON, of His Majesty’s Ship the 

Resolution, sworn. 

President —Were you in Basque Roads on the 11th of 
April, and when did you quit it ? 

A. I went in with the Commander in Chief, and quitted it 
about the 26th of April. 

Q. From the first attack upon the ships of the enemy on 
the evening of the lith of April, to the time of your leaving 
Basque Roads (according to your judgment), was every thing 
done that could be done to effect the destruction of the enemy’s 
ships ? 

A. I think there was. 

Admiral Young —From the time of the Commander in 
Chief’s arrival in Basque Road, to the time of your quitting it, 
can you state any instance of neglect, misconduct, or inat¬ 
tention to the public service, in the proceedings of the Com¬ 
mander in Chief? 

A. I know of none. 

President —Ford Gamhier, do you wish to ask any 
question of Captain Burlton ? 

Lord Gamb-iep. —No, Sir. 



217 


•• i » - ' :0 V« » •» . „ 

Captain HENRY L1DGEBIRD BALL, of his Majesty’s 

Ship the Gibraltar, sworn. 


President —When did you go into Basque Roads, and 
when did you quit it ? 

A. On the 25th of March, I believe, and left it, with the 
Hero, on the 21st of April. 


Q* 1' iom the first attach upon the ships of the enemy, on 
the evening of the 11th of April, to the time of your leaving 
Basque Roads (according to your judgment), was every thing 
done that could be done to effect the destruction of the enemy? 
ships ? J 

A. I think there was every thing done. 


o Admiral Young —From the time of your arrival in the 
Basque Roads, to the time of your quitting it, can you state 
any instance ot neglect, misconduct, or inattention to the pub¬ 
lic service, in the proceedings of the Commander in Chief? 

A. No, I cannot. 


President Hoes your Lordship wish to put any Question 
to Captain Ball ? 

Lord Gambier —No, Sir. 


Captain JAMES NEWMAN., of His Majesty’s Ship 

the Hero, sworn. 

» • - ... 

President. —When did you go into Basque Roads, and 
when did you quit it ? 

A. I went in with the Commander in Chief, and remained 
there till the 25ih of April, when 1 left it with the squadron. 

Q. From the first attack upon the ships of the enemy on 
the evening of the 11th of April, to the time of your leaving 
Basque Roads, was (according to your judgment) every thing 
done that could be done, to effect the destruction of the ene¬ 
my’s ships ? 

A. Perfectly so. 

Admiral Young —From the time of the Commander in 
Chief’s arrival in Basque Roads, to the time of your quitting 
it, can you state any instance of neglect, misconduct, or inat¬ 
tention to the public service, in the proceedings of the Com¬ 
mander iin Chief? 

A. None. From the nature of the oath I have taken, or 
even if that had not been the form of the oath, I should feel 

2 F 



218 

it necessary, if I had observed any conduct of any particular 
officer, and men, however humble their situation, to have 
mentioned it to the Court. 

President —No, that would have been improper—you 
can speak only as to the Commander in Chief-—it is only the 
conduct of the Commander in Chief this Court is called upon 
to enquire into. 

Captain Newman —Having observed some conspicuous 
conduct of the brigs, I was about to have mentioned that- 

O 7 

that is all. 


Captain WILLIAM ROBERT BROUGHTON, of His 
Majesty’s Ship the Illustrious, sworn. 

President —When did you enter Basque Roads, and when 
did you quit it ? 

A. I entered Basque Roads on the 17th of March, and 
quitted it with Captain Newman. 

Q. In your services in Basque Roads, had you any op¬ 
portunity of making observations upon the state of the ene¬ 
my’s fortifications on the Isle D’Aix ? 

A. Yes, 1 had. 

Q. Narrate what were those observations ? 

A. I was on board the Amelia when she was ordered to 
dislodge the enemy from the Boyart Shoal, and being nearly 
within gun shot of the Isle D’Aix, I observed the fortifica¬ 
tions : they appeared to me to be in a very different state to what 
I observed them when serving two or three years before under 
Sir Richard Keates : I thought they were repairing the works, 
from the quantity of rubbish that was thrown up, and 1 
counted on a semi-circular battery, which commanded the 
roadsted where the enemy lay, between fourteen and twenty 
guns, I am not positive as to the exact number—there was a 
small battery lower down, nearer the sea—I do not know the 
exact number of guns, there might be six or nine—I suppose, 
what I had before taken to be a block-house above the semi¬ 
circular battery, seemed to have no guns whatever—there ap¬ 
peared to be loop-holes in the upper part for musquetry, I 
suppose: it appeared to be a barrack for containing the guard. 
I thought, from this observation, that the fortifications of the 
island, at least in that part, were not so strong as we sup¬ 
posed ; and I reported my opinion to that effect to Lord 
Gambier. 



2\9 

Admiral Sutton —Do you recollect, from seeing the lo^, 
what day this was ? 

A. I am pretty certain it was the 1st of April. 

President —Are those the only guns you observed upon 
Isle D Aix, that could bear upon the anchoracre near that 
island > ' 

A. 7 hose were all that I observed-—there might be more. 

Q. Did you notice any furnaces for heating shot ? 

A. No, I did not. 

Q. Do you know whether there were any mortar batteries 
on the Isle D’Aix ? 

A. Only subsequently from their throwing shells ; but it 
was supposed so at the time. 

Q. Did it appear to you that the enemy was constructing; 
new works in front of the old ones, and nearer to the sea ? 

A. It appeared to me that they were repairing and improv¬ 
ing the old works. 

Q. Did it appear to you, that the heaps of rubbish which 
you saw, were the remains of works that had been destroyed, 
or collected there for the purpose of constructing new works? 

A. 1 think that the rubbish was the remains of the old 
works that had been taken down. 

Q. Did you see any other cannon besides those you have 
stated ? 

A. O, dear, yes ; the whole of the island appeared to be 
defended. I only spoke of those which appeared to bear 
upon the anchorage of Aix Road, and commanded the en¬ 
trance. 

President —Would your Lordship wish to ask any ques¬ 
tions upon this subject ? 

Lord Gambier—1 would wish Captain Broughton to 
point out, in the chart, the situation of the Amelia, when he 
was on board her, and made those observations ? 

A. The south point of Isle D’Aix was just shut in with 
Fouras Castle,and I think the bearing was nearly S.E. and by E. 
when it was open; when it was touching the point, we were 
just out of gun-shot from both sides—they fired at us from 
both sides, but the shot did not reach us. 

Q. Could you ascertain, from your position, the number 
of o'uns or mortars on the south and south-east side of the 

Fort? 

A. No, certainly not in the south-east part, except in 
part as far as the semi-circular battery went. 

President —If you are correct in the bearings you have 

2 F 2 


220 

given, there might be a vast number of guns which might 
annoy the Road of Aix? 

A. Yes, there might. 

Q. From the first, attack on the ships of the enemy, on the 
evening of the 11th of April, to the time of your leaving Basque 
Roads (according to your judgment), was every thing done 
that could be done to effect the destruction of the enemy’s 
ships ? 

A. I think it would have been more advantageous, if the 
line-of-battle ships, frigates, and small vessels, had gone in at 
half flood, which I take to be about 11 o’clock, or between 
11 and 12, I suppose. 

Q. Were there two line-of-battle ships remaining at anchor 
in Aix Roads ? 

A. Yes, there were—these memoranda were written at the 
time, to which I suppose there is no objection to my refer¬ 
ring—there were nine sail on shore, with the frigates—the 
Rear-Admiral and Commodore remained at their anchorage. 

Q. Did you take notice of the position of the French three- 
decker when she was on-shore ? 

A. Yes, I did. 

Q. At wbcit time did the two ships that remained at anchor, 
remove to the entrance of theCharente ? 

A. I cannot speak positively as to time; but it was soon 
after noon that the French Admiral, and two more, got off, 
and moved towards the Charente. I beg pardon ; 1 was 
thinking of the ships that were on shore ; the two ships at 
anchor went first. 

Q. Do you mean to include the three- decker as one that 
went away ? 

A. Yes. As far as my recollection goes, the French Ad¬ 
miral, and two more, got off’, and made sail towards the river, 
very soon after the two that were afloat. 

Q. By the French Admiral, do you mean the Ocean ? 

A. Yes. 

Q. As the two ships that remained at anchor did not change 
their situation till after it was noon, and the Ocean continued 
in her position till about the same time, if the British ships 
had been ordered in at 11 o’clock, which you thought would 
have been the proper time ?- 

A. I would rather say between 11 and 12 o’clock, and 
which, in my judgment, was more advantageous. ] do not 
pretend to put my judgment in competition with Lord 
Gambier’s. 


i 



221 

Q ; A\ ould not the ships so sent in, have been exposed to 
the fire of the two ships that remained at anchor, the French 

Admiral’s ship, and the batteries of the Isle D’Aix, at the same 
time ? 

/I. C ertainly ; but I conceived they were partly panick- 
struck, and, on the appearance of a force coming in, might 
have been induced to cut their cables, and try to° make tlieir 
escape up the river. 

Q. Jn the event of their proving not to have been so panicle- 
struck, and of their having defended themselves, aided by the 
batteries on shore, are you of opinion that the British ships 
must have suffered greatly on the occasion ? 

A. I think they would have suffered ; but that a ship or two 
might have been placed, in r my opinion, against the batteries 
on the southern part of Isle D’Aix, so as to "take off their fire, 
and silence them. I mentioned to Sir Harry Neale, on board 
the Caledonia, when the signal was made for all Captains in 
the morning, that I thought they were attackable—speaking 
of the confused state in which the French ships appeared to 
be at the time. 

Q. How near can ships of the line approach the batteries 
upon the Isle D’Aix, on that part where you would have re¬ 
commended an attack ? 

A. Judging, by the chart, I should suppose very close—1 
should suppose about two cables lengths. 

Q. If ships had been so brought up against the batteries on 
the Isle D’Aix, and it should have happened that they met 
with such damages, from the attempt, as to render it neces¬ 
sary to withdraw them (and such a case naturally implies 
damages in masts and figging); where, considering the strength 
and direction of the wind at that time, could these ships have 
retired to ? 

A. I think, as the wind was north-westerly and northerly, 
they might have found a safe anchorage and protection in 
what is called, in the French chart, which I had on board, 
D’Grand Trousse, particularly where the Aigle afterwards 
lay, where there is thirty or forty feet of water out of range 
of shot or shells in any direction. 

Q. Do you think that ships, having been subjected to the 
fire of batteries on shore from the Isle D’Aix, at the distance 
of two or three cables length, and finding a necessity to retire 
from these batteries, could possibly be in a condition with re¬ 
spect to masts, yards, and sails, with a strong northerly wind 
and lee tide, to fetch the anchorage, you have described, from 
the Isle D’Aix, without driving upon the Palles Shoal? 

A. It would depend upon circumstances. I conceive the 
possibility of the- batteries being silenced. 


222 

» 

Admiral Douglas —That question supposes the batteries 
were not silenced. 

President. —I say, there being a necessity to retire from 
the batteries; there could not be a necessity for retiring, if they 
were silenced ? 

A. It would depend upon circumstances—there would be 
slack water about two o’clock, or between two and three (it 
cannot be supposed that the action would be over in a moment) 
with die wind moderate, for the wind was moderating fast at 
that time—in the morning the)^ would be able to reach that 
anchorage, in my opinion. 

Q. In a crippled state ? 

A. Yes, in a crippled state-—I only speak as to the con¬ 
viction in my mind of the possibility of silencing the batteries, 
—not going to the above consequences. 

Q. Are we to understand, then, that you would have re¬ 
commended the measure of sending ships in against the bat¬ 
teries in the Isle D’Aix, upon a presumption that the batte¬ 
ries must be silenced, without adverting to what would befall 
the ships, in case they should not be silenced ? 

A. I did not give it that consideration at the time—I only 
speak to my opinion that I conceived it was practicable to 
acquiie that anchorage, although disabled; and I heard my 
Lord Gambier the same morning state, it had been his inten¬ 
tion to have gone against the batteries I now speak of, with 
the Caledonia and some other ship ; but as the enemy were 
on shore, he did not think it necessary to run any unnecessary 
risk of the fleet, when the'object of their destruction seemed 
to be already obtained. 

Q. Did you, on the 12th of April, know of the safe an¬ 
chorage you have now described for line-of-battle ships, out 
of the range of shot and shell? 

O ^ 

A. Only by the French charts, and which, from having 
been long accustomed to use, I imagined were correct. 

Q. Had you a French pilot on board ? 

A. Yes. 

Q. Did he state to you that the soundings on the chart were 
correct ? 

A. He had never been in, except in a chasse maree—he said 
he was not acquainted with the nature of the ground in Isle 
D’Aix Hoads—my conjecture of this being a proper anchor¬ 
age for ships, arose from a conversation I had with my brother 
officers, that should Lord Gambier think of attacking the 
enemy in the situation in which they were when we first came 
into Basque Roads, and in case of being materially damaged 


2S3 


believeH X haZard ° US , Und l rtakin °> if the cha,ts to be 

believed, there appeared to be water enough in that position. 

Q. Do you know that, from the anchorage in Aix Road to 
tne anchorage you have just now described, there is any shoaler 
water between the Boyart and the Patles Shoal; I mean in the 
entrance to this anchorage, that there is a bar goes across ? 

, , ° > ' ‘ ,0 not know any thing of it, whether there is or 

»°t. 1 sounded from the wreck of the Varsovie to that an- 

chorage, and found no shoal there. 


President—T hat is not the place; it is marked in some 
ol the charts that between the Boyart and thedail of the Palles 
there is a bar ? 

A. I sounded as I came in from the fleet, but I did not find 
out any bar. 


Q. y ou have spoken of conversations you had relative to 
attacking the enemy’s ships at their anchorage near the Isle 
_ Aix by the British squadron—Had you commanded the 
British squadron, the enemy’s ships being moored in two 
close and compact lines, supported by (he batteries of the Isle 
Aix, and without any other knowledge of the soundings in 
trie vicinity of that anchorage than was possessed by the fleet 
previous to the attack upon them by the fire-ships, would you 
have gone in with the squadron to have attacked them in that 
position ? 

A. Most certainly not: I only mention my knowledge of 
the anchorage to have arisen on our first arrival, in case there 
was a possibility of such an event taking place, which nobody 
believed ever would take place, there could be no prospect of 
any success attending it. 


Q. After the two ships which remained at anchor had got 
into the entrance of the Chareute, and the Ocean and other 
French ships which got off* the Palles had obtained the same 
situation, do you know if any practicable attempt for destroy¬ 
ing them was omitted to be carried into execution ? 

A. I was not in shore, and therefore cannot pretend to say. 
The Commander in Chief appeared to me to have sent them 
every assistance they could possibly require to effect their 
destruction. 

Admiral ^oung —How many ships of the line did vou 
think would have been sufficient to silence the batteries of 

Isle D’Aix ? 

A. I should think two would be quite sufficient. 

Q. How many would you have thought it necessary to send 
into the Road of Aix to attack the ships ? 

A. I should think five or six ships of the line of the least 
draught of water. 




/ 


094 

V V 1 

Q. If two line-of-battle ships had been sent against the 
batteries of Aix, and five to attack the ships in the Road, must 
it not, according to the common circumstances attending 
actions, have happened that several of those ships would have 
been disabled, and many men killed and wounded ? 

A. I should think by the batteries there would ; but I con¬ 
jecture that the discomfited French squadron would have 
made very little resistance. 

, « f , » ; f j ; ’V *’ I 

Q. As an attack, not proper in itself, should never be made 
on the mere conjecture that the enemy will not resist,— (I do 
not mean to insinuate that the attack you propose would not 
have been proper)—what would probably have happened to 
the ships if the enemy had resisted ? 

A. It is impossible to foresee what might have happened ; 
but from the situation in which the enemy were, not having 
recovered their fright of the night before, I think the loss 
would have been very little, as few of their ships were in a 
situation to fight their guns. 

O O 

, ♦ • f , 

Q. Do you know whether the five or six ships, which you 
proposed to send to attack the enemy’s ships, would, or would 
not have been exposed to the fire of other batteries on the Isle 
D’Aix, besides those which you proposed to attack bv the two 
ships ? 

A. From the view I had of the island and its batteries, 
when in shore, I should think they would not. I speak of 
subsequent knowledge, when I was on board the Aigle. 

Q. Information you have acquired since? 

A. Yes. 

President —Does your Lordship wish to ask any ques¬ 
tions ? 

Lord Gambier— No. I have none to ask of Captain 
Broughton. 

President —Lord Gambier, is it your wish to call any 
other witness ? 

Lord Gambier —I should wish Captain Kerr might be 
questioned as to his opinion of the effect of the batteries on the 
Isle of Aix, as he passed out in the Revenge. 

^ President —Your Lordship will recollect that Captain 
Kerr was pretty closely examined upon that point this morning. 


Captain KERR called in again. 

Examined by Lord Gambier . 

Q. In the course of your evidence you have stated that your 
ship received considerable damage from the batteries of Isle 



225 

D’Aix. in passing out; T desire you will state what, from your 
experience ot the effect ot the batteries, would have been the 
fate of the Revenge and any other seventy-four gun-ship, had 
they been anchored within two or three cables’ length, with 
a view of engaging those batteries until you had silenced them ? 

A. 1 should certainly have expected, from the heavy fire 
they kept up, both in going in and coming out, that ships 
anchored there must have been completely dismasted, and 
suffered a severe loss of men. 

. / 

Q. What would have been the probable fate of those ships 
so disabled with the wind blowing from the northward, as it 
did on the 12th of April ? 

A. If dismasted, they would in all probability, and indeed 
must have been lost. 

President— If ships so sent in to attack the batteries in 
the Isle D’Aix did not, from the strength of the enemy’s 
works and the resolution of those who defended them, suc¬ 
ceed in silencing the batteries, and found it indispensably 
necessary to retire from before them, could they, in a crippled 
state, with the wind blowing fresh at N.N.W. have got to 
the anchorage latterly taken up by the Imperieuse, Pallas, and 
Aigle under such circumstances > 

A. If a vessel so situated had lost her fore-mast, she cer¬ 
tainly could not have got before the wind; and without that, 
and having good way, so as to have been perfectly under 
command, she must have drifted to the southward and east¬ 
ward, which would have taken her up the Charente or upon 
the Palles. 

Admiral Young— Did you observe the batteries on the 
south end of the Isle of Aix? 

A. I did not make particular observations. The officers 
reported to me that they saw a number of guns on the S.W. 
side, and I saw a number of guns. 

Q. Is the battery you saw near the water’s edge, or at a 
distance from it ? 

A. Not any very great distance. It is not close to the 
water’s edge ; but the guns would have borne upon any 
ship within a cable’s length of it. 

Admiral Sutton— Were they covered works? 

A. W~hat I saw were not covered. There were different 
tiers of guns ; not one battery immediately over another, but 
at different heights. 

2 G 


I 


226 

Admiral Young —Was the battery low enough to admit 
of its being destroyed by the guns from ships ? 

A. On the south side I think not. On the south-west 
side the guns from the ships would have borne on the 

Q. Did you see any other batteries on the Isle of Aix that 
would have borne on ships sent in to attack the enemy ? 

A. None but those immediately connected with the works ; 
altogether it was one continued chain of works connected with 
the fortifications of the Island, extending from the western 
round to the southern side of the Island ; as the guns never 
ceased to act upon the Revenge during the whole time from 
her going in till her coming out again : during the whole 
time of her being in Aix the guns continued to play upon 
her. 

Q. Did you receive any orders from the Commander in 
Chief before the ships weighed from the outer anchorage 
in Basque Roads on the morning of the 12th of April ? 

A. I did. I received the Commander in Chief’s order at 
nine in the morning to anchor close down upon the Boyart 
Shoal within shell range, to be prepared and ready to go 
in, as I might be able to prevent the enemy’s ships warp¬ 
ing off. 

Q. Did you, at any time in the course of that morning, 
receive any orders contradictory to those? 

A. None whatever. 

Q. Did you understand that those orders authorised you 
to do whatever, in your discretion and according to the best 
of your judgment, you should think would prevent the ene¬ 
my from warping off? 

A. I did not think those orders authorised me to move 
the ship; and I considered myself particularly under the 
orders of Captain Bligh, who was likewise sent down there. 
On anchoring, I waited on him to know if the situation the 
Revenge had taken was what he thought right, and likewise to 
state that the pilot would not take charge of the ship further. 


Captain BLIGH called in again. 

Admiral Young —Did you receive any orders from the 
Commander in Chief previous to the moving of the fleet from 
the outer to the inner anchorage in Basque Roads, on the morn¬ 
ing of the 12th of April ? 

A. I received orders from the Commander in Chief that 
morning, about eight o’clock, to proceed with the Valiant, and 



\ 


l 




anchor close to the Boyart Shoal 
range of shell from the Isle D’A 


» a nd not to mind being within 
ix. 


Q. Were yon directed to anchor there for any purpose? 

A. Yes. To be ready to support the smaller vessels in the 
advance. 


Q. Did you think that order authorised you to use your dis¬ 
ci etion and judgment in the mode of supporting the smaller 
vessels, and to move your ship for that purpose? 

A. I did not think by that order that I was at liberty to move 
irom the anchorage without further order from the Comman¬ 
der in Chief. 

President My Lord Gambier, it is not the intention of 
the Couit to make any further examination of witnesses. 
There was something which you submitted to the Court yester¬ 
day, which it was deemed expedient to defer entering on the 
Minutes. If, in consequence of what has since been stated to 
the Court, your Lordship should be desirous of making any ad¬ 
dition to it, we are ready to wait any time for the delivery of it, 
which your Lordship may wish. 

Lord Gambier —If the Court will indulge me with a quar¬ 
tet of an hour to consider whether I shall add any thing further, 
that will be quite sufficient. 

President —It is now late in the day ; it will be impossible 
to arrange every thing finally to-day. I should doubt, there¬ 
fore, whether it would not be as well to adjourn till to-morrow 
morning, when you may make any observation you chuse to 
make to the Court. If you are desirous rather of giving it 
in to day you can retire for a short time to the upper apart¬ 
ment; but if you have the least wish, I will, with the greatest 
pleasure, propose to the Court to adjourn till to-morrow 
morning. 

Loud Gambier —If it is agreeable to the Court, I should 
wish what I submitted yesterday to stand in the Minutes of yes¬ 
terday ; and if I have any thing to add, I will deliver it in to¬ 
morrow morning. 

President —Will that be more consonant with your Lord¬ 
ship’s wishes, than to proceed immediately ? 

Lord Gambier —If you please, as the Court cannot finish 
the whole to day. 

Adjourned till to-morrow. 


2 G 2 


228 


« * 

NINTH DAY, 

', f * f 9 

Friday, August 4, 1809. 


Lord Gam bier —Mr. President, I closed my evi¬ 
dence on Wednesday, in the full persuasion that having 
established every part of my Defence, it was unnecessary 
for me to examine further witnesses, tile more especially 
as I had called all the officers who were in Aix Roads, 
and had been actively engaged in the attack on the ene¬ 
my. Their testimony would, I conceived, be more ac¬ 
ceptable to the Court than that of other witnesses deriv¬ 
ing their knowledge from subsequent information. 

The Court, however, in the exercise of its discretion, 
thought proper to call all the remaining witnesses; and 
I heartily rejoice, that nothing has been omitted to 
render the enquiry most complete. It is with no incon¬ 
siderable degree of satisfaction that I find, in their depo¬ 
sitions, testimony equally honourable to me with that ot 
the officers• before examined. 

Some positions laid down by two of these witnesses, 
have been so completely refuted by other evidence 
brought forward, that I feel myself the more confirmed 
in my opinion, that the measures I pursued for the attack 
of the enemy were those best calculated for the advan¬ 
tageous attainment of the object in view. 


The Right Honourable LORD COCHRANE called in. 

President —Lord Cochrane, I have received the note which 
you addressed to me, and have taken the sense of the Court up¬ 
on it. The decision of the Court is, that as the matter, to 
which your Lordship refers, does not at all bear upon the trial 
of Lord Gambier, they cannot enter into it. 

Lord Cochrane — I would request, Sir, that that letter may 
appear as an official letter to you, and that it may be entered 
upon the Minutes. 




229 


President —The Court will take that into their consider¬ 
ation. 

The Court was cleared. 

The Court was re-opened at one o'clock. 

President— Lord Cochrane, the Court have taken into 
their consideration the note you addressed to them, and have 
agreed that it shall be attached to the Minutes. 

The Letter was read , and is as follows : 


“ Sir, “ August, 4, I8O9. 

44 Having learnt from my brother officers that a report has 
gone abroad, that 1 censured, in general terms, the conduct of 
the officers employed in the Road of Aix, on the 12th of April, 
I wish to have an opportunity to declare the truth, on o- ffi; con¬ 
sidering reports of that nature highly injurious to the service of our 
country. I am also desirous to lay before the Court the or¬ 
ders given to the fire-ships for their guidance, as these will tend 
to elucidate and clear some of those who consider that blame 
has been imputed to them. 

44 I have the honour to be, Sir, 

“ Your most obedient humble servant, 

44 COCHRANE.” 

44 Admiral Sir Roger Curtis , President .” 

I ' i ,f»i , > fy , r ,• ( 

The Judge Advocate read the Sentence of the Court 
as follows:— 

At a Court Martial, assembled on board His 
Majesty’s ship Gladiator, in Portsmouth 
Harbour, on the 26th day of July, 1809, and 
continued, by adjournment, from clay to day 
(Sunday excepted), until the 4th day of 
August, 1809? 

PRESENT, 


Sir ROGER CURTIS, Bart. Admiral of the White, and Com¬ 
mander in Chief of Ilis Majesty’s Ships and Vessels at Spit- 
head, and in Portsmouth Harbour, President, 


Wm. Young, Esq. Admiral of 
the Blue. 

Sir H. E. Stanhope, Bart. 
Vice Admiral of the White. 

G. Campbell, Esq. Vice Ad¬ 
miral of the Blue. 

Captain John Irwin. 
-E. S. Dickson. 


Sir J. T. Duckworth, K.B. 

Vice Admiral of the Red. 
Billy Douglas, Esq. Vice 
Admiral of the White. 

John Sutton, Esq. Rear Ad¬ 
miral of the Red. 

Captain Robert Hall. 

■ . R. D. Dunn. 




250 

Pursuant to an Order from the Right Honourable 
Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, dated the 5th 
Day of June last, and directed to the President, setting 
forth, that Admiral the Right Honourable Lord Gambier 
had, by his letter to their Lordships’ Secretary of 
the 30th of May, 1809, requested that his conduct, as 
Commander in Chief of the Channel Fleet, employed in 
Basque Roads, between the 17th day of March and the 
29th day of April, 1809, might be enquired into by a 
Court Martial; and that by the log-books and minutes 
of signals of the Caledonia, Imperieuse, and other ships, 
employed on that service, it appeared to them, that the 
said Admiral Lord Gambier, on the 12th day of the said 
month of April, the enemy’s ships being then on shore, 
and the signal having been made that they could be de¬ 
stroyed, did, for a considerable time, neglect or delay tak¬ 
ing effectual measures for destroying them: and they, 
therefore, in compliance with his Lordship’s request, and 
in consequence of what appeared in the said log¬ 
books and minutes of signals, thought fit that a Court 
Martial should be assembled for the purpose of ex¬ 
amining into his Lordship’s conduct, and trying him 
for the same—the Court proceeded to try the said 
Admiral the Right Honourable Lord Gambier for 
his conduct in the instance hereinbefore mentioned, 
and also to enquire into his whole conduct and pro¬ 
ceedings as Commander in Chief of the Channel Fleet 
employed in Basque Roads, between the said 17th day 
of March and the 29th day of April, 1809, and to try 
him for the same accordingly: And having heard the 
evidence produced in support of the charge, and by the 
said Right Honourable Lord Gambier in his defence, and 
what his Lordship had to allege in support thereof ; and 
having maturely and deliberately weighed and consider¬ 
ed the whole, the Court is of opinion, that the charge, 


231 

That the said Admiral the Right Honourable Lord 
4 Gambier, on the 12th day of the said month of April, 
the enemy s ships being then on shore, and the signal 
having been made, that they could be destroyed, did, 
for a considerable time, neglect, or delay, taking effec- 
“ tual measures for destroying them,”—has not been 
proved against the said Admiral the Right Honourable 
Lord Gambier; but that his Lordship’s conduct on that 
occasion, as well as his general conduct and proceedings 
as Commander in Chief of the Channel Fleet employed 
in Basque Roads, between the said 17th day of March 
and the 29th day of April, 1809, was marked by Zeal, 
Judgment, Aeility, and an anxious Attention to the 
Welfare of His Majesty’s service, and doth adjudge him 
to be MOST HONOURABLY ACQUITTED ; and 
the said Admiral the Right Honourable Lord Gambier is 
hereby most honourably acquitted accordingly. 


(Signed) ROGER CURTIS, 

W. YOUNG, 

J. T. DUCKWORTH, 
H. E. STANHOPE, 

B. DOUGLAS, 

G. CAMPBELL, 

JOHN SUTTON, 
JOHN IRWIN, 
ROBERT HALL, 

E. S. DICKSON, 

R. D. DUNN. 

M. GREETHAM, Jun. 

Deputy Judge Advocate of the Fleet. 


939 

President —Hand me up my Lord Gambier’ s sword, 

■ i r» . . .f #||Q f . -' t fin 

It was handed to the President. 

President —Admiral Lord Gambier, I have peculiar 
pleasure in receiving the command of the Court to re¬ 
turn you your sword, in the fullest, conviction that (as 
you have hitherto done) you will, on all future occasions, 
use it for the honour and advantage of your country, and 
to your own personal honour. Having so far obeyed the 
command of the Court, I beg you will permit me, in my 
individual capacity, to express to you the high gratifica¬ 
tion I have upon this occasion. 

Lord Gambier — I cannot sufficiently express the 
sense I feel of the patient attention of the Court; and beg 
to return thanks to you, sir, for the obliging manner in 
which you have conveyed to me their sentiments. 



APPENDIX, 






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APPENDIX, 

No. r. 


IMPERIEUSE’s LOG-BOOK, 

AS PROVED BY HER MASTER, 

MR. SPURLING. 


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6 


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10 


APPENDIX,—No. I. 


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APPENDIX, 

No. II. 


IMPERTEUSE’s LOG-BOOK, 


Received from Lord Cochrane, and delivered 31st July, 1809, 

into Court by Lord Gambier. 

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16 


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85 


APPENDIX, 
No. IV. 


TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH. 


Road of the Isle of Ah', on hoard the ship Ocean , 10 th April, 1809, 
Zacharie Jacques Theodore Allemand, Vice Admiral, 
Officer of the Legion of Honour, Commander in Chief of one of 
the Naval Armies of his Majesty the Emperor and King, orders 
the folloxoing Dispositions, viz. 


FIRST DIVISION. 

The pinnace of the Cassard. 
The long boat of the Ocean. 
The long boat of the Patriote. 
The long boat of the Jemappe. 
The large yawl of the Foudroy- 
ant. 

The ditto of the Calcutta. 

The 2d ditto of the Varsovie 
'1'he 2d ditto of the Aquilon. 
The large ya\H of the Elbe. 

The 3d ditto of the Cassard. 
The 3d ditto of the Tourville. 
The 3d ditto of thelndienne. 
The 4th ditto of the Tonnerre. 
The 5th ditto of the Regular,. 

SECOND DIVISION. 

The pinnace of the ocean. 

The long boat of the Foudroy- 
ant. 

The ditto of the Tonnerre. 

The ditto of the Indienne. 

The large yawl of the Aquilon. 
The ditto of the Ocean. 

'The ditto of the Pallas. 

The ditto of the Hortense. 

The 2d yawl of the Jemappe. 
The 2d ditto of the Calcutta. 
The 3d ditto of the Varsovie. 
The 3d ditto of the Patriote. 

The 4th ditto of the Regulus. 
The 4th ditto of the Elbe. 

The 5th ditto of the Foudrovant. 


THIRD DIVISION. 

The pinnace of theFoudroyant. 
The long boat of the Varsovie. 
The long boat of the Aquilon. 
The large yawl of the Cassard. 
The ditto of the Regulus. 

The ditto of the Jemappe. 

The 2d yawl of the Tourville. 
The 2d ditto of the Foudrovant. 
The 2d ditto of the Elbe. 

The 2(1 ditto of the Pallas. 

The 3d ditto of the Calcutta. 
The 3d ditto of the Hortense. 
The 4th ditto of the Ocean. 

The 4th ditto of the Patriote. 
The 5th ditto of the Tonnerre 

FOURTH DIVISION. 

The long boat of the Cassard. 
The long boat of the Regulus. 
The large yawl of the Tourville. 
The ditto of the Varsovie. 

The 2d ditto of the Tonnerre. 
The 2d ditto of the Patriote. 

The 2d ditto of the Ocean. 

The 2d ditto of the Indienne. 
The 3d ditto of the Regulus. 

The 3d ditto of the Jemappe. 
The 3d ditto of the Eibe. 

The Sd ditto of the Tonnerre. 
The 4th ditto of the Aquilon. 
The 4th ditto of the Foudroy- 
ant. 


I 




36 


9 


APPENDIX,—No. IV. 

fifth division. The 2d yawl of the Horfense. 

The long boat of the Tourville. r F1 1 e 3d ditto of the Aquilon. 

The long boat of the Calcutta. The 3d ditto ot the Ocean. 

The large yawl of theTonnerre. The 3d ditto of the Foudroyant. 
The ditto of the Patriote. The 4th ditto of the .Temappe. 

The ditto of the Indienne. The 4th ditto of the Varsovie. 

The 2d ditto of the Regulus. The 5th ditto of the Ocean. 

The 2d ditto of the Cassard. The 6th ditto of the Foudroyant. 

The yawls take the No. I, 2, 3, &c. according to their rank 
and size. 

The pinnaces shall be commanded by an Enseigne de Vaisseau 
and a Midshipman. 

The long boat by a Lieutenant, an Enseigne, and a Mid¬ 
shipman. 

The large yawls by an Enseigne and a Midshipman. 

The others by a Midshipman, taken by preference from among 
those of the first class, who shall have due of the second class 
under their orders. 

When a division shall be detached, it shall be commanded by 
the eldest Officer. 

When two divisions shall be detached, they shall be com¬ 
manded by the eldest Lieutenant of the two divisions. 

If three divisions should be detached, they shall be commanded 
by one of the Captains of a frigate, as a Lieutenant of a man of 
war. In this case he shall embark without waiting for orders, 
according to his degree of standing. This service of honour 
shall commence from the head. It shall be the same when the 
whole flotilla shall depart. 

If by an unforeseen event, the five divisions should have orders 
to go out, the Captains shall keep their two last yawls, which 
in case of need, shall serve for a reserve, and shall depart when 
the Admiral shall hoist the flag, sixteen for the first reserve, and 
twenty for the second. 

The officer commanding one or more divisions, shall carry 
his flag at the main point of his embarkation on the starboard 
side, or at the main mast; he shall always go on board one of the 
good sailers. 

In case of a chase, the best sailers shall harrass the enemy 
without engaging imprudently with too superior a force. 

They shall approach the Commodore, when he shall make the 
signal'for it, by a broad pendant at the end of a gaff or at the 
foremast-head. 

If the embarkations are obliged to retreat, the best sailers shall 
take the worst in tow, * 

The Commodore shall never expose the division so incon- * 
siderately, as to be under the necessity of making the signal for 
dispersing, which shall be a flag at the end of a long pole, or at 
the foremast-head. 

Those who command an embarkation shall bear in mind that, 
although it is to their honour to display much courage in an 


\ 


APPENDIX,—No. IV. 37 

action, they are not to expose themselves to evident loss by their 
own fault. 

The signal for the order of battle, if close behind one another, 
shall be a broad pendant over a flag, on the same pole or the 
same mast. This order shall always be formed according to the 
degree of swiftness, taking care as much as possible to put a 
strong embarkation between the two weaker ones. 

The signal to chase without observing order, shall be by a fla£ 
above a broad pendant on the same pole or the same mast. ’Tis 
then there shall be the contest of honour to reach the enemy 
first, observing always the signals of the Commodore in order to 
comply with them immediately. 

If any of the Boats of the flotilla should approach the shore in 
the night, they shall make themselves known by a fire on the 
even days, and two fires on the odd days. 

The embarkations on departing on an expedition, shall always 
be provided with two barrels, containing each two-thirds water, 
and one-third wine, which shall be taken from the savings arising 
from retrenchments. They shall likewise have their stock of 
grapnels, t owlines, masts. They shall not put up the last but 
when they cun make an advantageous use of them, but never in 
a calm or fn the wind’s eve. 

When the sea runs high, or it blows too hard, those em¬ 
barkations only shall be employed, which are very capable of 
navigating, and the long boats shall then carry a piece of artil¬ 
lery suitable to the circumstances. 

When it blows, the schooner shall go to the support of the 
divisions, but she shall not expose herself to be becalmed in the 
offing, particularly if the currents oppose her coming in again. 

When the Admiral intends to .send out one or several divisions, 
he shall make it known by one of the articles 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12, 
in the list of particular orders, when at anchor without the 
broad pendant six. He shall also give the signal for the point 
of the compass to which he wishes them to direct their course. 

The commanders of the yawls shall attentively observe the 
Admiral's signals, who shall recall one division by its number, 
and the large American flag at the mast-head, and all the divi¬ 
sions by the large American flag only at the mast-head. If the 
Admiral after having recalled, should be desirous to have them 
return the way they came, he shall place a broad pendant at the 
mast head, until he no longer replaces the large American flag, 
which shall recall them anew to their several stations. 

In the night he will let off two fusees. These signals shall be 
obeyed immediately, but in re-entering with 6rder. 

When the Admiral is desirous that one or more divisions 
should rendezvous at the boom, he shall make the signal for it at 
sun-set, bv the articles 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12, above described, and 
he shall add thereto the signal for the hour at which they repair 
thither. ' 

Each embarkation shall take post, the length of the boom 
having a mooring there for their North West and their grapnels 
in the South East. The oars shall be shipped, the guns and 


58 APPENDIX,—No. IV. 

swivels ready to discharge, two matches lighted, and the soldiers 
who shall go on board, provided with their firelocks and sufficient 
ammunition. 

The present shall be read to the principal officers and mid¬ 
shipmen extraordinarily assembled in the great cabin, and they 
shall take a note thereof in writing. It will be proper likewise, 
that the masters should know the signals the Commodore may 
make, and particularly those of the Admiral for calling in, caus¬ 
ing to return, or recalling the division anew. 

(For Copy) 

The Adjutant of the Army, 

(Signed) GASP d DUPOEY. 






\ 


30 


POSTSCRIPT. 

I 


It will have been seen by the foregoing accurate 
detail of the proceedings on this Trial, that the most 
strict scrutiny of the conduct of the Commander in Chief 
took place, for the whole of the period to which the 
Inquiry w r as directed. The questions put by the Court 
to the numerous witnesses, including all tire Command¬ 
ing Officers of the fleet, and some of the most intelligent 
Masters in his Majesty’s navy, appear to have been 
framed with such sedulous anxiety to do justice to the 
country, that, whilst they have had the effect of obtaining 
for Lord Gambler so many unqualified testimonials in 
refutation of the charge preferred against him, they could 
not fail to have brought to public view every circum¬ 
stance of delay, neglect, or misconduct, had even the 
slightest occurred, during any part of his Lordship’s 
command in Basque Roads. 


If 


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C. SQUIRE, Printer, Fui'nival’s-Inn-Court, London. 






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